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....•;ji  conclusion ie in direct contradiction to the  original 
idea with  which I   stafcted.     Starting from unlimited  freedom, 
I  arrived   at unlimited  despotism....     (I) propose as a final 
soluti-n  of  the   problem to    divide  humanity  into two unequal 
parts.     One-tenth is to be  granted  absolute freedom end 
unrestricted  powers over the  remaining nine-tenths.     Those 
must give up their  individuality and   be turned  into something 
like a  herd,  and   by  their boundless  obedience will  by  a  series 
of  re  enerotions attain a  state of primeval inr.ocence,   some- 
thing like the  originel  paradise.     They  will  have to work, 
however....     What I'm offering you is  not odious  suggestions, 
but paradise,   paradise  on earth; for there con be no other 
one  on earth. 
Shigalyov 
in 
The Devils 
by 
Fycdor Doatoyevsky 
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INTRODUCTION 
. 
Revolutionary conspiracies,  abortive and successful,   have stirred 
man's mind since the bejinnin;s of governments.     Theorizin ; on the 
nature of political dictatorship goes back at least to Plato.     It is 
the ideolojical linking of these two  activities—the plot of a  "revolu- 
tionary"  party to overthrow an existing government,  and the •stablish- 
ment of a  "dictatorship"  by that party in the aftermath of the revolu- 
tion—,   within  the framework of the Revolutionary Populist movement in 
Russia in  the 1860's and 1870's that constitutes  the thesis of this 
paper. 
The French Revolution,   with its  Jacobin Terror  (1793-^) and the 
"Conspiracy of Equals" of  iracchus  Babeuf (1796),  offers  the most con- 
venient  starting point for modern historical research into  revolution- 
ary dictatorships and secret society activity.     It is conclusively 
established by the writings of Russian revolutionary figures that the 
revolutionary events in Prance in the 1790* s,  1830's,   and lS^+O's  share 
priority with the Russian peasant rebellions of Stenka Razin  (l;'>70-l) 
and Emelyan Pugachev  (1773-5) in the influence exerted upon the youn ; 
radicals of nineteenth century Russia. 
These influences,  at any rate,   served as a body of accessible 
source material  for the Russian  student generally interested in revolu- 
tionary tendencies.     It is one definite strain of the French revolution- 
ary tradition,   however,   that the theory and tactics of revolutionary 
^■It is curious  to  equate these two  influences,  but inasmuch as 
Socialism in Russia  prior to  the 1890*s came under the epithet of 
"peasant  socialism,"  it was fittin;  that the purely peasant uprisings 
took their place beside the purely proletarian movements of ifestern 
socialism.     Pu^achev*s rebellion,   especially received much attention, 
even  from the Russian  "Westernizersj"  3akunin used him in his pamphlet 
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dictatorship  took shape for a few of the extreme left Russian radicals. 
Auguste HLanqui  (1305-81) a French carbonarist and a leading partici- 
pant in the revolutions of 1830,  1848,   and the  Commune of 1871,   who 
spent over half his life in French prisons,   save his name to a political 
idea  which has  survived within the ranks of the French left wing until 
the present.        "HLanquism"  is,  as V.  Varlamov quotes from the Istoriya 
S.S.S.R:     (History of the U.S.S.R),  Moscow,  19^9,   "'a conspiracy by a 
revolutionary minority with the aim of seizin;; power.'"-'    HLanqui him- 
self in 1848 called it a  "Parisian dictatorship,"  emphasizing the 
necessity for powerful centralization in Paris as the only answer for 
the danger threatening  the Republic;   as  such,  it was in  direct contra- 
diction to  the democratic method of universal  suffrage,   which HLanqui 
felt  would permit the reactionary peasants to  destroy the Republic. 
Harking back to   the Jacobins and the 3abouvists,   HLanqui adopted their 
method of forceful action by a minority to liberate and guide the major- 
ity.     It is this  special adaptation of Jacobin tactics coupled with a 
;reat deal of Babouvist theory that forms the core of HLanquism as it 
was adopted by Russian revolutionaries in the I860*s and 1870*s.    Max 
The People's Cause:     Romanov.   Pu/achev,   or Pestel?   (1862)  to demonstrate 
the constant readiness of the peasant to  revolt against the government. 
The fact that Pu achev posed as a pretender-tsar in order to appeal  to 
the peasants is also   significant,   since it pprtrays the  stubboril loyalty 
of the peasant for the  "Little Father." 
2Alan B.   Spitzer.     The Revolutionary Theories of Louis Auguste 
olanaui.   Columbia University Press,  New York,  1957»  p«  15- 
^V.  Varlamov.     Bakunin and the Russian Jacobins and HLanquists as 
Evaluated by Soviet Historiography,  Research Program on  the U.S.S.R., 
New York,   1955.   P«  15- 
p.  40. 
*Mtt Nomad.    Apostles of Revolution,   Collier Books,  New York,  1961, 
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Nomad speaks of HLanqui's  "Parisian dictatorship"  and "that idea  to 
which Marx largely owes his concept of the  'proletarian dictatorship,' 
and which was later  to  find concrete realization in the reij;n of Lenin 
and of his  successors.""' 
Some distinction here between the terms  "Blanquisra" and "Jacobin- 
ism" may be helpful.     Varlamov duly notes the confusion and quotes the 
Malaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya  (Small Soviet Encyclopedia),   Moscow, 
1931i   on its explanation of the Jacobins:     "'representatives of the 
petit-bourgeois,  mass revolutionary movement,   who  did not stop  short 
of employing  firm measures,   includin3  even terror,   in  their  struggle 
ajainst the haute bourgeoisie.'■      In comparison  with the previously 
quoted definition of  Blanquism,   Jacobinism,   in the Soviet evaluation, 
seems  to refer  solely to  the  first or bourgeois revolution,  modelled 
after  that of Robespierre and the Convention,   including  the year of the 
Terror,   while Blanquism is  reserved for the  exalted plum of socialist 
revolution,  including  the  secret society activity preceding  it and the 
bloody movement of forceful  turnover by an organized elite of revolu- 
tionaries.     Franco Venturi,   who in his 11 Populismo Russo  (Roots of 
Revolution) has  written probably the most outstanding   '.<festern  European 
work on Russian populism,  uses only the term Jacobinism to  describe 
the concept of revolutionary dictatorship in  relation to  the ideas of 
Pyotr Zaichnevsky and P/otr Tkachev,   the two  most outstanding  theorists 
of Russian Blanquism.     Michael Karpovich also  calls Tkachev a  Jacobin, 
"which in the revolutionary vernacular of the time meant an advocate 
of a political overturn effected by a revolutionary minority without 
^Ebid.,  p.  40. Varlamov,  pp.  Ik,  15. 
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any participation on  the part of the popular masses."      I  shall  employ 
the term  Jlanquism as defined by the Soviets,   reminding  the reader that 
in most cases the  sources consulted make use of these two  terms indis- 
criminately. 
There is no thin,  implied in either of the Soviet definitions as to 
the form that the  government ought to  take after  the socialist revolu- 
tion.     It is a noteworthy fact of Russian revolutionary history in the 
nineteenth century that relatively few of the Russian revolutionaries 
in the generations following  the Decembrist revolt in 1825,   when "Con- 
stantino and Constitution"  were called for blindly by the enlisted 
ussian soldiers,   formulated detailed plans for the political  society 
of the future.     In the tradition of Herzen,   the first noted protagonist 
of the strug ,"le for the establishment of a hierarchial communal  system 
based upon  the ancient peasant obshchina,   the revolutionary luminaries 
of Russia  seemed to  accept unquestioned this vaguely defined federal- 
ists  structure,  only to   shelve it in the background of their plans, 
while plunging headlong into  the dual battle of convincing  the peasants 
of the feasibility of revolution and socialism and of organizing all 
forces for  the destruction of the autocracy. 
This is a very important point,  one which I intend to  discuss in 
more detail in the body of this paper.     The  sudden transition from pre- 
revolutionary illegality to revolutionary and post-revolutionary legal- 
ity was a potential problem underestimated in its  shock and import by 
the theoreticians and tacticians of rebellion.     The 1830's,  A-0's,   and 
'"A Forerunner of Lenin:     P. U.   Tkachev,"    The Review of Folitics, 
VI (July,  19^),  p.   5^5. 
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'50's  were spent in sifting out the most palatable Western ideas and 
adapting  then to  the uniquely Russian  situation.     The 60's  witnessed 
a  further  solidification of theory plus a  smattering of activity— 
student demonstrations,   propaganda leaflets,   illegal circles and print- 
in j  presses,   communal  experiments—culminating in the Karakozov attempt 
upon the life of Alexander II in 1866,   which precipitated a violent re- 
pression of all anti- -overnment thought and activity.     The 70's  saw a 
enuine flowering of propaganda and agitation efforts,  then disillusion- 
ment with the futility of attempting to preach  social revolution in the 
midst of a political lockout,  and finally the frantic efforts to kill 
a  tsar,   ending in the assassination of Alexander II on March 1,  1881. 
During these years of frenzied activity, there was no time to plan 
a future society, chapter and verse. Herzen's "commune of communes," an 
essentially ambiguous organization,   was  embellished with talk of a Zemsky 
Sgbor a National Assembly elected by the people to  coordinate a federal 
state.     But even that bit of parliamentarianism was a question for the 
distant future.     The Soviets call the pre-Leninist Ru«sian revolution- 
aries  "utopian"  socialists;   even Tkachev,   who  comes closest to the claim 
of a Leninist prototype.is placed in this Utopian category because he 
did not reco-nize the revolutionary significance of the proletariat.     H. 
N.  3aturin,  Soviet historian writin; in the 1930's after the elimination 
of the Pokrovsky historical school,   (which briefly championed the  strong 
influence of Russian  Jacobinism and HLanquism upon  Bolshevism in terms 
like these:     "'A Jacobin is an empirical forerunner of Bolshevism,   and 
a Bolshevik is someone who deepen^s the theoretical content of Jacobin- 
ism' "8),   classified the theories of the Russian Jacobins as: 
"Quoted in Varlamov,  p.  24. 
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...the ideas not of the October Revolution but of the areat 
French Revolution,   and   none  cf  the truly  revolutionary  elements 
in the ideas  of the  Russian Jacobins  went  beyond  the ideas of the 
French Revolution.     The  revolutionary  ideas of Zaichneveki  and 
Tkachov  are not  the  roots of  3olsheviam at all,   but the  last 
blossomi   of   the Great French Revolution on the unreceptive Russian 
soil....     ..e  iina  absolutely  no elements   of | roletErian  socialism 
in the  social  programs of Zaichneveki   end  Tkaohcv.     Instead   we  find 
in them ell the marK.8  cf petit  bourgeois  tcciei uto las.     Between 
these  reactionary  Utopias  end    -dsnevi so. 11  is  Impossible  not  only 
to  ploce  an equal  sign,   out also t- deauce any  kind  o.   anslo ., 
..i.ateocver.^ 
The point is cleer;  Utopian  aocielists  nova  no prominent  .lece in the 
rrenetlogy  of 'kJesian  Bolshevism.     Zaichnevsky and  Tkechev  recain 
outside the  Pale. 
But why  are   they,     ad   tv.o entire   generations of   lussian revolutionaries, 
considered  utopien  by  the   Soviets?    The obvious answer is their  pre- 
occupation with  the  peasant commune.    It  was this  question,  i.e.,   the 
possibility   of  transform n    the  peasant pbjfclina  into e  eocialist 
groundwork,   tnereby   s  i   ping toe  ca.italist  sta6e  with  ell  its inherent 
evils,   that motivated   Russian populist*  and   socialists in pre-Leni nist 
niatory.     It  wee  pri^eriiy  a  social and  econoiac  revolution for  which 
t..ey  longed  and   served,   end   aeco'd^riiy  a  politicel  revolution, 
eliminating autocracy  and  instituting de^crecy,   as the n=ceecery 
Msns of  establishing the   socielist  society  of tne future.     There  was no 
suspicion that these two ^oels might  be mutually  antagonistic,   that  a 
social   revolution might  preclude  the feasibility   of universal  suffrage 
and  free  spe-cr.,   end  vice  versa.     It was  onlj   when the methods  of  attaining 
these  goals were  under discussion  that  the  dichotomy  of political  and 
sociel  revolution  bece^e  apparent,   a  fact most  sorely  felt  by  the 
•Wednaye  Volya" (People's   ..ill)  .arty  ana   latsr  by  Lenin and  Trotsky 
^Varlacov,   p.   28 
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a-ter  t..e  October  Revolution. 
FtM  Raee&an Jlancuists were the  onij  radical t. to raced  this 
problem  aquarely.     The revolutionary dictatorship  would   niide the  people 
toward   socialaim  by  maintaining  power until  the  troal was  re-chad;  then 
a  republic,   ita   ". r.   undeline^ted   by  thes,   would  immediately  follow 
henceforth  end  forevermore.     lekunin and   the anarchists were the moat 
flagrant  aide-steppers on thie  oufcation of the future  society;  their 
energies were  ccncentretedufupon the destruction  of the  old  taariat 
Ld-inistration,   while the  buildinq of a  new political forai,   preferably 
ea limited   and  temporary  as possible,   woula   oe  left  to the machinations 
of a   new generation.     31anqui  himself,  when questioned   as to hie 
program for  the  future  society,   said   once,   "'.-.y  prorrr.:.?    I   do  .'iOt  K.now 
it  v.ili   be;   I  ao  not know what 1  will do;  I  will act cccorji       to  cir- 
cumatences. ' "^    In thia  sense,   he  was more anarcr.ist  than ccm_.uniat; 
his faith  in a  slow  progreseion channelled   by  a new  .rer.eretion,   efter the 
dictetore.-i-  has eccompiiehea   the  revolution  and  ajf tnorcu-h^oing 
socialism end  then abrogated  itself,   mirrors e.tcoet exactly  the  senti- 
ments  of  Bakunin on the   Es:..e  subject.     The  lonj-range  goal  was utooien, 
but the  8hofct-ren'ce  goal,   overturn of the autocracy,   was realistically 
practical. 
ZaicnnevsKy  end   Tkacnev  spoke  o.enly in terms of dictatorship,   as 
t:.e French   ilanc^-ists neu  aone  and  aa the  --iub-ian  situation—masaes of 
nd   reactionary  peeaants—demanded.      Sakunin ana  Neciiaev,   leae 
overtl,,   clai-ed  a  temporary  period  of power for  their   secret  revolutionary 
p-lieu.     It was tne Narodnaga  Volya members  who from tne  be  In  in^ 
Quoted   in Max i'iomad,   Apostles  of Revolution,   p.,.   cJ.ol. 
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clsi   e:    jr-cii.e.-.ce. for  their  | ( rty   only  in the immediate convooetion of 
e   donstit'.;-.;nt  Asse.bly;  the  reat  was up  to the Rue si an  people.     Even 
this magnanimity   sounder  Utopian and impractical,   particularly in view 
of the   strict!,;  aisciplined  membership ans   secretly  organized  maneuvers 
of thfl   party  dedicated  to tne  assassination  of the  tsat. 
3ut all  these  revolutionary factions  si.iraa   one trait.     Franco 
Venturi  assesses that common  atrain in thes-  words: 
Beth Populism ena  Jacobinism sprang  out of the  revolutionary 
movement  of the   'sixties.     You riff Russia (Zeichnevs.-.y' s  leaf let) 
merely  proposed   e  ruthless  political me1 r   brli   - to 
_x - ect e   programme which  was common to ell  bl lists: 
SOBMUMl ownership  of the  land   with  redistribution  laid  down 
by  general  rules end   carried  out  by  village  a6ee_blice.     The 
aiu; of this Jacobinism was not,   in feet,   de^ocrecy   but 
peasant  Socialism." 
.•or the  sake cr  a   social revolution,   the meana noooaaary to achieve it 
was  left   sufficiently 1 ■ In  order tc  justify eny_ tactics. 
In pursuing this dual  cuestion   of the nature  of the disciplined 
elite in precipitating the  revolution and   of the  political dictatorship 
in accomplishing the  revolution,   I   shall focus upon the political 
dictatorship in  1661-1661  because  it was  ihe most fruitful  period   of 
revolutionary theory  and  activity  in ore-Leninist  Russia.     The  preparation 
of a  revolutionary  awareness for  Lenin's ideas  end   ac-ivitiee in these 
two areea will  be made menifeet in  the  course of  what follows.     The 
period     ha# well-defined   boundaries,   beginning with Pobruarjl   19$   1661$ 
tr.e data  of the emancipation of tne  seffs and  the firat  step on the 
way  to  socialiam cru  democracy in the minds^i   .he  rtusaian  radicals,   and 
ending with ..arch   1,   1661,   the date of the  assassination of  Alexander II 
tlRoota~of~ '.evolution,     eidenfeld  and  :.icolson,   Ltd.,   London, 
T£3o;   p.   297. 
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and   the  1%? M gni^loent  effort  cf Russian  Populist to  precipitate   its 
Revolutionary   uto.ien   -oal. 
conspiracy unL 
I   htve divided   tr.e thesis of„ revoluti onary dictatorship into two 
partsi    it3 exegesis  and  its  ap.li cation.     The  first   .art delves into 
Ue  period  preoedin     1861,   for  it dealt  with tne views of herzen and 
Bakunin   ^n the  effloaey  of manipulation of  power  by  a minority. 
Included  in t;:is phase are Py©Ir Zaichnevaky and  .-yotr  'ikachev,   full- 
- itiqpL Russian   jlanquitita in theory.     The  aeccni   part   begins    kith  a 
t known as  the   "Organization, "  whose  loader was Nikolai  Ishutin and 
whose  claim to  importance  rests with t.;e attempt  on the   ta   r'a  life 
in lb66   by  Karekozov,   an  "Organization" mea.ber.     The  other two  "  appli- 
cators"  of revolutionary  elitia-  included  in this  section ere  Sergei 
Necheev,   that  terrible  proponent  of  secret  cell activity,   and  the 
*Narodnaya Volya  Party,   whc9e  genesis,   activity,   and  fate mark  the 
closing  pr.aae  of the  period   considered.     This division is not  strict, 
for there  it a   ti:ue  overle^  between    the two areas and   a  confusion in 
so:-e  casts  between  31ancuist,   the theorist,   ana    ilancuist,   the activist. 
Yet,   for  the tnesis outlined,   it is,   in ^y  mind,   ti.e mo8t  convenient 
distinction between the  two  sets of Russian revolutionaries dedicated 
to   .ne  concept  of  31anc-ist elitism in pre-  and  epoat-rtvol  zionary 
politics. 
PART I 
IS 01      . 
Alexander Herzen:     Creative Destruction I 
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At first glance  it appears  strange to commence a discussion  of 
secret terrorist activities and   revolutionary  dictators.-i^a in  nine- 
teenth century Russia  with the theories  of Alexander herzen,  the most 
outstanding  battler for overt  peaceful propaganda  and  a federal   structure 
characterictic  of  ae^ocratic  .^overn-ent.     Kerzen,   after a  flirtation in 
hie younger days  with the extreme  left  of  revolutionary  theory,   did  in 
fact  settle down  to a  respectable  admiration for the forces  of moderation 
and  peaceful  reform.     His incessant attacks in Kolakol  upon any  form of 
extre_ism—Jacobinism,   anarchism,   nihilism,   terrorism,   Bakuninism—from 
the  1850's until his death in 1670,   place  hia irrevocably  in the  ranks 
of  the idealistic  constitutional  reformers.     3ut it is  with  the years 
1646-4? in herzen's intellectual development  that  this  pa.-er is 
concerned,  for that period merke  his  brief entertainment of  the  theory 
of revolutionary  dictatorship as the most  effloient  m«ana  of  oonducting 
a  social  revolution. 
Alexander Herman wa;  born in .-.oscow on .-larch 2>,   1612.     Committed  to 
tha  revolutionary   OLUS.   since  the Decembrist  revolt o.   1525,   which 
inspired  the  oath  made  by herzen a.id  hie  friend  Nikolai   O^ar/ev  (161J-77) 
"to  sacrifice  our   lives to the   struggle  we  hp.ve  undertaken,"! Herzen 
formed  a  circle at i-ioscow University in the  early  lcJO's dedicated  to 
the  study of French  Utopian socialists,   particularly  Saint-3imon. 
Arrested  in  lc^4 as  "a daring freethinker,   extremely dangerous to  society,"2 
he was  exiled  to Perm,   then Vyatka  and  Vladimir for  six years;  he married 
..atalya  Zakharina  in  1638.     In 184l in St.   Petersburg,   he was again 
lA.   I.   Oertsen.     3fllrrpifllMB jftflM nenl^tiftridtBatriJi to^akh,   Itdatel'atvo 
Akadeaii   Nauk,  woscow,   1956, vat  XIII  ,   p.   81. 
2£.   Lampert.   Studies in Rebellion.  Frederick A.   rraeTfr,  New York, 
1957, p.   176. 
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arrest-d,  and  exiled  to Novgorod.     Back in .-.oacow in 1642,   Herzen epsnt 
the ne*t  six yeara  writing critical atticles,   studying He.-relianism    and 
applying for  an exit permit.     The year  1847 marked   his departure from 
Russia,   never to  return.     Living in Rome,   Herzen viewed  with  joy  the 
February  Revolution in Paria,whither he moved  in May,   1648,   only  to 
receive  a  rude  awakening in the massacres of the  June Qayp.and  the 
counterrevolutionary  repression.     Quickly  aisilluaioned  with the  super- 
ficial  efforts to maintain a democratic  Republic in France and   with 
the apparent decadence  of Western European civilization,   Herzen  left 
France,   and  finally   settled  in  London in 1852.    Maintaining  his faith in 
a  Socialist  revolution as the  only means to chect  the decay  of  a dying 
Suro.;e,  herzen,in the PolarMaya  ^vezda (Polar Star)  began to foraulete 
his special  brand   of Socialism,   a  peasant-oriented,   in fact  .-.ussian- 
peasant-oriented   one,    Initiated   by  himself and  Ckarev.     He  aav.  in 
his native country the  saving power for Europe,   end  the agent  of  that 
power was the  Russian peasant in his ancient Otahchina or rural  commune. 
Coupling this faith in the peasant with  a desire to picture his  Russia 
in a favorable  li -ht  before the eyes of  critical  Europeans,   Herzen 
launched  a  vi rorous attack in hie writings against Tsar    icholas I, 
and directed  his  readers'   eyea to the virtues of the  peasant and   his 
inherent  bent toward  a  communal  socialistic existence.     Upon Nicholas' 
deoth in 1855,   Herzen rejoiced   and  in lc57 channelled  his publicist 
activities with the hel;.   of  Ogarev into a  new journal,   Kolakol  (The  Bell), 
with the  purpoaejof convincing the new tsar to reform Russia into  socialism, 
the first  step  to  be the  emancipation of the  serfs.     3one was Herzen1s 
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pre-16A8 fervor for  revolution;  all hie efforts were   now absorbed   in the 
battle for a  lejal  evolution toward the desired   goal« 
Kololcol was instantly  popular in Russisn circles,   including the official 
ones.     Kerzfen. beca_e the  recognized   leader of the  press agitation for 
emancipation;   radicals,   liberals,   rnd   even sore  conservatives  rallied 
to the cause.     February   19,   1861  saw the emancipation of the   serfs, 
but it was a  Pyrriiic victory  for  Herzen in view of the oppressive 
redemption dues and   the miniscul.)  grants of  land  to the  ?fireed"    peasants. 
Discouraged  by  these facts and   the new repressive measures of the tearist 
aro.y  in Poland,  nerzen pressed  harder  for  reform and   struck  out defensively 
at  the  radicals who  threatened  by  their  student  riote and   secret  societies 
to  etifle  toe  faint   strains of tsarist  benevolence. 
This  period  marks the  renewal  of his  storxy  friendship  Hitta i'likhail 
Bakunin,   recent escapee from exile in Siberia.     Pressured   by   3akunin, 
.-.srzen,   jrud Ingly,   gave Kolokol'e    support to the  Zemlyail Votya 
(Land  and  Freedom)   secret  society  in  1661-62 and  the  Polish  rebellion 
in  1865.     Attacked   by  patriotic  liberals for his endorsement  of the 
latter and   by  the'radicals for  not urging uncompromising  support  of 
the  revolution,   herzen fell into the  "has-been"  category  of  Russian 
revolutionism in the aims of the  new generation of   "critical  realists," 
materialists,   and   potential terrorists.     Herzen stood   staunchly, 
consistently,   in favor of a  social  revolution and did   not  wish to 
endanger that  goal  -with  futile efforts at  political turnover  through 
inaividual terrorism;  his disillusionment  with democracy,   faith in the 
poesioiiity of peasant  socialism,   and   loveifor the indiviiualiiyfof 
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man forced  him to  com precise  with  the       rmer enemy  in order to  scueeae 
uiore  concessions out  of  f.im. 
Hll  revolt"cionary   rcls,   however,   haa   already   been usurped   cy the 
radicals;   atudenta   began to  look to non-emigrant   ao.rces of  revolutionary 
atrength,  ana   h.olo.:ol  ceased   publication in  lc67 for  lack of  circulation. 
After four years spent in Geneva,   r.erzen died  in  Peril   on  wanuary 9,   1873. 
he  sttnde as a thoroughgoing  in-ividuelist  tnd  Utopian s-ciaiist 
of  the   _a: .-.t-oimonian  variety,   but ha has t:  to be  classified 
oft«n as E t.udjie-heeded  liberal ana  weak-kneed  constitutional  reformer 
iy   because he  chose the gradual and   peaceful  road   of -oue ration in 
cuest of hie carefully conoaived deetinati   ... 
franco Venturi   ends  bia  chapter on Her ..1th  these  words! 
The  fundamental  ele  ante  of  Ruaaiai    Po  uliaa—diatruat of 
all democracy;   belie:   in a  possible autonomous cevelopxent 
Socialism in Aussie;  faith in the future  possibilities of 
the  obiic:.ina;   the  neec   to create revolutionaries  who 
could  dedicate  themselves  t.o the people—thest-  were the 
principles tier   an slung  to after his experiences in 1646, 
the iueale ha bad   created :or the n.xt generation." 
It  wafc  with the failure of the  revolutions of  18*8,   as ne  wj.tc-.ed 
the Prenoh  Republla  aoccumb  vo the  power of a Cavaifc-nac  ana   then a 
Louis Kapoleon,   that herzen became disillusioned   with  the  trappin   ■  of 
democratic government,    .-.ore Important,  the year it At nerked  Intenaa 
preoccupation with  toe  question of political  revolution,   a  break-between 
his Saint-Simonian  socialism of the  1650's  and  4,)'s ana  his peeaent 
socieli: a  1  50' a ana   60' a. 
The  political  battle   an May   15,   16^6,   between the extreme  revolutionaries 
under 31anqui  and   the  Constituent  Assembly  un,er  Lemartine  was  followed 
^Venturi,   p.55* 
-14- 
by  the  bloody  June Jays during which the  workers inspired   by   socielist 
slogans  struggled  to initiate  social refonne  by force.     The  socialists 
were defeated   both  times.     Herzen was in Paris for   ooth events and 
evalueted   them in the  light of hit.  own socialist goals.     He admired 
31-ncui  and  the  extremists for their valiant attempt to carry  the 
revolution beyond   the  '..outgeois regimes of  Robespierre r;nd  Lamartine 
to a  genuine  republic  with  a   socialist orientation,   y^t their very 
.cvsment  a.^ainat  the  nationally elected  Assembly  attracted  conservatives 
and   liberals alike  to the  op  osite  side in defense of an Assembly  that 
could   be  easily  underlined  and  trt;nsforaea   into a monarchy  once again. 
The  battle  lay  not  between two groups of politicians,   but  between two 
concepts of political  structure—one,   the  traditional French  centralism; 
and 
on the  other tiii  was  the Republic,   not  of Letnartir.e   out 
of  31anqui;   a Republic not  of  words but  of deeds;  universal 
suffrage not merely  ap;lied  pettily and   stupidly  ior the  election 
of a despotic  Assembly,   cut for the whole administration;  the 
liberation of man,  the commune  and  the department from 
submission to a  strong government using   bullets ani  chains as 
:-str.ods  of   -ersuasicn.^ 
This l?tter  side made the mists.:e    i  _ixing  republicanism with  socialism 
without  sufficient  preparation,  thereby introducing  brusquely  into 
French awareness two entirely  new concepts  with  no fitting receptacle 
in which to  store them  safely.       New wine  soUrs in  old  bottles. 
Thus,   incompetent  leaders anu   lack of  preparation on the  part  of 
tne  leaders and  the  led   were the  reasons in Herman's mind   .or the double 
of 
fai.ufce.     Yet,   aerzen never lost faith in the goal^tne French  proletariat. 
^Venturi,   p.   2b. 
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The  revolution must  be   eocial and  total.     It  was  only  the tsctics  that 
needed  drastic  revision,     he  turned   briefly,   in lcA6 to   3l8nqui's i-ee 
of  a   revolutionary dictatorship as an interi:      jvernxent  between the 
monarchy  and   tr.e  republicj  he  aaaireu   Ba^nqui's thoroughgoing  passion 
for destruction of the old  in orier tc make  way  for the  newj     "Blancui 
is  ths  revolutionary  o:   o;r  !.:    .-.     ...  hi      understood  that ncthin : can 
be  xerely  readjusted,   but that the  prixary talk is  to  pull down the 
existing  structure." 5    A genuine  republic  was possible  only  after 
...a  revolutionary  dictatorship,   which must not  invent 
new civil  codes or  create  a  n^w  order,   jut must   area ah all 
monarcnist  relics in the Comaune,   the Deportment,  the Tribunals, 
and  the army.     It  will un.ask aljthe actors of  the old  order, 
will  strip thex of  their cloaics,   tneir uniforms,   end 
their epaulettes,   of-all the  symbols  of power  which xoves 
people  so intensely. 
Tnis destruction,   which  resembles a  soxewhat moderated   Jacobin Terror, 
only  tnis tixe directed  a  ainst all the  opponents  of  socialism,   would 
resemble _.ore  closely  a   state  of anarchism then a   dlenquiet  revolutionary 
dictatorship,     herzen  sympathised  deeply  with  Proudhon,   even financed 
and   collaborated   with  him on La Voix du   reuile in  1649,   '  and  be 
was more influenced  by  Proudhon's a nti-de-" cere tic,   -nti-Louis  >'apoleon 
polemics than by  any  theories  of anarchism in the   3akunin style. 
Martin Italia makes this comparison of Proudhonist  and   Blanouist 
influence upon nerzen at this time: 
Herzen had  no doubt fallen into contradiction in accepting 
simultaneously  (and  even confusing)  Proudhon1■  ^rass-roots 
anarcfiiam and   Blanqui's   'communist'  dictatorship of  the  proletarian 
mi .ority,   a  policy  which  could  on^y   uroauce authoritarian results. 
^Venturi,   p.   50. 
6ibid..   p.   5»,   5% 
7lbld..   p.   50. 
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3ut thiB eavocecy  of   'eomnuai sic'   was no  re than a  temporary 
•xar-ereti   n of  Herzfcn's thought,   snd  a measure  of  hi8 fury 
against toe   'old  world^   rather then e  real adherence to 
'31ancuiat* methods.     In reality,   3tanqui,   like  Proudhon,  marnnt 
for Herzen not  the  positive authority  of dictatorship  but 
the  negative  force  of destruction.   8 
herzen cham toned   the individualist  revolt  against   state centralism 
and  toe  socialist  revolt against  bourgeois capital!am,   and   both 
revolts  led   hiu. to entertain briefly  the ijea thst  revol.ti unary 
dictatorship must destroy  the  olo  end  prepare ror the  new  aocie:y, 
since  tha  old  democratic forme  v.ere Lmj ractical  in the  transition 
at&ge  when none  were  .. repered   sufficiently  for  a  shift.     Ha   sensed 
an usurpation of  power following the Jacobin tradition  of  Robespierre, 
in the French  hepjolic  and  in tne  universally  sleeted   Louis  hapoleon, 
nd  he  was  wary  of a  stste  which always exereiaed  the  privilege of 
initiating a   'democratic  •rthodoxy. "9    Deploring a  state Modelled   after 
tne Jacobin model,   herzen c.aimei   (quoted  by  Venturi)i 
Jovernment is not  an enc,   Dut  a necessity;   not,  a   sacrosanct 
institution to  be  served   by  Levites,   out a   ban/.,   a  chancellery 
of  the nation's affairs.'—in other  words,   the maximum  of 
freedom,   the ioin. u;um or  .wpoleor.ic  centralization.iJ 
herzen clung to the idea  of en interim diotatorahlp,   but  onii   a 
temporary  one.     Since its function  was mere  destruction,   snd   "every 
destruction is a  kind  of  creation, "H then the  temporary   dictators 
-    yield  to the true  re.ubiicens  to ohannel  the new forces of  creation. 
There  is no indication that he  feared  in Ibhb-k? that   Buch  en elite 
nt  be  reluctant to hana  over its hard-won power to  a  baby-republic 
BXTgxaSar  r.erz.n em  the   31rth  of   .tussian  3. ci disci,   harvard 
University ?reac,   Daabridga,  Maea.,   l>cl,   p.  578. 
^Venturi,   p.   52. 
101 bid.,   p.   52. 
^Alexander  herzen.   Selected  fhilosopnical   .Vori-.e.  foreign Langusgee 
Publishing House, ...oscow,  195-,  P- ^°5« 
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(the  same ideological  oversight committed  by Trotsky   seventy yeers 
later),     rerhpps in his contempt for the republicans  "in-words-only" 
of the   lc4c  revolution,   herzen assumed  that a  grou.. disciplined  in 
the art   o:  destruction woula  harbor  6uch  a genuine  love-for the 
wei.are  of the  v.orkers as to make them a  gi_t  of a government and  en 
economy.     Yet ilerzen,   in e^eakin^  of creative destruction,   _a>ee these 
prophetic  statements,   ,-robEbly  unwittingly:     ".■.an  cenr.ot   be  content 
with  destruction alone.     It ie against his  creavive nature. "12 
Powerful  -orceajbf  aestruction will  never  give up  wiiii. air 
source   of putt ;   tne  executor muet  be executed   hims-lf  before he  will 
cease  his  lucrative,   perhaps even pleasurable,   activity.      Of this 
particular feet,  Herzen hed   scce conce tion when it  was a  question of 
assessing the  character of ccunterrevoiutioncries;  howerer,   he completely 
neglected  to foresee this in  his socielist  .orces.     There  is a  good 
reason for this  oversight,   but  even this reason would  not   justifly 
herzen1 ■  cleim to  realism on the  question of revultuionary  tactics. 
It ie that .-.erzen  believea   naively,   idealisticail,,,  that  it  wte tne 
pfrfysration i or tne  revolution  that was  so  difficult;  the  revolution 
LlTaeIf   and  the reconstruction of  society  woula   be easy   end   iim  le, 
becaus-   the  old  was  bad,   ugly,   inhuman,   false,   while  the  new was good, 
beautif.1,   ..uman,   true.     The former  wouL.  automatically  yield  befonftr.e 
letter,and  the  latter  would  flourish in its own right.     It was a common 
error  of  judgment  among  revolutionaries in Russia at this time.     Bakunin. 
especially,   believed  the  new society  would   spring up of its own accord, 
once the old  forme  heu   been destroyed.     2ven the  so-called   realiets 
l^herzen,   p.   k0% 
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had  dreams  of  se.ing a   socialist  r.uasie  within their   lifetixea.     Dreams 
are fine,   even  necessary,   but often,   ana  herzen la a   case in point,  they 
cloud   the  facts. 
nerzen's own atru ;.le to accept the coldblooded   totality  of  revolu- 
tionary method  affected   him so ueeply  that c.e ccncxudei  irrationally 
teat every  young radical must  experience  the  same  battle  within him- 
self  before fae can genuinely desire  and   work for a  revolution.     These 
are   some of   hi a thoughts  in From the  Ctr.er   5h ore | on the  necessity  for 
total aestrictii.n of  old   for-.a: 
.-.an houses a  ..er-ir.snt,   revcr. .1 onery  tribunal  within himself, 
an implacable Fouquier-Tinville,   and,   even a  guillotine.     Some- 
times judgee   fall asleep,     he      iliotine rists,   the falne nations, 
outdated,   romantic  and  feeble,   come to  life  and   xe  ke  themselves 
at home  when all of a  sudden some terrific  blow  rouses the heedless 
judge  and  the dosing  executioner,   and  tr.en comes the   savage 
retribution,   for the   slightest  concession,   the   slightest mercy 
or  pity   shown leeas  back to the  past and  leaves the chains intact. 
There  is no choice:     dfcner execute end     o forward,   or  grant a 
reprieve  ana   stop miaway....     People  are  afraio.   of  their  logic 
and,   havif'i raar.ly  summoned  to court  the church,   the  state,   the 
family  and morality,   good,   end  evil,   they  endeavor  to  aeve  some 
scraps,   fragments of the  old....     In passing from  tne  old  world 
to the  new,   one  can take  nothing alon?....     We  are  to  be execUfcrs 
of the  past.*5 
Ihe  special  brand   of  revolutionary  who could   stomach  eich destruction 
was  rare indeed.     Herzen  raged   at  the  bourgeois  rep. blicara o.   1646 
NhO let  the  guillotine  rust and  who,   in an eff  rt to  :>rserve  order and 
citilizaticn,  forced  the   revolution to its doom. 
And  there you  nave the  cruaaaere for  freedom,   the  privileged 
liberators of  mankind.'       Freedom ie the very thing they dreed I 
they must    have    authority  because    they    do not    trust 
themselves.1^ 
Again and   a  ain Herzen's declarations cen  be  read  as very  prophetic 
8tateme..ta  concerning the  power  struggle in  revolutionary  situations, 
yet ignoring these  conclusions in ni e -emulations  -or a  revolution 
Selected  rhiloso-f-ical  Worxa,   PP«   575-575. 
l%bid..   p.   451 
-19- 
borne  by  the  Ruaaien peasant,  untr' ]   by  what to him was the 
disgusting degradation end  treachery  of  Western revolutionary   socialists. 
The  batternees  revealed  In the above quotati   n from  :.erz-n rankled  in 
this consciousness,   fed   oy  the   salft  success  of the  counterrevolution 
of flavai^nec,   the   strong nan,   the trustworthy  authority,   ana  finally 
by  the  <ou_. d '6tat  of December,   1651. 
In the  transition period  before his formulation  of   ..easent  socialism, 
herz-n  fall  into a  morbid   jfc;res£ion during  which he denounced   revolution, 
constitutionalism,   ana  parliamentarianiein indiscriminately.     3yron's 
Lucifer in  Cain assumed  j.e;or im ortanoa  in herzen's  jiaillisfcned mind 
as en advocate  of individual cri»«. and   of  the murder  of thoae  who 
bldcked  the  revolutionary momentum.     Herzen's hatred   of a mankind  that 
will allow events  such as occurred  in rtri a in 1648 drove him to this 
amorality,   out as Thomas .-iaseryk observes  in nis analysis  of herzen's 
psycae at tr.i s  stage; 
To  one  who tmnks clearly  and   purauec  r.ia thought! to their 
lo leal  conclusion,   revolution,   the  revolution  o.   it'-,   .1   nlfiea 
cri   •    nu  -urder  a»ong other thing*.     Must we  tnen choose  between 
crime  and  crime,   between murder  and  murdert 
In 164c,   as an actual fact,   herzen expressed   nis op  oaition 
to the  revolution;  and  nis  Byronic moou  of that epoch,   ma 
decision in favor  of murder,   wae  but n-cral winaow-ire,eing.^ 
:-iaaaryk goe.  on to explain that  i©48 marked  herzen' s firm oppoaition to 
revolution,   which in  turn lea   to his  ; olo   : ,E       mnat  ell  terrorism  end 
secret  revolutionary  ac i-ity.     Hie  strong  ettecrs  in tne  1663'a .gainst 
the new generation of  Cnernyehevsky' a  ■ new men,"   risarev's nihilist. 
15The  S£irit"£f  Aus|ia.     Oeorge Allen  and  unwin,   Ltd.,   London, 
1919, vol. 1, P. 4oj. 
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and the  31enouist  conspirators of  Youn-: Ruasia certainly   suggest that ^hiB 
own ideas of  dictatorship end   3yronic crime are effusions of a freak 
period  in his  otherwise  consistent  s'.ru  gie toward   individual freedom 
and a  socialist republic. 
herzen's  later work which most  revealed  tne  bitter conclusions 
drewn from this significant  shift  in ideology was  his  "Letters in  an Old 
Soiflrsde,"!^  written in   1..6J  to 3akunin.     In these   letters,  herzen ta.-:e8 
it u.jon himself to oppose iakunin's theories  of violent  revolution and 
the immediate destruction of the   State.     Recallin.- the events of  1646, 
herzen assessed twenty  years  of changes in ecenomic  ana   social  questions, 
which called   for ■   reorientation in tactics  for achievin-  socialism! 
The minority  marehlng in the  vanguard  has not  arrived  at manifest 
trutns,   at practical :ceens,   at  complete formulas of  the future 
economic   life.     The majority   who  suffered most endeavors through 
one  group  of its urban workers  to throw off this  state  but is 
restrained   by  the  old,   traditional outlook o-   the other,   more 
numerous  group rpeeeantr^.     knowledge  an.  unaerBt.^ndin;  are not 
to  be acquired   by  any coup d'etat,   not  by  a  coup do tete. 
Ttaa  slu     ishness,   incoherence  of   bba historical course  of 
understanding exasperates and  depresses us;   we find  it  intolerable 
and  many  of us,  against our  better judgement,   nurry  ourselves and 
others.     Is that  good  or bad?    That is the question.     Should  we 
exert  external pressure  en the natural  course of events in ord-r 
to hasten the internal  process which is in svidsnool     Certainly 
a ..id wife can hesten li  hten,   eliminate the difficulties  of travail, 
but  only  within certain  Limits  which are difficult  to ascertain 
and  uangerous to  exceed.... Peter I and   the Convention tsu 
us to march in seven-league  boots,  to pass directly  from the 
first month  of pregnancy to  the  ninth and destroy,   without 
discriud nation,   everything  is  our way.     Die  zerstorende  Lust 
jet sine  achaffende Lust^-7—and  forward   we dashed  in the   steps 
of the  unknown god-destroyer,   stumbling  on broken treasures 
intormingled   with ali kinds of rubbish End refuse.10 
16Selected  Phi losoy.iicoi   [orfc>f,   PP.   576-595. 
17»The destructive, passicn is a  creative passion." 
ieSelectei  rhilosop ical i'.'orka,  pp.   576-577. 
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Violent  revolution bent  upon pan-destruction,   Sa.-unin'e favorite doctrine, 
threatens to destroy  even the  original distinctive factors of economic 
and  cultural progress.     The  economic  revolution has a   strcr. «r foundation 
than a  political of  religious revolution;    it tends to depend upon 
^rad-al  transition end  the maturity  of tne majority. 
The  term  'gradual progress1   nolds  no terrors for me,   discredited 
though it is  by  the vacillations and  -iatakes or  diverse reformers. 
'Gradual progress,'   like  continuity,   is an inalienable pert  of 
every  process  of under-i     ...  ,...*0The  people are  conservative 
by  instinct  and   because they know nothing else.     They  have no 
ideals 0Jt3iue  the  conditions thet  exist....The forms of the 
state,   the church  end  the  court fill up the chasm between the 
incomprehension of the masses  and  the one-aided   civilization of 
the  summits.     Their power and  extent are in direct proportion 
to  their ignorance.     It ie impossible to  overcome ignorance  by 
force,     Neither the  republic  of Robespierre,   nor that  o- .Anacbarsis 
Cloots,   left  to themselves,   could  maintain themselves while 
Vendeeism took yeere  to extirpete.     Terror is as  little effective 
in wiping out  prejudices ae conquest  is in annihilating a  nation.20 
Ihere   stands herzen'e xo9t deter^inea  condemnation  of  revolutionary 
conspitacy,   political  revolution,   terroristic  pan-destructicn,   end   the 
im-ediate establishment  of an anarchistic  society.     With  his -ove  away 
from advooaoy  of destruction,   the need  for e  revolutionary  dictetorsnip 
to wield  that force was automatically  cancelled.      Some o.   his later 
writings assess  revolutionary  conspiracies ai._ed   at the establishment 
Of e dictatorship  (a  ch  es tt.e  BabouYlat  Conspiracy   of  Equals) as 
"tyrannical  .-ind   statist."  21    This is an indication of  Kerzen's mature 
appreciation for  the dangers inherent In the  concentration of revolutionary 
power  in the head a of a minority  elite,   though here again Kerzen is on 
I 
lyflolected  rhilosooi'.lcal   .-."orka,   p. S8H,   , 
20ibid.,   pp.   550-591. 
21 Ventori,   p.   297. 
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one aide  of the fence,   condemning the other  side  am   overlooking the 
faulta in his own backyard. 
Herzen's view of the  Russian peasant and  the type oL   society  that 
peasants  wo^ld  inhabit eventually   wat idealistic  anj   Utopian;  jet,   nia 
appreciation for  tr.e  drawbacks to  an immediate,   forceful  revolution in 
the face  of the traditional i   norance  of that peasant  was a tribute  to 
the profound   penetration onj  realism of his LMight.      Soviet evaluation 
finds .-erzen almost  without  blamiah)  it has  a tendency  to  glorify .ierzen 
the peasant  soci.list,   the   -ro-cund  intellectual,   the  brilliant author, 
the revolutionary  de.-crtt,   zae  untiring polemicist,   and  to ignore 
entirely   or invent  rational explanations  for r.er-en the  constitutional 
monarchist and  the   .srlfeamentary  reformer.     Floating  soiiewr.ere  near 
the heart of  tnis two-:.eadeu  i-.erz.en,  the  outburst  of  revoi.-tiom.ry 
passi-n  oi  the year  164b divorced  him almost completely from the  sentiments 
he bad   known and   was destined  to know.     Zaichnevaiiy  saw the  1646 
revolut.on through herzen's eyes and   .-icked  up from him the  fe&oioiiity 
of e  centralized   eeizure  of power.     .:•■■-  isvorite   Soviet epithet 'for 
Herzen is  "  revol  tionary democrat," Lj! one  of the most non- 
committal terms in  political terminology,   and  yet  appropriate for the 
ideologue,   who KBS more  oi   a democrat in theory  than a  revolutionary 
in acti.n. 
.dkhail Bakunin:     Creative Destruction II 
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Herzen's  resort  to  the tactic of   revolutionary  dictatorship was a 
patting  ;-hase in his intellectual development.     This  conept had  a mere 
Lasting  source  of   propagation in the figur*  of rdkbail  Ba<cunin.     Once 
introiucted i :unin'e theoretical framework with all the :orce of 
his revolutionary  passion,  t'r.ia tactic 01"  revolution,   embellished   by  the 
concepts of  secret alliances  and   enerciie:,   flourished   and achieved 
grandeur in the  realm of nineteenth century Russian revolutionary 
theory.     From this discussion it  will  become clear that the  3akunin#ft 
form of anarchism has a  natural  relaionship with the  Blanquist  concept 
of revolutionary  dictatorship. 
Sakunin was  born  on the family  estate  of Pryamukhino in Tver 
province on Kay  lc,   16lA.     Entering the artillery  cadet  school in 
Petersburg in  1628,  he  was promoted  to officer  status and   served  in the 
am.;/   ;or one year.     Returning in  lt$y to i-.oscow,   where rticipated 
in the  Stankeviob circle,   w hich included   such  figures as  Belina.;y, 
Botkin,   end    Katkor,   3akunin ran the  gamut  of the  oerman idealist from 
Kant to  HegelJ     fleeing  Russia in 1640 after fierce arguments  with 
Herzen,   Belineky,   Katkov,   end   hi s  family,   3akunin studied  in  Berlin and 
Dresden,   where  in  lfc42 he  wrote his famous article "Reaction In v»eni.any 
:or th= Deutsche  Jai.raueiicr under the  editorship of  Arnold  Ruge.     This 
erticle  was the first iraicuticn  of  left regelianism in  iakunin's 
ideology;  it  was  a call  :or  social  revolution  baaed;.upon hegelian 
negetion.     In Zurich  in  Ibh}  3akunin_et   .ilnemi Neitting,   trie   Be man 
"ommuniet,   from whom ho  absorbed  ■  -ore intense Interest  in  the   ecciaiist- 
anarcr.ist  current.     Pueaued   by  the Russian Third   Section  for  compulsory 
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return to Russia,   where  he  bad   been condemned    by Nicholas I  to exile 
in Siberia, I   to   Bruesela,   then to Paris in 1644 where he 
becB-e  acquainted   with  Marx,   Bn ,   .-roudhon,   end   a  group of emigre" 
roli6h  revoli.tionaries.     Attracted  especially   by   Proudhoniaa tncrchlam 
.   Slav  nationalism of the  Poles,   3akunin  began to consolidate 
his ideas on  violent revolution and  the  .lon-^overnaentel,  federal 
society   of the future. 
Present in Paris for the  February  revolution,   1646,   Bakunin  soon 
tired   of  the  French  causa and,   financed   by  the new French  Provisional 
.ov^-r me   t,     ad   the  Poles,  he  hastened  to fra :oe  to pcrtici;,stt; in the 
alev  Oongreae.     motivated  ecualiy  b}f  his newfound love  :or ell   -lave end 
his hatred  of  Austria and   jermeny,   iakunin hoped  to unite  all   'J1EV6, 
incl the  Pole a  and   the  Ruesii    _,   in c  federation dedicated  to  revolt 
against their   -cny  oppressors.     Participating  in    he  insurrection,   the 
repression of  which eventually   bro: e u_;  the  conference,   he treveled   in 
Jermany  trying to  promote  rebellicna.     Generally,   these  revolts assumed 
a national and/or  republican,   rether than a   e-ocielist,   character,   end 
Bakunin   took  advantage of this  nati-nalist  ser.tiu.ent  to  activate 
rebel.i^ua feelin  s. 
In Jresden, Ha; ,   164^,   Bakunin rejoiced  tc find   the  rudlmenta of 
- ocialist  ae^-ocrbtic   revolution,   out  the   swirt  reprieei 
toe   3axon king meant the death  of the republic  ana   -Jakunin's hopes. 
Arreeted  May  9,   condemned  by  s   oaxon court  to death,   the   aente.ee 
later  commuted  tc  life  im] risonmerit,   Bakunin  was extradited  to Austria 
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in 1653,   Again cndemneu   to  death tot  hi a   -anticipation in the Prague 
insurrection,   tnen another commutation followed   by  another expedition, 
this time   bo   .:.„a&ia.     After  six years  spent  in the  Schiusselcer; .-crtress, 
during  which he wrote his famous  Confession to i.'icholas I   with  no  result, 
3a.:unin  was exiled  to  Siberia  in  lfc;7  by  Alexander Ii.     a.1    ..:.:..,   wfceree 
he was married  in 1658,   3ekunin met  -overnor-General Muraviev.   a  distant 
relation,   and  in the course of tnair discuesi  ne o. ft-red  him the  role 
o-   revolutionary   lictator cx.r  the   Slav people*,  thereby  repeating  the 
offer made  to  Kicholei I   in the  Confession,   Escaping in 1661 to the 
Lnited   States,   Bakunin   bur at  in upon '..erzan's  -eeceful existence in 
Lonuon in December,   1661. 
The returned  exile's iirst  contribution    to Kolo.:-l  was his open 
letter  "To Russian,   Polish,  anj   All  Slavic Friends"    in the  edition of 
February  15,   1662.     This  article  wee to  ae the first  in a   series,   but, 
as  Bakunin  '-eca^e  -ore  an-  m  re absorbed  in the  new develOj.menta  of the 
. ussian revolutionary movement,   the  international   Sl8v movement   sui'iered 
in nis attention.     The years  1662-#J marked   3ekunin'8 intense involvement 
in a  pro, reaalon of developments  in the Russian  situation:     first, 
tne  "Zemlyai Volya"  (Land  and Freedom)  agitation for  constitutional 
reform;   then,   tha   "Old    :-xiever"  Inoi   BI    ,   Li        Lol nin attempted 
to  solicit  help for the   revolution from the traditionally  anti-tsarist 
reli  ious  schi emetic a in Russia;   then the  encounter with the  emigre 
peasant Martyanov,   in whose honor  Bakunin produced  the pampniet 
The   i-eopla's   :?auau:     .-.O--. r.ov.   ru/cchev.   or   .-.3tel7   ,   hiajfa^.ous  appeal 
to Alexander 11  to  ieai   the  peaceful revolution  toward   socialism;   and 
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finally  tha  rolish  reoeliion of  166J,   which inspires In'a n-torioue 
riae  ~n the  ehip Ward  Jackson with the  goal  of  aaaiatin rate 
Poliel /olutionariee.     All four incidental ended  unsuccessfully  end 
even tragically  for t  06e in .'.uesia  end   --oltnd   eaught up in the repressive 
• ,-.-   tsarist  forces. 
Moving to Italy  ir.  lick,   Bakunin mat   :-ariceldi   end   flirted   briefly 
with Itelien nationalism.     But  the  dire  need  for  social  reform in Italy 
soured  him on the  purity o:  Italian  revolitionerianism and  nationalism, 
and  he turned  instead  to the ideas publicized   by .-.arx,   whoa, he  had   run 
into on the  way  to Italy.     Inspired   by  the International   /-'orkinsmen11 
Association,    iakunin organi-ed   the first  of hie many  secret  "brotherhood s" 
in ?lorence,   supposedly  as an adjunct  to the European Association.     Hie 
main  -unctions as  leader of the   Brotherhood  seemed  to be  limi'ed  to 
makin, impe&cioneu   speeches for   proletarian solidarity  and  collecting 
funds  .or   "expenses" —as it turned   out,   hi a own rat..er  than the 
Brotherhood' s.     The  3rotherhood   collapsed  when he«oved  to Naples,   but 
tia managed  to attract a  .ussier, emigre followin: to the    formation cf 
a new  Brotherhood. 
In the  Revolution: ry  1-.   ac: i sr.,2 the  statutes  of the new organization, 
Bakunin made his first   systematic app--tl   for  the   "'annihilation, 
dissolution,   and moral,   political,   judicial,   bureaucratic,   end  financial 
bankruptcy  of  the tutelar,,   transcendental,  centralized   State,   the twin 
partner  of the   Jhurch  end,   ae   buch^tho  per-anent   source  of pauperization, 
deception,   and  en.irvement of the peoples.'"5    This is  the  creed  of 
 delated   ^enetratir.S.y  by   B.B.   Carr in ...icnael   3a.-:unin,   pp.   266-501, 
2Thie catechism,   written in  1866,   is to  be distin uj    Cx m  the 
vtechier of  tr.fe  ^yolitionar:,.   written in  l66y   by    lakunin and 
U  -v.     ..ere-fter tl*  U6c document will   be  referred   to as tne 
-cvoi.tionary  Oatecnism end  ttie  1069 document  as tne  Jatec; ism 
of   i. h - r.ev o 111i onary. 
Quoted  in Carr.  ..ichafcl .Bakunin,   p.   ?;A 
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destructive anarcnism,  the  culmination of  a   afcr.tin.fcnt  ranklin    in  -jalc^nin'a 
eoul  aince the  explensticn  cf hie  leftist  rieselisn attitude in  'he 
erticle   "Reaction in Germany"  (1642),   where  he had  decierc-ai     "'Let 
ua put  cur trust  in  the external   apirit  which destroys and  annihiletes 
only  because  it  is the unee' od  eternally  creative   source of 
all  life.       he  patsion for  destruction ii alao a  creative  passion.1' 
From that inauspicious  be-innin^,   Sakunin'a  "  passion for destr ction, " 
nurtured   by  Waitling'a  Jlanquiet-inspired   communi en and  anarchism,   by 
years of participation in  secret   societies and   revolutions dedicated  to 
the overthrow of  0Ppi*e8Bive   .50vernc.er.ts,   flowered  into an indiscriuiinate 
pan-deetructi.n of   ell existing forma that threaten the freedom of man. 
It la e  fantastic doctrine,   one dediceted   in Sakunin'a  consistent 
c onception to the  iii-eration of the individual human bein:-,   yet one 
employin    any  *r.own means for achieving  that exalte.]   goal—a  revolutionary 
i-.acrjitvellianisn: in its most  danrerous drees. 
Yet,   3akunin in  1866 hesitated  to  carry  Bit : cr^cl denunciation of 
the  State a   step further  Lo its  practical  application.     Thorouvhly 
disgusted  with  Italian nationalism at this point  end   perhaps drawing upon 
his own bitter experience  with nationalist   revolutions in   164c,   3akunin 
denied  nationalism as an efficient  revolutionary  e;-:ent,   out maintained  its 
temporary  necessity   : or  the   es.K.e  of   the  thoroughness of  the  revolution. 
National  parliaments  representing a  federation of autonomous communes 
were to  be  represented  in turn  by  an international federation of 
~*fcicn&el   iekunln.   pp.   Il?,ll6. 
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Bocislist countries.5    The  feds- unlti   posi is  id   e.11  the oharecteristic8 
of MsntlaB cooixunist   societies,   and  the interneti  nel coalition wes 
..erven's  'oOBDUms  of   com-suneE11  carried  one   step further.     At any   rate, 
3akunin's naticnaliev I  earns  to an end   with  this new conception  of 
internetionslism,  ine.ired  this  time,   not  by  ideas of a  Slav fe^eratiof:, 
gpt by  the  communistic  theoriee  of   Sakunin'e potential enemy,  Karl Marx. 
1869,   tnis concession  to the temporary maintenance of   statist forme 
iicn  by  the  wayside in the  sttack upon Marxist   sent railam,   out 
Jak.. ir,sjs> o  vicusly   allowed  it  to iflfluence hie prive'.e  viewc   m tue 
n;cc;i:   rj  isens to conduct the  revoiuii 
The  last ten yeare of   iakunin's life  can be  summed  up in hie 
encounters with  two  revoluti _rr rj   "greets,H   Karl Mara snd   Sergei  l^echaev 
—as different  es  Ha gall an antit heses,   ;.'£" Lin    in  ecually   significant 
respects to   3akunin's  revolutionary   soul.     His  battle with Man  dates 
.rcm the  formation of the Let   ue  of Peace end  Freed cm at  Jeneve  in I867, 
which   3akunin used  to in  ratiate  himself  with the First International, 
of   .-.iiicr) he  became a  member in  lcc6,   thus  precipitating    a  clash 
with the ...oder-te forcee of the  League  over the   socialist  threat  to 
destroy capitalism,  mercilessly, £2 toto.     The League lost  its founder, 
but  3akunin bad   squeezed   out of it ell that he  wanted,   by     ein:   it  as a 
sounding  Joard  for his  public  oppositi m tb Marx on the question of 
communist  concentration  of  power.     Oonuunist  power  BOant  a  powerfully 
centralized   State and,   as  sucn,   a  threat to individual freed-   ; 
?0arr.   Bakunln.   p.   55^. 
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3aktnin celled  hi.nseif e   "collectiviat"  in fsvor of  the aboliti-n  of the 
Stete end of parsoni1 inherited property,* 
From the  League,   j8.ar.in turned  to the International  s.nd  the 
n of hie  own Internt-ticnal  Sccial-Jeaocratic  Alliance,   which  wee 
to infiltrate  end   aei§e  control of tr.e  -ormer.     From this lnltiel  thr 
of ueurpetioo  of ..erx'   leaderahip,   it  wet   a  ehort  roedto trie Hegua  Congress 
in  1672.   wnen    iakunin was  ouatea  from the  International.     That  road 
was earked   by  the following eventai     Bakunin's  publication of,   then 
loea of,   the Kerodnoe Jelo    (reopie's Oauee)  journal;   tbo forced  dissolution 
of the Alliance  by  the International,   only  to  see the  formetion of tne 
Geneva  section o.   the Alliance,   lnepired   by   -akunin,   end  duly  voted   into 
membership in the International;   the  ^frle  Congress  of the International 
in 1969,   wnore   3akunin battled  for  b  declaration of the abolition of 
inheritance,   while warx  wente,   aiaply to aboliab    rivste  property  ift» 
one general aweep,   both  proposals failing to pass the Con,,resB,   and 
Bakunin  by this :.ove assuming added   stature as a tr.reit to Merx; 
iaannln'a  participation in the abortive  socialist upheaval  at  Lyons in 
tr.e v.ake of tne Omwna of 1671,  which in turn precipitated ni a pole do 
against   both  ^eraan and   Russian autocracies entitled  the The  Knouto- 
3er^enic  n^-ire  and  the  Social  Revolution;  Affi finally  the Neohaev 
episoue,   166;-70,  during  which   >a,.unin briefly   re-eatabliahed   whet he 
thought  was a   vital  rexetion  with  th •■  en  revel, tionariee.     The 
aspects  of this  last episode  pertinent  to the thesis of this  paper 
will  be discuaaed  in '.he  chapter on Nechaev. 
The  next four years  were  spent in abortive  attempt a to  promote 
4l6^,Jp.35». 
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3akuninist alliances  with  the   Jul^criens end  Poles  and  in e  farcical 
play  et  revolution in    jologna in  1674.     3ekunin ifctd   in 3erne  on July  1, 
1876.     It was the  death  Of a man who left   little  behind  in the  sense  of 
systematic  revolutionary   theory  and   who had  notbine to  show in the area 
cf accomplished   revolution,    jut  who gave   ihe  iapetUSjbo a  wr._le generation 
of  revolutionaries in  .\uasia and  in Western 2uro e. 
Bakunin's views en revolutionary dictatorship in the tactics of 
revolt  can  be divided   into two distinct  areas:    his three   specific 
apr.-els  to official  leaders to  tsev^e  such a dictatorship,   end  his 
theories en the relationship of  pre-revolutionary   secret society activity 
to the  administration  of the future  society.     Of his three appeals in 
the first erea, to Nicholas I,   tc Kuraviev,   and  to  Alexander II,   the 
appeals to the tears  share the most  publicity,   due  tc two  of   3akunin s 
written  works,   the  Confession  (1852) and    The  .-eople's Cause:     Romanov, 
Pu  ec-.ev,   or  .-esteit*   (1662)  respectively. 
The  Confession,   written to Nicholas  I in lc52 in the  hopes^f 
receiving 0  pardon from the  Schlusselbere  eonfim ,   is  e   remarkably 
soneiliatory mescage from the intrasigent  rebel.     Signed   "the  repentant 
sinner, "7 the  appeel  abounds in,   what  Paulette  3rupbecr,e»,   the French 
translator of the  Confession,   calls e   "tone of  submission,"  e   "superfluity 
of humility"  and   "praises directed  to  the   'glorious  tsar,"  as  well as 
C 
en attitude   ■-:   sincere  repentance for his revolutionarj  crimes.      All 
of these accusations  can  be  explained  away  by  the  dissipation bf energy 
Michel  Bakounir,e,   Confession,   Les Editions Rieder,   Paris,   1952,   p.   28% 
6Ibid..   pp.   55,56. 
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and will from years  of dial end   prison confinement,     ut the  contradiction 
of this attitude  with  that   of the fret  Bakunin  before and  after hie 
imprisonment  tempera the  veracity  of hia pe»it~nt  behavior  sufficlently 
enou gfa to discredit    them.     It is   eignigicent  that  all  three  appeals 
Bakunin are,clouded   by  tr.i s desire to ingratiate himi    --, 
dan^iroua  revolutionary  that he  was,   with thjse in power (Nicholas  and 
Huraeisv) on with those  whom he  simply  wanted   tc  impress end   solicit 
.or  his  revolutionary  or 1   r:b  (Marty a nor,   i.he  petiant). 
In the  Confession 3e:.unin outlines hia   "crimea against the  State" 
for Nicholas,   refusing to mention other names,   but uncannily  honest  aa 
to hie desires for  revolution in Russia.    Ke  discusses two topics for 
Nicholas'   benefits     advoccticn of  8   Slav federation and  his entertainment 
of ideas on the  course  of  a  purely   Russian revoi.-.ion.     In the former 
nin makes the most  open appeal to Nicholas to take up the  banner of 
ian-Slaviam and   lead  all the  Slavs against  the decadent   rovernments  which 
oppress them.     Pressing hon-sty  to its very   limit,   Bakunin revaal3 the 
word8 he  spoke  at the Prague Con-ress against  those  who  looked  to 
a reconstituted   Slav  State  within the Austrian Empire and  especially 
a^einat those who pieced  their hope in the  Russian tsar to  restore  an 
independent  SlavlO  power.     The tsar  was now  allies  with  Austria  to 
subdue  by   force ths   Slav  revolutionaries.     "The  Emperor Nicholas 
loves  neither mass freed en nor  constitutions."9    The two empires 
thus discredited,   3akunin  calls for a  aelf-Sovernin3  SIFV federation, 
much in the vein of  the international federation he  postulated  twenty 
?3aAOunine,   Oonf eaai -n.   p.   lAO. 
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yeere  i--ter.     He  then   swesre to Rieholae  that  he had  in mind  the  com.lete 
destruction  of the Austrian Smpire,   end  beyond  that,   "my  other    oal, 
the most  Important,   wae to find  in that  Slav onion the  ^oint  of  deprrtore 
for I     rand   revolutionary  propaganda  campaign in  .u.seia  with the view of 
lMtigatiXJ    a   struggle against you,   Sire. "10    At that  point,   oe  wanted 
ft avoid   i   iuro.-aan war of   jermane against  Ruesiana,   and  he  proclaimed  hie 
: red for the  Jer.ane eni  wariness of the Polish nationalist  revolt-tionaries. 
Then,after,analyzin    the course  of the  proposed   revolution in 
Russian,     Bakunin boldly,   as if to demonstrate hie thoroughgoing shame 
and   reentence et  these  insultsjto the ts< r,   reverses the  coin and 
declares that   the   roiea  beet;  e  to aisgustod   Mitb the French revolutionary 
government  and the  German rebels that t.ey felt there  wee  but  one 
resource  laft theniJ     "  to have  recourse to the   protection of the  Russian 
inperor and  to entreet  bin  to incorporate into the  Russian State 
all the  Polish provinces dominated  by  Austria ana   Prueeia.,41    This 
wae exactly    what   3akunin had  previously indicated  he  hod  warned  against.' 
3ut his next words  state his firm conviction that if   Nicholas haa  te.-.en 
up the  Slav  banner end   sent   out  tha call to ail  Slavs,   they  would  h; ve 
flocked  to him to fight a ^.inst  aeru.sny,   and  even the  whole  of   .Vestern 
Europe. 
Then follows the most attonishin    statement of all;   bakunin claims 
that at that  point,   at  the eno   of the  Slav  Congress  at  Prague,   the idea 
came to him to write a  letter to Nicholas,   in which  he  confessed  his 
sins and   begged §tv rorgiveness;  finally, ht Concluded. Wi*h ti*&. wortel 
l°3a.courine,   Oonfession.   p.   l4> 
11Ibid..   p.   184. 
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"I   implore you,   Sire,   in the neme of  the  oppress-.   Slevs,   to 
come to their aid,   to o-fer them your  powerful protection,   to 
■je  their  Saviour and   their father,   and,   after having j,rcc4^imed 
yourself the Tsar of all  the  Slevs,   to  raise the   ilev    stern"   rd 
in Western Europe,   for the destruction of the  jermans tnd   all the 
other oppressors end  enemies of the  Slav people.'"12 (translation mine) 
3akunin then declares that he destroyed  the  letter Jeceuse he feared  that 
the tsar would thin^i it preaumptHcui or B marc   BU iject and political 
criminal  to dare  to  counsel  His Majesty  end  to  auggaat  that he modify 
his politics.     Indeed,  Nicholas.1   reaction to this   brazen suggestion is 
captured  in this   Barer-stic marginal  notel     "I do  not doubt it—it i s to 
sey that I   ..ould   place mjpaelf  et tne  head of the  revolution—in somewhat 
trie manner of a  Slav i>.a8aniel}.o,   thank you.'"^5    It  would   require  only  a 
Bakunin,   anxious to flatter the  tsar who eight  -erd-n bin and   Milling to 
employ  any eeans to achive  hie  high-flown goal,   to  conceive  of   a 
revoi   . i -  ary   Laader in the aiott reactionary  of  Russian tstrs. 
Dertalnly more c-nsistent    with   3akunin'a life long political 
.oaophy was his treatment of  the  planned  revolution for his fatner- 
land.     Analysing the  corruption of the Russian bureaucracy  and  the 
poverty  of the  peasanta, Ln  stftes his well-defined  aspirationa 
for the type of society best adapted  to the solution of thoae  problem*, 
I   republic   to  be  established  by  a violent  revolution! 
I   wanted  tne  Republic     But what type of  Republic?    I  did 
not^ant a  parliamentary  republic.     The  representative  government, 
the  constitutional forms,   the  parliamentary  aristocracy 
and  its  eo-eall*d   ecuiiibrium of powers wnere all  the  agitation 
forces are  so cunningly  counter-balanced  that  none  of them 
can act,   in a  word,   sll the crafty,   confinej,   c   sable 
*23a.counine.   Confession,   p.   185. 
^Ibid..   p.   184. 
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politioal  catechi-m of the   „est-rn liberals wa    ufN    D   Jbjeet  of 
my  adoration,   nor of my   sympathy,   nor even of my  eeteenu...£ 
believe that  in Russia,   moreover,   e   rtrong dictatorial  power ia 
com ulsory,   a  power thet will  be  exclusively  preoccupied   with 
the Elevation and  the instruction of the masses;   a  power  free 
in character am  spirit,   out without parliamentary forms; 
printing  boo.ce of  free  content,   but  wlthoul   freedom of the 
press;   a   power   surrounded   aj   partisans,   enlightened   by  their 
counsels,   etren thened   by  their  free  collo-oration,   out which 
will  be  limited   by   nothln    or no  one.     I   would   say  thet the 
difference  between this  dlctatorehlp end  .ronarchiet  powere 
would  consist  only  in the fact that the first,   according to the 
spirit  of its  principles,  must intend   to render  superfluous 
its own  existence,   because it would  have  no other  goal  but the 
liberty,    the independence  and  the  progressive maturity  of the 
poople,   while  the monarchial  power,   on the contrary,   endeavoring 
always to render its own  existence Indispensable,   is conseouently 
obliged  to maintain its  subjects in a  perpetual  itate of 
infancy. 1^ (translation mine) 
Ooncernin: the  question oL   what  will  succeed  the d-scribed   "enlirhtened" 
dictatorship,   3akunin  humbly  ox; r<;sses his i /noranee,   totally  bent 
as he ie upon the destructive process,   but  he furthereclaims that  no 
one could  or would  dare to predict  so far into the future.     Moving to 
a dlaoueelon  of  who  would  serve as the temporary diet: tor,   3akur.in 
immediately,   and  vehemently denies his  own competence for  -   Bl exalted 
role,   and  claims touohlngly  his conviction that  ..e would   rail  victim 
in the  unecual   stru   .le to precipitate  the  revolution.     3akunin's 
answer to the  qua   tlon o       he  leader'■ identity  is enti-climaOtic after 
this humble self-effacement,   but thl    a    lenetlon la couched  within a 
 ic   state.-ent  of  his vision of the  role  of  the  revolutionary! 
Very  often I  have  said  to  Jermans and  Poles,   when they  were 
discussing in my  prasenee lutura formsoof government:     'Our 
mission isto destroy  and  not to construct;  there ar-  other 
men wr.o will construct,   better tnan we,  more intelligent and 
freeberj     I  had  t.ne  same hope for  Russia;   I thou ht  that the 
revolutionary  ^ove^ent  would  arouse  some more  vigorous,   younger 
1^3akouninef   Oonfession.   pp.   168-170. 
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men who would take hold  of  the revolution and  conjuct it to 
its goal.1^  (translation mine) 
It is the  statement  of  an anarchist,   fifteen years before   Bakunin'l 
systematic  ..olitical  philosophy  had matured  to that point. 
It  would  be  difficult to  reconcile  this  call for violent^ revolution, 
destroying the tsardom in Russia in order to  replace it  with a  "repub- 
Ml 
lican" dictatorship thenunknown type  o:    overnment  led   by  a  youn-er 
generation,   with  Ba^iunin's magnificent oifer of  revolutionary  Pan- 
Slav leadership  to   .icholas I.     Yet,   Bakunin's ..achiavellianism in the 
realm of tactics might  permit  even such a  glarin ; oontradlotion in the 
same  letter. 
Again,   at Toxsk,   in 1656,  the indomitable  tactician flattered  the 
vanity  of his  second  cousin .icholas Muraviev,   Governor and  veritable 
Bt Of Eastern  Siberia,   by offering bio  thsssace  revolutionary 
leadership of the Pan-Slav movement that  ..icholas had   received from the 
same  source.   B.H.   Oarr  attributes this extraordinary  offer to  "t.e 
political circumstances  of the times"  (the  Slav  patriotism generated 
by the  .-.uiao-Inrki sh  V.'ai)  and  the   "temperamental ii£pulsi"esness common 
to both  of them. "^    .-lureviev enjoyed   such    n    rbitrarily powerful 
position in Siberia  that  he fancied  himeelf  a   god-like protector of  all 
his subjects,   including the  political exiles,   rrofessing a  liberal  and 
violently patriotic attitude,   itoraviev appealed  to the  same  sentiments in 
nin'i mind  and  inspired  the fantastic offer  ana  the   slowing  letters 
3akunin wrote  back to Herzen.     3arr treats this i-iuraviev episode as 
^iakounine,   Confession,   p.   17^. 
16Carr,   3akunin.   f/ 2*1. 
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■n Important influence in the consolidation of Sakunin's political 
Idaology.     According  to  3a.'.unin, 
viev  was the  peeaestined  savior not only  of Russia  but of 
Europe*     Lnitin-  the  Slav  peoples under  fiie command,  he   would 
march  areinst the hated  Austrian end   the  hated Turk.    He 
would  hive  no truck with   'a  constituti~n and   a talkstive 
parliament o .    lllty,1    EUc Instrument would be a 
'temporary iron  dictatorship'—a   'rational dictatorship   which, 
B.00ording to his convictions,   can alone  seve  Russia. '     Such 
was the extraordinary   shape now assumed   by  Sakunin's revolutionary 
dreams.     He had   rejected  forever the  V.'estern conception of 
parliamentsry  democracy.     Revolutionary dictatorship,   curiously 
blended  with  pan-Slav fanaticism,  took its  plsce in hie  program.17 
The prisoner's plans  were  cut  short  by  his escape,   but the essentially 
reactionary .-luraviev had   served  well the  development of the  cause  of 
3akuninist  revolutionary mentality. 
Cnce Jiore,   in  1862,   3akunin expressed  his approval of a   revolutionary 
dictatorship wielded   by  a tsar,     .'.artyanov,   a former  serf freed  by  nis 
own savin:8  on^y  to  be cheated   by  his  former master in the transaction, 
r.ad eud^rated  in 1661  to London,where   Sakunin met him and  enthusias- 
tically   oe.'aa to  support hie cau_e.     ..artynov hod   written a  letter to 
the tear in April,   1662,   later -din Kolokol,   spelling  out  his 
grievance,   asserting his  loyalty  to the  "Tsar  of the Russian Nation? 
and appealing to Alexander  to  call a  ZemskV Sober.ie    Anxious to 
utilize the  traditional  sentiments of this  remarkable peasant,   3akunin 
wrote his pamphlet   The People's   3auaei    Romanov.   .-u;achev.   of festal?'. 
Originally  intended   for Kolokol,   but,   because of  the nature of the 
contents,   refuse.   J\   l.erzen and   Ogarev and   printed   separately   as a 
^Osrr.   iakunin,   pp.   242,   2k% 
ieIbid..   p.   277. 
pamphlet.     Analy:in; the three figures,   Bakunin refused   to entertain 
the ld9a of  a  Pestel,   a   bourgeois intellectual  (one  of tne  leaders 
o;  the- jece: brist   -ievolt,   lt25),   leaain; a  .Hustdan revol.'.ion.     A 
peasur.t  revolt under a  new rUgachev  was not foreign to  3akunin's mind, 
for back in  lfc49,   as he  tied  confesses   so cunai^ly  to Nicholas; I,  he had 
planned  by   pro Ln     -e villa-es to attract the   Jehemian peasents 
to the revolutionary  ce^se fend  ha.   entertained   the  same  objective in 
his proposed   rebellion in  .->.us:.ia. 
Jut now   TJakunin was dealing  with a  loyal  subject of  the tsar,   not 
a  bour eoie  anti-.-onarchist  nor even a peasant  proclaiming to be tsar. 
.he only  course was a  revolutionary dictatorship foptbe  reforming tsar, 
Alexander II: 
..e  will  speak the truth.     We  should  raost gladlj   of til    ollow 
Romanov,   if  uomanov  could  and   would transform himself froa a 
retersburg amperor into a National Tsar.      .'e  should   I'ledly  enroll 
under his  stenderd,   because  the  Russian people  still  recc  r.izes 
him,  and   because his  strength is  concentrated,   ready  to act, 
and  mi   ttt  become an irresistible  strength if  only  ne   would     ive 
it a popular  baptism.     We would follow him  because  he a lone 
could  carry  out and   complete a great,   peaceful  revolution 
without  ■bedding one dro.   of Russian or  blav  bjio&d. *° 
In spite of  the  call  tc 1  revoi. ,   ..eraen,   by  now a convinced 
constitutional monarehiet and  removed  fron his own flirtation with 
revolutionary dictatorship,  mistrusted   3akunin's idea of a  non- 
parliamentary  Zemety Sobor and  called   the  artioe*  '"a medley of  3akunist 
9gy,"   seconaed   by   Cgerev's assessment*   "'c6»fftsed  Taarism.'" 
The call  went unheeded;  ..artyonov  returned  to  Hustle,   onl,   to be arrested 
I9qj5oted   in Zarr,   Sakunin.   p.   276. 
20Ibid..   p.   278. 
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snd exiled  to Siberia,   where  he died in 1666. 
If consistency   of iieolcgy be   jua;-eti merely  by  repetition,  an 
■ ■ ee a ems nt of  Bakunin's reel  sympathies would   he polarized  inconclusively 
between tsari at and   ar.ti-tseri st  revolutionary deetatorship.     Any  remains 
of his £an-Slevist  hopes,  were crusi.ed  with the  repression of the  .oliah 
•Hi  n of   166J.     This time it  was en anti-tsarist -lOveaent, 
thereafter Bakunin' s  course  Uy  alon: this path.     Yet,  there  remained  two 
stead-ast facts of  revolution which  stand  at  Bakunin'a most  consistent 
contribution! to  revolutionary  theoryt    anarchistic  pan-destruction and 
its inseverable  parter,   a temporary   revolutionary dictatorship. 
Bakunin' s penchant   "or  anarchism based  upon total destruction of 
old forms oppressive  to the  people has  been  noted  in toe Conf essioji 
and hie  ..evolutionary  Catechism of  1666.     his hatred   -or par.iamentary 
forms anu  his advoceey   oi   a temporary dictatorship  bent on total destruc- 
tion both in  Bohemia ana  in nussia,   to  be  superseceu   ay  he knew not  what, 
were also emphasized. 21    It is in the Confession also that   iakunin's 
vereion of the  structure of the  revolutionary   secret   aooiety  is laid  out 
in a detailed  fesnion in his discussion of the  plane for the   Bohemian 
revolution in 1646-49» 
The  society  was to  be composed   of  three  separate     roupe,   independent 
of and   unaccuainte.  with each otherl     one  for the  petty   oourgeoxsie, 
another for "the  youth,   and  a third  -or the villages.     «ch of 
these grou   s was  to  be  aubmitted  to a     aevere hierarchy  and 
absolute discipline,   out they  would  saapt tnemselvee,  ^details 
and  forms,   to the  oharao   ,r     id ao  ivity  or  the  corresponding 
class.     These  ,roups  were to  be  limited  to a  small number 
o.   persons,   but  to comprise as fa. as possible within tneir 
 2lventuri  choos.s to call Bskunin's programme for  revolutionary 
m aictatorship in  Bohemia a   "Blancuiet  rather tnan anarchist 
one.     (..o~ts of  Revolution,  p.  58. ) 
mid at all the men of talent,   wisdom,  energy,  ana  influence who, 
obeying the  jirection of the  center,   would   aot in their turn on 
the masses,   so to   speak invisibly.     These three   groups were to 
be linked together   .y  a  Central  Committee  cou.osed   of three, 
or,   at the moat,   five members....The  revolution accomplished, 
ay  secret  society  was not to be dispersed,   but on the" 
contrary to  be   strengthened,   expanded,   and   joined   by  vigorous and 
really   strong elements,   end   little  by   little,  it  would 
encocvass all  the  Slav territories;  I   hoped  that it  w. 
furnish  equally  the men necessary for  the different tas  e  o.   the 
revolutionary  hierarchy.   (16p2)22 (translation mir.e) 
It is no  wonder that the Russian Third   section,   educated in such a 
detailed fashion by  the  very  patriarch of revolutionary  secret   societies, 
couij  infiltrate  and  destroy   so  successfully many  sucr.  secret circles. 
At any  rate,   this  W .urn that   Bakunin vasito use in the 
formation of  all his  Ifter  "Alliances."    It  is unnecessary  to evaluate 
tr-em all,   similar as they  arei     a hierarchy  of  secret  cells,  many 
imaginary,   but all  obedient to the  leader,   Bakunin.     "he one  such 
organization consiuered moat  -an erous  by  ;-iarx tc t:.e  revolutionary 
movement  was    -.a.-unin's International  jociel-_.e._ocratic  Alliance,   end   t.-.e 
one feared   so mowfcrousl,.,  yet   oo  briefly,   by  the tsarist  aj.inistrati on 
-inspired  Nechaev  conspiracy. 
Tne International-Social-De^ocratic Alliance was  forma a,;unin 
in 1866  in aeneva.     It  was inspired   by  the .-'irst Internati-nel headed 
by ..arx and  into  which   iakunin had   just enrolled  as a memDer.     Encouraging 
his followers  to  join .-.arx'   Internati-nel,   3akunin whipped  into  8ha.Be 
r.ia  "  Secret  Alii ince, "  the     overnin     )Ody  oi   bbf International  Social- 
Damocratio Alliance.     This  secret organization was to  serve as the 
"'general  staff  of the  revolution,1"  the  "'invisible dictatorship"'2? 
223aKOunine,   Oonieasion,   pp/ 222T22?. 
25:\omad,   Apostles,   p.   168. 
which would  infiltrate the  .•'irat International and  constitute the  security 
or     ;   ed   ^eft wing of that body,  while maintel   I       Irt the  same time 
its own iac.enience.     Its    purpose wes subversion,   that is,   tc ta. e 
Bossession of  the  International and  direct the  revolution in its naice.24 
unin,   elraedy  at oddi  with .-.arx over the  question o-   the  State 
.1 Its  appurtenances,  incl    i ha rl ht oi   inheritance, versus 
tr.e State ownership  snd  control ol   ell  property,   now took  secret action 
in line  with his  defiant  wor, e.     Allcwin    the  'open"  Alliance to  State 
publicly  his  collectivist  views  as  put forth in the Revolutionary 
-stfcchlsm of  1666, An drew up for the   "Secret  Alliance1  bis 
pro ram  and   Aim of  the  Aev.luticnarv   Cr-nizeticn c:  the  International 
Brothers,  in which  the dual   . ersonalitjjea of  3akunin the  anarchist and 
;akunin the  revolutionist  were in sharp conflict.    Dlacuisini 
questions o    tactics for agitating  and  arousing the  revol  tJ    c  r; 
Lnstlnota of the meases throu-h propaganda,   -or ieefcroying the State, 
.or reorganising  society after the revolution,   the r.-c rex hit 
Tigoaously at those  ■•Jaeoblns <*• Weaquista'    who opted for  'dictatorship' 
am 'state eantrallzatlon.'"25    It ii beginning of 1 Ltter 
nin-Marx  war,   but  more  In  ortant it  is   ?akunln'a fir at  recognizable 
break,  in theory  with  the  Blanqulal   tradition.     The course  of  revolutionary 
ilctatorthlp,   travelled   itrtdghnaj  for twenty yeers,   eud   enly  veers  off 
to the  left  as  -'akunin,   flrmlj entrenched  in his s,eciel  brand  of 
snarohlam,     rabe the   reir:s fro. the fOMW #**•* :sumes  control 
ot   ... -   .■ ...  momentum. 
24 Ihus, we have presumably tr.e com 
B 
who 
the  "0,-en"     Alliance,   whic 
t:.e rirst International.' 
11 •   :ed  hierarchy   of   Bakunin, 
',d        i   fo   owe * Mtte former Italian ^T,r^e, 
in turn direct the  "Secret  Alll.ne.,"  whic, In turnjovarn. 
«« _■     lliance,   which in turn  is to usurp t nd  control 
2?homad,   j-poe^jae,   pp.   169,190. 
This  sc-called   break -^z'   be  carefully  analyzed,   however,  -'or there 
is none of herzen'e  backsliding  here.     iiakunin,   drunk with the elixir 
of power,   with  the  opportunity of manipulating a   secret  aociety in the 
revolutionary   atri. ;gle       ainst the  whole of Europe,  felt,   accordin-  to 
Max .Qi.8i,   U I     ,:-   ievelop the  trappin  s  of  ■  new theory for his 
society to propagate,"®    Wishing I   credit the r-larxists who blocked 
his  path  to  supreme  power,   he was forced  to ta    than with   some derogatory 
epithet.     He  chose   ilenquism and   Jacobinism for it  seemed  to him 
that the  genuine freedom yni   ecuelity of the masses were threatened 
by .-.erx1   strategy  to  seize political control  of tne  State  end  use it 
te lireet the  socialist  revoluti 
The  Don  uniste  believe  they  muet organise  the  workera'   :crces 
to take poaaesai  n of the political power of the .    The 
volutioncry   Socialists organise  with a  view to ti -.ruction,, 
or If ycu prefer a  politer word, the liquidation of    he   State, 
rhe  Communists are the  upholders  of the  principle and   . r- ctice 
o. authority,  the Revolutionary Booialiati   b       oo   Ldenoa 
only in liberty.      5©th  equally   supporters  of that  science which 
must kill  superstition and  replace  faith,   tne  ;ormer 
would  wish to impose it;  the  letter  ..ill exert ti.oaeelvea to 
prop-       a  it  so that grou.-a of   human beings,   oomlnced, 
will organise  themaelvea and   will federate spontaneously, 
fi 
foi 
traoed  J 
.     .     ,,        . mi.-   o...itli4lnnipii    £nr-1n lists   tr.inlC.. . i.:8t 
8U; 
the  . 
governed,   and  thst the   source of its misfortunes does not 
lie in  such  or  auob  Conn of   government,   out in the very 
principle and  feet  of    .overnment,   or whatever  type it  may   <>•.*'  (1671) 
Reactionaries in the   pact,wrote  .akunin,   have failed   because 
they wanted  to  ere, te the  Revolution themselves,   by  their  own authority 
^Apostles, pp.   191,192. 
27o ,    „„,m    ^edomanc  the  State,   (1671, Freedom rre.s, 
London,   1950,  *.'•   ^enafick,   ea.,   pp.   16,19. 
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and by their own power by revolutionary decrees, by imposing this 
task upon the masses; rather their aim should be that of provoking the 
„28 
masses to action.    Marx is making the same mistake, with the aim of 
facilitating the socialist revolution, but in reality exchanging the 
old despotism for a new dictatorship.  Revolution with the intention 
of capturing the forms of the State for the so-called liberation of the 
masses from political and economic bondage "would lead to political 
dictatorship, to the re-emergence of the State, of privileges, of in- 
equalities, of all the oppression of the State—that is, it would lead 
in a round about but logical way toward re-establishment of political, 
29 
social, and economic slavery of the masses of people."   A Marxist 
"dictatorship of the proletariat" will not be able to escape this 
inevitable law of political behavior: "We believe power corrupts 
those who wield it as much as those who are forced to obey it.  Under 
its corrosive influence, some become greedy and ambitious tyrants, 
exploiting society in their own interest, or in that of their class, 
while others are turned into abject slaves." (1869) 
Eschewing a revolutionary dictatorship in the Communist style 
(contrary to his sentiments of 1848-49), and a Constituent Assembly 
smacking of bourgeois hesitation and potential counterrevolution 
(consistent with his sentiments of 1848-49), Bakunin threw the revolution 
into the hands of the masses, especially the peasants, a class mistrusted 
by the Marxists.  Supposedly seething with revolutionary instincts deep 
G. P. Maximoff, ed., The Political Philosophy of Bakunin, pp. 397-399- 
29lbid., p. 298. 
3°Bakunin in Isaiah Berlin, Karl Marx: His Life and Environment, 
Oxford University Press, London, 19^3, P- 233 
within their souls,   the oppressed  masses  represented  to  3akunin e vital 
force in the conduct of the revolution.     He  sew then  spontaneously 
organizing tnemselves into groups,   inspired   by  revolutionary  leaders,  and 
risinsr up to assert their freedom against  oppressive government! 
"The only army isjbhe  people,   the  whole people,   in both  the  cities  and 
the country. "51    Any  and   every  government would  be  oppressive to  them; 
therefore,   the  violence  of the  revolution must  be total an; universe)., 
destroying all the artificial forms of  society  which heve  served  to 
exploit,  disable,   and  kill the  people.    The instinct toward  freedom 
will be  satisfied,   and  the new  society  Mill  be  onfof the  greetest 
possible freedom and   ecuelity. 
A discussion of   Bakurdn's concept of freedom and  equality,   the 
interaction ani   conflict  between the two in political  philosophy, 
wil], not  be attempted  here.     Suffice it to  say  that he thought in 
terms of  pure concepts,   and  his vision of  tbJ future  society  was no 
less Utopian*    where man was to be  free without  restraints an.  equal 
without domination.     The  nature  of that  society  was to  be  Proudhonian, 
a "no-government"  or an-srehic  system or  "the republic  as  a  oomaune,   the 
republic  as a federation,   a  Socialist anu   a  genuine  peopl.'i republic- 
tr.e  system of Anarchism. "52  Sakunin proceeded  to outline a   ,ro,:ramem> f or 
taat future  society,   the  last point  or which  was the 
Organizing  o, a  society   by means of a  free federation 
fro-  below upward,   of  worker's associ,ti-ns,   imustnal as well 
^ricultur'al,     cientific  as well as  --a^associations--^^ 
of lions' ^HaSon.    £  o*  nations into an international 
fraternal association.   (lc<57) 99 
?*..a>:i*off,   p.   5eo. 
?2Ibid..   p.   297. 
55lbid..   p.   296. 
Whet Is this but  a  State  in die uise directed   by the  conveniently 
unmentioned  revolutionory  leaders?    Mai Komed   remarks upon Bakunin's 
contradictory use  et   bhfl   word   "State"  even within the ?ro;-;ram; in one 
section the rro^ram speeki of the necessity of  the total destruction 
cf"the  State and   all  State institutions,'"  while in another  section it 
refers to  "'the  new and  revolutionary   State. "'5^    Here   ;ekunin the  onatchist 
meetc . -   I long 3akunin the revolutionist;  »lax ;.qmad further describes 
this furious antithesis» 
1'he  philosopher in Bakunin,   his quest  for the  'absolute,' 
made him absorb Froudhon's  political idea  of   'Anarchy1 
in the ..eaning of   'Na-govarnneabj  toat is to sey,  the 
greatest  possi ;ls  realisation of  humtn freedom.     Dut 
the man of action,  the  noble  adventurer,  the  practical 
revolutionist,   who was out   tor  concrete achievements, 
forced  him to  contradict and  con-".wad  the uneertk^ dreamer. 
Subsecuently  e  verbal  compromise  wee  effected  wnereoy  a 
decentralized,   deiocretic  government,  managed  from 
behind the curteins  by an invisible revolutionary 
oligarchy,   was declared to  ce identical with  'An-archy'.-r55 
But which  one  wee the  re: 1    iakunin'i       ne years  betwen  1641 and 
MM   Jakunin's  develoaent toward  a  systematic  tnocry  of anarchism, 
the final acceptance  of  which is  attributed    >Oth  to bis    is  - st with 
Italian nati-nalism and  the challenge    resented   by l:arx an.   his 
State centralism.     Yet he  never  discarded  his passion for destruction 
and,  though his attempts to define the future  eociety  in 1668 were more 
detailed  and :aore  assertive than his humole  refusal to  speculate in  1652, 
nis words ore  sufficiently  M I   mi to aumit of  his dispaasion and 
■laoat unconcern     or  the  creative  phase as  oca a red  to his intense 
^Apostles,   p.   190. 
35lbid. 
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concentration on the destructive  phase of  the revolution.     Several 
fragments from  Bakunin's  works indicate that this failure  to plan for  the 
future was a deliberate  strategy  of   Bakuninist revolutionary Ideology* 
e frudely   refuse to  work out plena for futufce conditions, 
because this does not coincide  with our activity,   end 
therefore we  consider the purely theoretical work of 
reasoning as  useless....No one can aim at destruction 
without taring at  leest a  remote  conception,   whaVther true  or 
false,   of the new order....(because) the Liore  vividly  the future 
!• viou*liied,-the core powerful if th« foroo of doitruotion.... 
?or those  who are already  committed to the  cause  of 
revolution,   all talk  3 jout the distsr.t future is criminal 
becauseolt hindeg pare destruction end   steejs the ti-e of 
revolution.   (1675)56 
This is the   sa^e    'a/.unin,   a  little   bolder perhaps,   oi   the Confession. 
The activist  believed  in  "revolution now^"  but*dreader  believed  in the 
beautiful  society   later,   probably after his own death and  perhaps whole 
generations  liter. 
■■•11  of theea incon8ii.te.ciea only emphasize the feet that  Bakunin'a 
(violent polemics against the   dlanquism of Man ana  against the  possiAity 
of such an authoritarian  "withering away" into the  clessleas,   completely 
free  society  of  ;jure  Communiaa were an indirect condemnation oi   hie  own 
I revolutionary tacticafend  dreams.     The tight discipline,   unquestioning 
obedience,   end  utter  secrecy  of his organized   society   belie  niu  ttate- 
aents concerning t.-.e  neceseity  for the absolute freedom an-   equality   of 
the aasses.     Max Nomad,   in f-is  penetrating analysis of this  contra- 
diction in  3akunin'a ideoio j  end   tactics,   ppce,;s of  several incidents 
within the Alliance itself  that  betrayed  his  own pers.nal  dictatorship 
witnin the  society.     In 1£69 a  group of the members acted  on their  own 
~Fzr j&J2ene  i^z&T,   The Joctrine of  Anarchism of i-J.chael  A.   3akunin, 
MargLietto  university   ?reas,  .,ilwau.:ee,   .isconsin,   195P,   pp.   il3rll4. 
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cor.centr8ti.on on the destructive  phase of the rsvolu.ion.     Several 
fragments from  Bakunin'a works inuicate taat this failure  to plan for the 
future was  a deliberate  strategy   of   iakuninist revolutionary Ideology* 
.e frankly  refuse to work out plsne for futufce conditions, 
because this does not coincide with our activity,   e nu 
therefore we  consider the purely  theoretical work of 
reasoning as  useless....Ko one can aim  at destruction 
without having at  least  a  remote   conception,   whether true  or 
false,  of the new order....(because) the more vividly  the future 
if viBMlifcee, :th«"»or«'.pcwerful i« the fore* ef deitruotlon..,. 
For those  who are already  committed to the  cause  of 
revolution,   all talk 3jout the distant future is cri^insl 
becauseAt  hinder* pare destruction and   stens the ti.a of 
revolution.  (1675)56 
This is the   sa^e    lakunin,   a  little  bolder perhaps,   of  the  Confession. 
The activist  beli.-rved  in  "revolution nowj1  but.dreamer  believed  in the 
beautiful  society   later,   probably  after his own death and  perhaps whole 
generations  liter. 
All  of these  inconsistencies  orly  emphasize  the feet that  Bakunin'e 
violent polemics azainst the   Jlanquism  of Man ana  against the  possidlity 
of such  an authoritarian  "withering eway" into the  cluseless,   completely 
free society  of  pure  Communiaa were an indirect conaemne'.ion  -    bis own 
revolutionary tacticsfend dreams.     The tight discipline,  unquestion. 
obedience,   end utter  secrecy  of hie organized   society  belie  Ola  t-tate- 
aentB concerning the necessity  for the absolute freed cm an-   -quality   of 
the masses,     .-.ax Nomad,   in uie penetrating anulysi& of this  contra- 
diction in  3akunin's Ideology  and   tactics,   ppee,:s of  several incidents 
within the Alliance itself that  betrayed  his  own personal dictatorship 
witnin the  society.     In 1£6°-  a  group of the members acted  on their own 
IS tu.tene  .yziar,   The Joc^rine  of An^rcr.ia^ of ..ichael  A.   Bakunin, 
Marfuette university  Press,  Milwaukee,   '..'iaconei.'i,   195^.   Pp.   115rll^ 
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initiative  ana   convened  a meetin,:  without   iekunin's knowledge,   the  result 
of  whicr. wasfen accusation :rcm the  Brothers against  Bakunin's auth.ri- 
terianisin,   answered   by  Bakunin's indignant  "To All These   jentlemen," 
denying the  charge and  resijnin    hie  leadership position.     T.e fact 
that the executive committee  wes renderea  helpless  by his resignation 
was perhaps  sufficient proa.:   „.   •_,...  c   r  5. 
Truly,   it   ..as a   sort o.   one-man conspiracy... .Yet it  was 
acne in the name  of  anarchism,   the  supposed  antithesis  of 
authoritarianism....In his letter   'To All These  fitirtlWMP  ' 
3akunin  stated  as hie   'innermost conviction'   'that man ie 8nd 
always will   oe,   the dictator,   not  jurijicfelly  but actually, 
who ects,   and  only in so far as he acts in the  spirit end 
in t.'.e interest a  of  the   society.'     ..as there ever a aictator 
who did  not make the  same  cleim?"57 
Surely,   :akunin used   different  criteria  to assess his activities 
snd  those of   ot..er revolutionaries.     Could he  poasi.-ly,   in all his 
fearful insight into  the danger  of the  Communist   "dictatorship of 
the proletariat" turning into  a dictatorsni;   over the proletariat,   have 
overlooked  the  same danger within nis own ranks?    .-.ax -:omad  a;__in pin- 
points B  fitting answer to this rhetorical question: 
... P.akunin'B  enerc.iy—in  the  sens-   of  no- .overnment—was 
merely a fancy-dress ter-  for  -is  antipathy  to any  dtetator- 
ship other t.nan . ia M»i.... 58ln one  of  his whimsical 
moods Alexander herzen called  his friend   3akunin a 
Columbus without  America.... "akunin thought  i.e had 
founa  the  road  to the heavenly Uto ia  of An-arcjay. 
V.hat he  actually discovered   was the  path to the internal 
reality  of Dictatorship.59 
Two ot::er teelin . indications of  3akunin'e  consistent  belief in 
the e.ficE.cy  of a  dictatorship in revolutionary tactics concern his 
57j-.ax ;;omad.   Apeetles.   pp.   I$»;vl9§. 
58I_bid.,   p.   194 
$9I bid..   p.   215. 
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unouelifi-J   ..upport  or  two 0-& ail diaoiplaa,   who put in  o fl     r 
oretf.ce  the  -lost despicable asoects of  secret  society authoritarianism! 
-er ;ei  Seat  ev  fcnj  '••icr.ael  lazhin.     The ..echaev episoje  will  be discussed 
in more detail in  . >ond  p  rt of  thifl  yt.;er,   out it is fitting to 
n0ft.n-r« t.hnt tn-   ?stec.::uu    :• t.- rjj   rulee for Heehaav'a 
organization of  a  revolutionary   society  based  on strict  secrecy  and 
severe punishment for    disobedient and  traitorous member!,  if not 
actually  written I,   was  at  least  collaborated  in ana  approved 
usiastically  by   him.     The Ivanov murder an.   the ensuinv  sordid 
actions «f ^echaev in  Jeneva were later denounced  vehemently  by   3akunin, 
but tt,  would   be  interesting to know v.hat  3akunin's attit.de would  have 
been toward  Sechaev  ana  his  acitivities,   had  there nor. also  oeen para       1 
animosities   between the two ■■jllj any   rate,   Hechaav  fooled     l     nin for 
a consider  bly..lonS time and  the   latter was entranced  with this wal.dn , 
talking,   acting embodiment of  the ideal revolutionary  k la  Jakunin. 
3azhin was not as     -   .boyent,   bat     I    nin approved   of  Id I auth-rifearian 
stence within the  revolutionary  „ov,..er.t,   particularly  as Sazhin echoed 
3akunin'a words faithful!,  and   supported  his mentor in everything, 
though it is true that the young man treated   Bakunin mo* dia- 
respectfully  in  later ye.re,   deserting him in   iolosna  in 1674 and  acti 
disloyally  in the  3arcn*ta affair.*° 
Bakunin'. theories  on revolutionary   authoritarian! am can be  judged 
further  by  the use his followers in toe*, made  of  them.     ..h.reea the 
i*°^.'u  the  ref 'erences to  Saz::in in Oerr,   Bakunin. 
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Russian BakuninistS took relatively little Interest in his concern over 
t.-.e menipulati->n o :ov.'-r by a minority an, its temporary or permanent 
character,   they did  find  in   iekunin't ce3 to  the nascent  revolu- 
tionary  instincts of the peasants a  ground  for  a^itatin    -:.ong them for 
a soontaneous revolt,     the  abortive  Ohigorin conspiracy  of  lc77,  in 
whicoJLhe  peasants  were appealed  to in the  name  or  the T»4r to rise up 
and destroy thai*  landlord-oppressors,   was instigated   by  a  group of 
3akuninist  "rebels"  and  is a fitting sequel to  Sa^unin's  own appeals 
to the ts^re to take up revolutionary  jictators.aips.     ?ertici larly  in 
southern Russia arouna  Odessa  and  Aiev,  a  grou, af  these   "r.bels" in 
the 1879'a agitated  among the  workers and  peasants,   tee«lag to arouse  a 
l«ri«l  Of   spontaneous revolts and  even participating in ter/OTiat 
activities,   Ualuiiag assassination,   a _ai   st  gevavtl   I  iffiaUU. 
liny of them later  joine-   the'feeroeaaya Volya party and partici.ated 
in the  attempts a^Lnst  the Tsar.     3akunin never condoned  terror, 
ner ae,  though he  would  have   permitted  it in the destructive  period 
of the  revolution as  long at it was directed   -gainst traitors to the 
revolutionary  cause.     The  3akunir.ists wer*  concerned  with immediate 
action as^ppceed  to  the Lavrovist  propagandists,   who rowaw a  long 
period   -f  propaganda  in preparation for the  r.volt.     Thai! approach 
wa, typically   iakuninist,   that is,   livin6 amon : the mr.ssos,   adapting to 
their ouitoa,   an,  developing tha instinct  to  revolt  lapareep  L   ij    >» 
their covert propaganda.     Imbued  with tha  paeoion for .estroction, 
these   >ak,ninist disciples can be   said  to ,ave  concent. -solely 
on 
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the destructive  phaM as opposed  to the creative  st« ge.     In this 
sense,   they  were purer anarcni£.tj than Sakunin himself. 
Cne other fl gure,   partially  1   fl      oad alcunin,   ehoold be 
mentioned here in connection with  the thesis of this psper.     Prince  Peter 
KropOtkin,   noted  Russian anarchist  and former propagandist in the 
ShaUovaky  Oirola in St.   Potoroburg,   1672-74,   publicized more  syste- 
matically  anj  mori   eloquently  than  Sakunin the creed   of anarchism. 
.n a pamphlet  entitled   "Rovolutionary   Sovertmont, " written in 1680, 
i.ropot..in eUnounoad   equally  the  reliance upon parliamentary forms and 
u.on a  revolutionary  do'ctetorship to accomplish revolutionary  ^eala. 
^cn.inced of the necessity  of a violent revolution for accelerttin ;  the 
Socialist  Society  of  t.ie future and   evan of  the  rightnesa  of assassination, 
particularly  of the Tsar,  if trie victim's death  would   contribute to 
the comin^ revolution,   Kropotlcin echoee Bakunin in nia hatred  of 
bourgeois parliamentar     forma  which  a ;ort the eatebli ■Mf of a  socialist 
republic.    He than ta'::es up the  battle against those  who wish to conduct 
the revolution by means of  a dictatorship! 
-or us anorob.iota.tho dictatorship of an individual or  of 
a party   (at   cottorn the very  same thin-;  baa been finally 
condemned.     WO  know thet revolution und   government are 
incompatible.     une ;auet destroy  the other no -natter  what 
D DM  is    Ivan  to  -ov.rnment,   whether dictatorship,   royalty, 
or  parliament.^* 
ftropoticin is more hesitant  than 3akunin about  besmirching the name 
of 31encui,   and  he  ninta at his purely anarchiatic tendenciest 
The  ^an  who more then any other  was the incarnation of 
thlo  system  of  conspiracy,   the man who by  a  life  spent in 
prison paid  for  his devotion to this  syste- on the ave 
of his ieath uttered  these words,   which o.  tbaaoolvoo 
make an  entire  pro  ra._?-'..either  Jod  nor KaatorJ 
^Petor  KropotKin,    .ro.o.-in's       •■ - .1     i^sr;;   Pem .hleta,   Vanguard 
tress,   Now YOr. ,   1927,   Ro ar    .    Joldwin,  ed.,   p.   24J. 
42i bid.,   p.   2k6.   £i  Diett rn  ..attre  wse the  name of the   31anquiat journal). 
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3ut even  ilanqii  in  September,   lt70,   was not the force that felled  the 
Republic;   ratr:er,   it  was th- masses o-   Paris  spontaneously  risin    up 
against Napoleon IIIJ 
For it is not  socret   societies nor  .v-n  revolutionary 
organizations tliet  can    ive  the  finching   ,low tc    overnments. 
_;.eir  -unction,   their historic mission.is to pre,,   r^ _en's 
minds for the  revolution,     n.i  then wr.en men's  AnJa  .'re 
prepired  and   external circumstances are fevorub.e,   the 
final   ruifa  is made,   not  by the  ^-Doup  t:.at initiated   t:.o 
movement,   out  by  the mass  of the  people alto other outside 
of the  society.^5 
.he secret   society    must abrogate its power  and  content itsei    v.it. 
I el ping to  or.orj.z-  the autonomous workers'   end  peasants'   associations. 
.he  new society  will  be a federation of tnese autonomous organizations? 
in short a   "ne- rcvern.cr.t,"  ^n-arc:dc  society.     The eloquence  and 
consistency  of ..ropotl-.i n' s Bnarehio t       ;ht,  in comparison with the 
contradiction and  rambling of  3akunin's   .or  s merely  reflects the 
fact that the former  was never faced  with the  problems  of the latter 
in translatin: r.is theory   into revolutionary    ction. 
Finally,  what baa  been the  Soviet treatment  of the man who preached 
end attested to practice methods used   by  the Solsr.ev.-.s themselves 
in capturing and   conducting the  revolution.     Varxarcv indicates that,^/'^ 
3akunin was  in high repute as a   revolutionary  great.    Yuri   ote..,ov, 
i  unin's _i.st famous  Soviet biographer,stated  in 1>2J  in the ;iret 
volume  o.  his  biography  that 3akunin was  '"the founder  of the concept 
of Soviet power,   the  political form of the dictate*ship iff the  proletariat.'"^ 
£5Kro?ot..in,   p.   246. 
44yarls...ov,   p.   6. 
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;.;ax Nomad partially ieconds this opinion with the quipi " Sy an ironic 
twist of pereonsl evolution, the moat famoua Sue si n .-.arxist, the ex- 
3akuniniet  rle^henov,   op.ose, olshevik Revolution,   while rlokhenov's 
.     .arxist  iisoiple,   Lenin,   rev-rted  to itany  of    iakunin'a 
c-.'.cepte which  be) passed  as i«Iarxias. "^5    This is all  rather  strange  in 
view of  3ekinin's   ..itter  attacks upon Marx ana  his  "dictatorship of 
tba proletariat,"  and  particularly  in reference to a  pamphlet   "Cn the 
Eve of  October"  written by  Lenin in 1917,   in Mbiob ba  attaoked those 
opportunists,  especially   3ernstein,   who accused Marxian  of   ilanquiam, 
denying tba oharg* an isizin     tba urgent necessity to  save the 
revolution by a violent  a-i     1      1     powr    .,   ■  uieciplined  revolutionary 
elite,   reit^ratin;- hit  aentimenta of •..r..at_ is  to  be done?  (1902). 
Jailing the   ioleheviMarxist tactics for an upriaing on art,   Lenin 
contested  their  art  with  the imprecticaiity  ox   a   ^lanquist  seizure.46 
The distinction is not clear,   out  lo icily   s.-cakir.    Laain and  his 
Pradect*ors  should  nave incited   3aKunin with tnoae jer.ouncers  of 
...arxis*.     i-erhsps it   speak, for  the  obvious  ei-lUrity   in tba  final 
analysis,   between ...arxist anu   3eKunin«t tactics;   or .ore  li.ely,   certain 
phases   0.   3*kunin'« ideology  were,  convenient**  »V*rlooked   by  tba 
Soviet ^interpreter s. 
At  any   rate,   Ste^iov'e cUeaificati-n of  BakUftiO in the  Soviet 
.10  ,  in  1,20  «..   -odi-ied   by  h*. in 192c,   when ne  noted  publicly 
3.kunin>. f.ilura  to  appr.ci.te tba   significance  of  the   ,r.ietariat 
^Apostles,   p.   215. 
^Quoted  partially  in Hans Xa>hn,T|* ,Hnd   of .^rn Russia,   Harper 
and  Brothers,   New York,   1955,   PP-   242-245. 
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as a revolutionary  force.     At this time,   Steklov called   him still, 
however,   a pupil  of Marx  end   a forerunner of  Lenin because  of  hi a 
revolutionary,  as opposed to opportunist,  goeialian    n.  hiJereatment of 
$he nation lity  problem.^7    Another  Soviet historian TJyac.eslov 
polove.d.in 1926,attacked  this view of 3akunin's fathering the  Bolshevik 
ideologyl 
1 3akunin was   not the founder  of the  concept of  Soviet  power, 
if  only  for the  reason that  in nis  projects there is  not the 
slightest trace  of   similarity  tc the  Soviet  power....(yet) in 
appraising  Bakunin,   we must   reec     Lae  that hisis the greatest 
revoli.  ionrr     :i     re  la fustian r.istory  of  the  last  century.... 
In his real  practical  revolutionary  struggle,   3akunin actually 
introduced  into  his organizational  work ell  those  basic 
conception which have entered  into the armoury  of revolutionary 
struggle  of  evsry  truly  revolutionary  party,  including the 
Communist Party.     In this  sense,   Jakunin is  one  of the 
greatest  revolutionaries of the past,  and  we  3ccu.uni ats are 
realizing,   by  other ways  and methods,  the dreams which 
Sakunin could   not  bring to realization*..*We  rev-re  dakunin as 
our forerunner aid  as oerr predecessor.     And  the  struggle  wheih 
was  wa to   sc furiously  in the  Pi ret International is for us 
history  which  we try  to analyze dispassionately.   '^° 
In the period   1940-1950,   dakunin was in disrepute,   oondemned   by the 
Soviets for everything from the  "cowaruice" of  his Sunresslon and 
letters or  eppeals  to Alexander IA   .O the  "Jeaaitlan" of   his colla- 
boration with xvechaev.     It is  only  necessary to  note the aeouaati   Q 
from this  period  against Jakur.in's disruptive and  even 
traitorous behavior in the first International and his failure to 
head the Marxist emphasis upon the urban world.n    class,  and  the 
about-face  of the  Soviet treatment of  Bakunin  will  be  obvious. 
Regardless  of that fact,   dakunin1 s theories and  personal  life  ere 
vulnerable to this  sort  of treatment;  his own anifts in mid-stream 
'Varlamov,  p.   7. 
48Ibid*.   p.   £-10. 
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were nctorioua,   particularly  whan,   as in the  otM of   -he  concentration 
of power  in the  hmvjmot a Binority,   h« was  com^ittin    the  £o.„e  crime 
he was condemning. 
Perheps   3akunin recognized  the  potential iangei   o;   . .. revo- 
lutionary  authoritarianism,   but it is more  likely that hie  "creative 
destruction" was motivated   by  such  genuinely   lofty ideals oi h 
freedom  and  equality  that   hil    r.c'.l nvellian methods  were  obscured  and 
practically  discounts';   in    is  aind  for the  iake of the realization of 
:.. t Utopian goal.     Even as  an emigre,   his theories were  felt more 
intensely  for  a  longer period  of time  by  e  greater number of radical 
figures in Russia  t..an thcaf of any other  revolutionary  leejer,   excepting 
onJy Marx and   Lenin. 
Pyotr Zaichnevsky and Youn;- Russia:  The Inception of the Idea in Russia 
■ 
The first organized party within Russia to aaopt as its official pro- 
gram the as uuption of power by a revolutionary uictatorship for the pur- 
jjse of aocompl1 riling the socialist revolution occupies a very short chapter 
in the  story of  post-emancipation revolutionary Russia,    xoung Rus-ia,  an 
illegal revolutionary leaflet, began to appear in St. i'etersuurg in .Jay, 
1.-62.    It was uistriuutea by a group unaer the auspices of two MB, pyotr 
Zaichnevsky anu perikles Argiropulo,  uoth of when lay in a Moscow prison 
for clandestinely circulating forbiduen books,  ana cease- witn Argiropulo1s 
ueatn from typhus in December,  1962 and Zaichnevsky1 s exile to Sioeria in 
January, 1863.    More Jlanquist than anarchist, Zaicnnevsky's group was a 
flash in the pan, but it exerciseu a greet influence upon one most noteu 
..ussian advocate of revolutionary uictatorsnlp, Pyotr Tkachev,  and deserves, 
therefore,  a place in the  theoretical framework of Russian ilanquisai. 
Zaichnevsky was born in Orel province on October lo,  161*2, and entered 
Moscow University in lo59,  where he -tudiea mathematics anu engagea in the 
clanaestine printing ox pamphlets publicising the socialist-materialist views 
of Oyarzov, Herzen, dlanc, Leroux, rroudhon, Fe«erbacn, and Bucnner.    In 
looO,  Zaicnnevsky oecaae  interested in the  "Library of Kazan Students," 
a secret organization of students dedicated to the Spirit of the Socialist 
devolution, but In 1361,   le   od bia jew frie i        Iropalo founded a new 
Society called "The Society of Communists," in which Zaichnevsky workea on 
organization wnile Argiropulo handleu the euitorial side.    After successfully 
lithographing many editions and conducting their society on an experimental 
communal oasis,  Zaicnnevsky and Argiropulo soon foundea a real secret printing 
oress,   "Tne First Free Russian Press."    iieanwnile Zaichnevsky was becoming 
iavolvea in the Polish revolutionary cause,   for the  ■**■  of which he deliverea 
a speech on the steps of the Catholic Church in ..oscow on February 17, tftt, 
1 
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to the students wno had attended a requie 10a Tor the Poles killea in a 
demonstration in »/arr-aw on February 1$.    Zaichnevsky callea for the uniting 
of Russians anu Poles under  "  'the  common banner,  red i'or Socialism and 
blMk for the Proletariat,1   nl or in other words a Socialist Poland, lhioh 
was far from the desires of the majority oi Polish revolutionaries who 
wisheu only liLeration from the Russian yoke. 
Disao jointed in  the Polish cause,  Zaicnnevsky turneu to tne Sunuay— 
schools then   lopuler in Moscow for the instruction of the illiterate workers. 
The   third Section,  fearing the consequences of private  instruction of the 
peasants uy revolutionary-mindec. stuaents  31 ut c.own the  schools almost from 
bheir inception.     In May,   1861,  the unaauntea Zaichnevsky left ...oscow to 
travel in the  south,   soreauing propaganua leaflets a.aong the peasants.    Bn- 
couraged by a numoer of spontaneous peasant revolts,  particularly the one 
led by Anton petrov in Beguna,  Zaichnevsky uegan to .Jiite open letters es- 
pousing his  socialist iueas.    It ./as at this  time that he came particularly 
under the influence of .lazzini ana his "Young Italy" society,    quoting lazzini's 
••  "Now ana always,'   »2 Zaicnnevsky explained to his friends his fervent de- 
sire to conduct propaganaa openly and continuously.    It was ids encouragement 
of an armed peasant revolt that finally attracted the attention of the offi- 
cials,     no. he and Argirojulo were  ;.rrestea in June,  1861.    Exactly one year 
later, Young uussia began to appear,  Zaichnevsky assuming the role  as editor 
,'ro,i his orison cell.    The police never   dscovered the source of the leaflet, 
Decause the articles were smuggled out of th« prison to the printing pre:,-, 
hidden in ;<y~zan province,  and the literature was then distributed in Wb. 
Petersburg to  take  suspicion away from Moscow,  wnere Zaichnevsky was imprisoned. 
■'■Venturi,  p.   287. 
^Venturi, p.   289. 
1 
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Ignorant of his authorsni,.-  of Young .tussia,  the commis ion iientenceu 
aim to two years ana eight months in Siceria for ni^ a6itation as  "  'a 
jreacher ana confessor of socialism.'   "-*    Zaichnevsky livea in Siberia until 
lob^,   then moved to t^enza uepartment,  where he  organizea a new group of 
"conspirators"  fro.a sane  sympathetic   students ana soxdierb.    ...ovea oy the 
joiice to several new areas, he reachea Orel in ld72, where he became the 
center of the new revolutionary generation,  ana in 1875 he estuul abed re- 
lations with Tkachev and nis followers in Europe.    Insisting  always ujon 
orfaanization ana opposing terrorism ana  aeiaont^trations,  ZaichnavslQr partici- 
pated in the demonstration  before  the Cathedral of Our Laoy of ilazan in ot. 
Petersburg, for which action he was again exilea to Siberia in lodO.    He 
returned in 1885,  settled again in Orel,  anu set up a new conspiratorial 
society, which lastea until 1889,  when  zaichnevsky was  ^gain arrested,  triea 
two years later, and exiled again to Siberia for another five years.    Return- 
ing to Om*Lensk in l8?b, he oiea t.nere on Kerch 19. 
To understand the content of Zaichnevsky's theory ana activity, it is 
important to know a little of the L,ackferouna of revolutionary activity in 
1861-62 in Russia,  far Young Russia was merely a printea version of in-ny 
currents present in Russian revolutionary society at that time.    This is 
tne era of Niaolai Chernyshevsky,   (l828-d9)  ana his  "new men"  and Dmitri 
Pisarev (l81|0-bb) and nis -critical realists," or "ninilists," ana both 
revolutionary publicists addea a little to the development of thought on 
the  subject of the revolutionary minority.    Chernyshevsky's most famous ue- 
scription of his  "new men" is found in his novel,    rfhat is to  be oone?, 
in which men and women create  a very productive  co «mal association and 
a new morality in :oarriage.    Tne motivating factor is  self-interest,  moral 
3ibi4i p. 301. 
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self-improvement for the ourpose of serving in the oest possible fasnion 
tne interests of the people.    Tnose rare onsa who can express the hibiiest 
moral qualities witnin tta—nalfi oecome a morul elite,  propagating the 
new morality for the new society.    They are the new m, the &iants wno 
function as the hiad,  brains, eye^,    nu ears of tne societal organism.    They 
.serve aj  the vanguard of the onwara march  of nature,  directing the   spontan- 
eous moveaent of the masses toward improvement of society,  "by tneir superior 
knowledge  of moral ana .material reality."'4    hakhoetov in What is  to be done? 
is one of these  giants,  morally impeccable,  physically strong,  ana intellec- 
tually superior: 
They are few in numoer,  but through  them the  life of all man- 
kind expands;  without tnem it woula h_ve  ceen  stixleu.     They are 
few in number,  but  they out others in a position to breathe,  who 
without tnem woulu a ve  been  suffocate-.     dreat is tne nass  of good 
and nonest men,  but itakhmetovs are rare.     They are the best among 
the  oest,   tney are  the movers of the movers,   they are the  salt of 
the   salt of  the earth.5 
If the new men are to channel tne material forces of nistory, what is 
their relation to the masses?     rfill they in fact constitute an oligarchy 
dictating  to the people':     Herbert bowman answers uy emphasising the elite- 
ness as o>oosed to tne aristocratism of ohernyshevsky"s  "ne/.  men": 
It is not  the function of an elite  to impose preconceives 
ideas or iueals, but,  on the contrary to aluciaate the  self- 
interest of tne unenlightened masses,  who... historical events are 
moving in uirections  which they,  in tneir relative  blindness,   are 
unable  to  observe6.   .   .His (Chernyshevsky's)  elite are not tne 
uearars of a noble mission out the purveyors of scientific truth 
and Historical  necessity—realists and enlit.hteners,  not crusauers 
anu exhorters.7 
^leroert Bowman,   Revolutionary olitiem in Uhernyshevsky," American 
.lavic and  ..ast European .leview,  13,   (April*  195k),   p.  19b. 
^Nikolai Chernyshevsky,  »Vhat is to Le none?, handom Mouse, New York, 
1961,  p.   2hl. 
bowman,  "Revolutionary alitism in Chernyshevsky," p.  1?6. 
fold, p. 190. 
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,lieldin6 the revolutionary weapon of true knowledge,   uhe new aan can trans- 
form society in this realistic image.    It is ouvious that Chernysnevs ./ i  s 
not concerned here with   jol_tical tactics, but v;ii.;  the    hiloso ideal justi- 
fication for a revolution,iry  -'lite. 
Dmitri Pi^arev, inspired uy these ideas of Liherny-nevsky, embellishea 
u.on them and came  u; witn another epithet i'or the  "new men"—"critical 
realists," popularly known  as   "nihilists."    Galled by 3altykov-5hchedrin 
the  "enfants terribles" of Populism in the luoO's",  the Nihilists tnrou&n 
their pamphlet Russkoe blovo (The &u    Lea .*oru) expounder the necessity of 
inaiviuual emancipation as opposed to social liberation.    ..evolution lay at 
the end of  the roaa along which materialist,   technical,   scientific knowle^e 
uravelleu.    Denyinfc all  traditional element;: of  society whicu coula not be 
jroven empirically valiu and useful to its inhaoitauts,   taese  "thinking 
;  oists" callea i'or a critical re-evaluation o£ a  society  th^t foun-erea 
an ibnorance ana the continuing submission of the masses,   in  spite  of the 
emancipation.    Pisarev was arreatea in July, 1862,  and oia not e.aerge from 
orison until November, lb66, dying only two years later by arowning in tne 
3altic.    But his thoughts and ideas affected deeply the dissatisfied stu- 
dents and intelligents throughout Russia in the mid-looO"s.    Venturi sees 
in Fisarev's "nihilism" the roots of both Russian bakuninism tod .vu-sian 
Jacobinism: 
If we put the emphasis on individual revolt and personal  're- 
fractoriness,'   we arrive  at anarchism;   if on the  other hand we  stress 
the  political  function of  an enlightened and decideu minority. 
arrive at Jacobinism and the theory of a revolutionary elite./ 
isarev v.as solely a theorist,  out nxs worus and epitnets carried in- 
spiration for a later generation of  activists. 
Venturi, p. 32$. 
9Venturi, p. 330. 
f 
-59- 
This,  then, was the intellectual olimate in which aalchnereky oegan 
his  short career as a  political leader in the revolutionary movenent of 
that   >eriou.    His political orientation up zo tne time of nis own personal 
movement  "to  the people" in    ay,  1861,  was a general  socialist ana revolu- 
tionary tendency,   Barked uy it;, extre asm,  as was noted in his Polish speech 
in i°eoruary,  1861.     rhe ounuay-scnools brought him close- to the   >eople and 
the problems oi' eu.ucating then both to revolt ana to accent the Socialist 
organization of the  x'uoure  society.    U    oo that ti.ae a .nere propa^anuist 
tnrougn his illegal orintin,..  activities,  ^aicuiievaky cau„m,   bhfl ro.julist 
uue  ana left the city  to agitate amon6 the .t masse...     inspire,  by .jvton 
etrov's peasant revolt ana thrillea at the  eagerness wit., which the pea- 
sants listeneu to him,  Zaicnnevsky tola his  land-hungry auuiences that the 
iauu was tneirs il   wiey  nuui". but reuuuiicc   one  ui-a.j.U>rou.>  t^ar ana outain 
arms for a violent rebellion against the  lanalords. 
i-'aoea with the  problem of  organizing the aaorphous peasant uiscontent, 
Zaichnevsky looked to  tne   .;j.oGans  and construction of Jklaz..ini' s secret 
societies.     It was wazzini's xiery  "now ana always" attituae,  as well as 
the careful orfaanization of "Younb Italy"  that influe.xeu  the  naoing of this 
later oamphlet.    iieyonu the propaganua, which aust incluae a .aanifesto ais- 
triouteu  to tne village  revealing  the truta  about  the tsar ana the emanci- 
pation,  there had to oe  « „roup of leaders who coul-    re,  re  for immediate 
action anu recognize the right moment for revolt.     In an ope.i letter to a 
frieuu, Zaicnnevsky revealed the firtt definite iaaication of his Jacobin 
tendencies: 
There  are  two aiiferent ways of   ;uttinb one sell' at  the head of 
the oeoole's movement;  eitner,   like Loui^ ulanc,  by in^il^ratin^. 
into" the .uasses,   spreading panphl.ts among the workers, denouncing co,.- 
^etition, business ana everything that both ...hysically  ana morally 
omres*es ana Kills the workers: or, like Barues, by putting oneself 
at the head of every movement ona ..lakint, one':   name tne name oi  every 
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popular party,   so that in time o_ neeu the people ..oula turn to 
us as the men who h<-ve prepareu the t-,roun-.    dita us in Russii 
at the present moment Louis Blane'8 Mtbod is not feasible.     That 
leaves  the way chosen by     ip  38.     It is true  that it demands    iany 
sacrifices.    It demands  tnat those who snare these ideas  should 
always  be reauy for any action,  however aangerous.    .iut it is the 
only way possible, the only way that can lead to victory.* 
This Dolaness placed Zaichnevsky  in prison* but it also electrified 
the young revolutionaries who reau Youn^ .quaia one year later,   an.  terri- 
fied the  conservatives and moderates of official Russia.    Zaichnsvslcy,  a 
aere  nineteen years of  a&e in Ha/,  1062,  was responsible for tnat first 
article in Young ,-lusjia widen Degan with the o.oinous words:     "  •Russia.   .   . 
is entering the revolutionary   -eriou of its existence.'   "n    Tnis was a 
jolting revelation to those elements,   including  "Zemlya i Volya," which 
hopsd for the  miaule way of  constitutional reform,     ^aiennevsky  was  taking 
the hard line loading to 
.   .   .a revolution,  a cloooy ona jitiless revolution,  a revolution 
... ich must change everything -own to the very roots,   -  berlji 
overthrow..::    all the foundations of present society and bring- 
ing auout  .he ruin of all wno sup or-   ihe pre       <rder".   .  . 
.    are not afraid of it,  althou b *• know bh t     river of  blaod will 
flow an. bbat innocent victims fill perishj we greet its ecu.    , 
are   .rev re.  to  lay down our lives for the   sales of it,   the  im 
desired.^ 
This is tfakuninist anarchism in i.s most violent form,  as if the sxeite- 
t aroused in him by the peasants a a festered within him for  a year and 
then ourst out into tne open with redoubled strength. 
.aking  xn   the name of  the   -Central Revolutionary Committee "-obviously 
Zaichnevsky ana nis circle of revolutionary propagandists-, loung Rus^ in 
a more rational and practical frame  of minu consiuere^ the  tactics of  such 
^Quoted in Venturi,  p.   29J. 
llAvrahm Yarmolinsky, ^ to .evolution, Collier sooks,  0m York, 
1962,  p. 11U. 
12Venturi, p. 292. 
Yarmolinsky, p. Hi*. 
-61- 
an "implacable" revolution, and in so aoing,   su.fereu the same vulnerability 
to accusations of inconsistency as _,akunin, the same conflict between dreams 
ana action.    Boldly,  Zaicnnevoky diseussM in the leaflet the Utopian society 
that will follow  the  total destruction of the revolution cjia che  type  of 
^overn-iiint   uut can most efficiently effect the revolution.    The   future  so- 
ciety would ue a feaeral republic governe.   bg and regional asaan- 
Dlies electeu by universal suffrage.    Property  will be socialize*-., MM8 
diicipated, monasteries closeu.    further ue tails would ue workeu out uy the 
•eople  themselves in  a National ^sscmuly.     The elements of the    .opulution 
to  ue  relieu upon most neavily in v»^stroyine  the olu -iiu consti-uctlng  Uie 
new were to ue the peasants, Raskolniki <■■»>■ fiin-**4B^*wat—#, disgruntled 
army officers, and especially the young students and intellectuals.    Asso- 
ciations of workers  mi peasants would run the factories an    farms.    Poland 
and Lithuania must be granted complete independence, and    11 other regions 
of Russia must have the right of self-determination in deciding whether or 
not to join the Russian Federal Republic.1^    It is a strong radical pro- 
gram, one whose general feoals would anoeal to almost all revolutionary theorists 
in the period under consideration. 
In the next breath, however, Zaichnevsky accepts the difficulties in 
achieving such a utopia and in his characteristically candid manner makes 
a practical evaluation of the methods necessary to  assume in the  face  of 
those difficulties! 
•,Ve know that it will not be possiule to carry out this part of 
our programme  at once.    We are indeed firmly convinced that the  re- 
volutionary party, which (if the movement is  succes,;ul    will be  at 
the head of the  government, will h-ve to retain for a time the present 
system of centralization.    This will certainly oe nejessapy as re- 
gards politics,  if not the administration,   in oraer to be  .ble to 
Introduce as  quickly as possible the new foundations  of society and 
iWenturi, pp.  29U-295. 
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the economy.    It will have to take the dictatorship into its own 
hands    nd stop at nothing.    The elections for the National Assembly 
will have to be carried out unuer the influence of the Government, 
which must at once make  sure  that the  supporters of the present regime 
do not take part— ,h-t is,  if any of them are  still alive.    The 
French National Assembly of 18ii8 has shown what happens when the revolu- 
tionary government does not interfere in the elections; it led to the 
destruction of the Republic and the election of Louis Napoleon as 
Emperor.15 
Though obviously reflecting the Mazzinian viewpoint, this remarkable bit of 
revolutionary theory possesses all the recklesc honesty of a Bakuninist 
statement in the Confession or a Herzenist reflection in From the Other Shore. 
It  sneaks with their disgust of parliJMWtary forms  saturated with counter- 
revolutionary tendencies, as if this young firebrand had actually partici- 
pated with them in the events of loUo, instead of merely reading at second- 
hand their reactions to that unsuccessful revolution.    All of the consequences 
of that failure are present in this powerful statement of a Dlanquist and 
anarchist ideology adapted to the Russian situation.    It is free of the 
middle/aged caution of Herzen and the tactical restraint of ..akunin,  then 
lacked in mortal comuat with Marx.     It is the first uncorruoted statement 
of Russian Jacobinism (as zaichnevsky himself calleu it after a careful study 
of Eurooean revolutionary politics)   by a new generation of Russian radicalism, 
as filtered through the writings of the two fa.ous Russian emigres. 
Their reactions to this bastard child of their own illicit revolutionary 
love affairs are a very interesting expose of their own revolutionary fervor 
in the SUM er of lu62.    Bakunin answered the new Russian JacoLdnism in The 
People's Causet     Romanov, Pugachev or Pestel?    in September,  lo62: 
■"hey  shout and decide questions as if the entire people  stood 
behind them.     ,ut the people are still on the other side of the 
abyss,   and not only uo not want to listen to us but are ready to knock 
us down  at the first sign from tb« Tsar.   .   .1  accuse the writers of 
Young Russia of two crimes.    First of a mad and really doctronaire 
I5ibid, p.  295. 
scorn for the people;  and secondly of an attituue which is utterly- 
devoid of tact and which is quite frivolous in face of the great 
cause of emancipation,  for whose success they say they are ready 
to sacrifice their lives.    They ere  so little used to real action 
that they move in a world of abstractions.16 
This last crifeis!!: is a valid one, in view of the absence of a party capable 
of pursuing the action described in the leaflet,  and especially in view of 
the lunacy of a  ffUfagestion by Zaichnevsky that the revolution-ry party take 
their axes  and murder the  imperial family,  and if necessary,   the entire  im- 
perial party also.    But it must be  remembered also that Bakunin was writ- 
ing this oarticular paimhlet in an anxious ctte apt to appease the loyal 
Russian peasantry throug..  its representative Martyanov and was   so afraid 
t   at the honest   Machiavellianism of Zaichnevsky might frighten them that 
he  ignored all the implications in the leaflet identical to his own  senti- 
ments.    He  later praisea Young Russia for its honest apprai'i 1  of revolu- 
tionary necessity,  but claimed always that this organization ignored the 
oeasant masses and differed,  therefore, from his own strong populist tendency. 
Other expressions of disapproval came from Chernyshevsky, who had helped 
to found the printing press;but who thought the sentiments expressed in the 
leaflet "inopportune.11    Zaichnevsky harbored a mild contempt for Chernyshevsky, 
him, 
though he admired him greatly,   and called^sarcastically a "man of learning" 
and a mere theorist,   overlooking the fact that he was vulnerable to the same 
criticism.     "Zemlya i Volya" moderates, attempting at this time to appeal 
to the educated liberals for a bit of opportunistic  collaboration for the 
sake  of the  convening of a Zewlsky Sobor,   reflected the firm opposition of 
Herzen to  the Young Russia  stand: 
A revolutionary oarty by itself  never has the   strength to  over- 
turn the State.   .   .Revolutions are made by the people.   .   .We are 
Revolutionaries;   this does not mean men who make revolutions,  but 
loQuoted in Venturi,  p.   29 o. 
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men who love the people  so much that they do not abandon them when 
(under no pressure from us) they fling themselves into the fight.  .   .17 
This program of mere distrust of the State and waiting for the revolution 
in order to channel it ana reduce its violence, as op .osed to Zaichvensky's 
program of contemptuous hatred of the State ana forcibly unleashing the in- 
stinct for its violent destruction,  became the battle of the Lavrovists 
against the Bakuninists  and partially of the  "Chernyi PereOel"  (31ack Earth 
Partition)  against the  "Naroinaya Volya" in the U70's. 
finally,   there is Herzen's reaction against this raoical group of 
Russian Jacobins.    Zaichnevsky in his 1'irst article had duly noted his debt 
to Herzen for his advocacy of socialism and revolutionary dictatorship in 
Uu9, but he condemned the former revolutionary for his backsliding into 
the camp of liberal constitutionalism and reformism.    And that same Herzen, 
who had criticized the moderates of 1313 for failing to demonstrate enough 
extrenism in order to assume the necessary oictatorshio,  now condemned the 
radicalism of this Russian group, which had sworn to go beyond the extremists 
of 1793-4 and ltiU8, in two scathing articles in Kalokol,  \$ July and 15 
August, 1362.    The first article, entitled "Old and Young Russia," opened 
with a blanket condemnation of terror,  an attack forced upon Herzen by the 
groundless accusations from all siaes against him,  "Zemlya i Volya,'' and 
Younfe Russia, for starting the fires th t plaDuei Petersburg in May, 1862, 
Though he blames agents provocateurs working at the behest of the Third 
Section for the deed, Herzen takes this opportunity to voice his opinion 
of the blind recklessness of the "terrorists" and to lament the oassin., of 
the liberal era.    Young Russia is described in a dialogue in a most dero- 
gatory fashion,  as if it were childishly nihilist: 
17A clandestine reply to Younb Russia from Zemlya i Volya, partially 
quoted in Venturi,  op. 298-299. " 
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"Just what is this 'Young Russia'   "?    "0 this is a terrible 
Russia.    You know, the negation of everything.    Nothing is sacred, 
nothing at ail, neither property nor family nor authority.   .   .»" 
'Young Russia1   appears to me a two-fold mistake.    In the first place 
it is not at all Russian;  it  is one of those variations  on the 
theme  of .sestern  socialism,   tae metaphysics of the French Revolu- ' 
tion,   socio-political desiderata,   by means of which a form of 
challenge wan  added to the call to  arms.    The  se:jon<_i mistake is 
its inonportuneness—the chance coincidence with the fires has 
ravated the situation.    It is clear that the young people who 
wrote it livea more  in the worlo  of comrades ana cooks  th_r. in the 
world of facts}  more in the algenra of ideas, with its superficial 
and general formulas and conclusions, than in the workshop, where 
the friction and temperature, bad temper and blisters change the 
simolicity of mechanical law and impede its fast course.    Their 
speech has a ".'eared in  such  a way;  in it there is none  of that 
inner restraint which would demonstrate its experience or the or- 
der of an organized -'arty.1?    (translation mine) 
Kerzen then  attacks the content of Young Russia's program with a note  of 
marked incredulity: 
But is there really a shade of probability that the Russian 
people will rise up in  the name of Blanquist Socialism,  filling 
the" air with shouts of four words (Long Live the "Russian Demo- 
cratic Socialist Republic"),   three of which they do not under- 
stand?^    (translation mine) 
Herzen repudiates the Jacobins over the two points to which he now stands 
most determinedly opposed in his own mind:    forcible revolution and the 
centralization of power in the hands of a minority.    The latter point 
particularly threatened to divorce this party from all contact with the 
peoole,  a neglect which Herzen, the peasant Socialist, the reformer, could 
not oermit in any attemot at revolution in his oeloved Russia.    The people 
(this was also Balcunin' s ooint) must oe appealed to on familiar terms of 
land reorganization;  communal associations,   decentralization of authority. 
Venturi cites this attack oy Herzen upon the Young Russia advocates as the 
first conspicuous  "division,  which was aop^rent at its birth,   uetween 
Populism and Russian Jacooinism."^    His next article on Young Russia 
l.Gertsen and Ogarev, ttlotol (Vol. 5,  1362, London), Izdatel'stvo 
Akademii Nauk SSSR,  Moscow,  p.  112+9. 
^Ibid,  p.  1150. 
20Gertsen,  Kgloleol,  Vol. 5,  P-  llSl. 
21venturi,  p.  297. 
' 
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aopeared in the August 15 edition of K»lokol, under the title "Journalists 
and Terrorists."    In it Herzen answered the charges of Young Russia which 
accused him of having "lost all faith in forceful revolution,   .   .  .He have 
lost not our faith in it, but our love for it."22    Again he deplores the 
rash youths who take pleasure in terror and counsels moderation and aopro- 
priate propaganda as the order of the day.    .'Jost of all, he is concerned 
with the threat of centralization of power, whetrier tsarist or revolutionary, 
in Moscow or Petersburg, and again advocates the decentralization of authority. 
If Zaichnevsky had been aole to read these issues of Kolokol, he would have 
stigmatized Kerzen with the same epithet he had given Ghernyshevsky:     "man 
of learning," harmless, cautious, non-activist. 
Though there was widespread fear and even contempt for this new revolu- 
tionary group, in Petersburg a group under the direction of Leonid Olshevsky 
and Pyotr Tkachev oegan to propagate the ideas put forth by Zaichnevsky: 
elimination of the autocracy and a violent revolution.    Their most interest- 
ing pamphlet was one entitled "To the Russian People (A Tale by Uncle 
Kuzmich)," which was a popularly-written version of Young Russia.    Zaichnevsky 
himself never lost the ourity of his ideas, though he never had the chance 
to translate them into action, and Venturi calls him "the Jacobin, who  spent 
all his life trying to turn himself into a professional revolutionary."^ 
His followers had learned their lessons well, for some joined the Marodnaya 
Volya,   some the Socialist Revolutionary Party,  MM the Social Democratic 
t>arty and beyong that the Bolshevik Party, one of whose   .embers is supposed 
to have  influenced Lenin  "to accept the idea that the  seizure  of   political 
22flertsen, Kdlokol, Vol. $, no. UiX, p. H6$. 
23venturi, p.  293. 
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.:>ower by a revolutionary party was both feasible and desirable."2'*    indeed, 
7arlomov quotes it. N. Pokrovsky's statement in an article in 192u which 
calls Zaichnevsky's Young Russia « 'the first Bolshevik document in our 
nistory.'   "2^    Pokrovsky,  in a speech at a memorial meeting immediately 
after Lenin's death in 1921, also took note publicly of elements of Jacobin- 
ism in Leninism,   and attributed to Zaichnevsky and Tkachev the first formu- 
lation of the concepts of a secret conspiratorial party seizing power and 
conducting the revolution.    But he was cautious with his linking of the two 
"isms": 
I again disavow the thought.   .   .that Lenin did not arrive at 
these  ideas himself,  under the influence of the  objective  conditions 
of the revolutionary movement, that he was the pupil of Tkachov and 
zaichnevsky  (of whom he probably n.ver even heard).    This would be 
a comoletely absurd  statement.    But if one must not say that the 
ocean deoends on those rivers wnich flow into it, nevertheless, it 
is a fact that these rivers flow into the ocean and nowhere else. 
Tom this point of view there is no need to deny that several elements 
in the Russian revolutionary movement of the l860»s and lo70<s flowed 
into Lenin's tactics,  were accepted by him,  independent of the  fact 
that well-known objective conditions movea him along this path. 
?okrovsky's  school was liquidated in the  1930' s noon Stalinist orders to 
disavow all non-Marxist roots of Leninism,   and the itusian Blanquists, 
zaichnevsky and Tkachev,  suffered a sh,rp decline in popularity and pres- 
tige among Soviet historians.    Since Stalin,  their return to  favor has been 
only oartial. 
Zaichnevsky' s startling flash upon the revolutionary horizon in the 
summer of 1362 can be attributed partially to the prevailing ferment of 
the  society which both fostered it and viewed it with alarm,   and partially 
to  Zaichnevsky's youthful,  bold,  and dedicated revolutionary character. 
2^armolinsky, p. 116. 
25varlamov, p. lh» 
26Ibid, pp.   20-21. 
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The shooting star trailer awaj  in x,he darknes- of Siberia, out the consis- 
tency of his ideas iiianafceu to shine continuously tiirough the remaining 
years of his life.    Tnis purity of ideology was orobaoly facilitateu  uy 
the aosence  of an opportunity to smudge  it with  oiie airt of translating it 
into oractical activity,  but it testifies, even more  to the clarity of  the 
udnu that contained it.    Zaicnnevsky was dsstlned to remain un the theoreti- 
cal  side of revolution,   ^-ut the current ^enerateu oy .u.u ideas  struc* a 
willing chord in the minus of the later activists of Ishtfi'n's  "Organization," 
tne Hecne^v conspiracy,  and  "IJaroonaya Volya." 
Pyotr  Tkachev:     The 3rand Old Man of Russian 31anquism 
p 
Pyotr Nikitich Tkachev, the most outstanding theorist of Russian 
Blanquism, was born in l8hh in the Velikiye Luki district.    Influenced as 
a youth by the writings of Chernyshevsky, Dobrolyubov, and Pisarev, Tkachev 
came to Petersburg in 1861 to enter the university, where he soon became 
involved in student disturbances and was arrested in October,  1861.    Freed 
two months later, he joined the Olshevsky Circle and fell under the influ- 
ence of Zaichnevsky's ideas.    Arrested with Olshevsky in the summer of 
1862,  Tkachev spent three years in the fortress.    In 1865 he was arrested 
again for participation in a student demonstration at a theater showing a 
play laughing at the nihilists,  and in 1866 he was caught up in the wide 
police dragnet following Karokozov's attempt on the life of the Tsar, with 
which Tkachev had nothing to do.    He was released again in 1867> and then 
associated himself with the underground remainder of the Karokozovtsi, 
banded together in the itaorgon Academy, and during the years 1867-9 con- 
stituted, with Sergei /Vechaev, the extreme left of the student movement. 
His apartment became the center of student meetings, and his articles in 
the Russkae Slovo (Russian Word) and Delo (Cause) were read avidly by the 
radical youth. 
In March, 1869, Tkachev was arrested for the fifth time since 1861, 
and waited in prison two years before he was tried and found guilty of author- 
ing the inflammatory proclamation "To Society."    Following an imprisonment 
of one year and four months, he was exiled to his home in Velikiye Iaiki 
escaping froa there to Western Europe in December, 1873.    At that point 
Tkachev found it difficult to adjust to the new vogue coming to dominate 
revolutionary thought.    His years in Petersburg had been filled with illegal 
propaganda and the organization of secret societies.    Now, in iBlk, Pyotr 
Lavrov was attracting notice in his review Vpered (Forward), which had inherited 
? 
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the work of the Chaikovsky Circle in Petersburg and appealed to a new 
generation of young people anxious to go "to the people" to preach social- 
ism and prepare them for the "sometime" revolution. They were propagan- 
dists, not interested in tight organization and secret activity; Nechaev had 
been caught, tried, and put away; revolutionary activity had suddenly stepped 
out into the open after years of underground work. The activity o£ the 
Chaikovtsi among the workers (1870-73) and the movement "to the people," 
that is, to the peasants in the villages, in the summer of 187k,  were open, 
ill-organized, and almost spontaneous revolutionary maneuvers on the part 
of a group of "repentant" gentry and students, who felt the need to repay a 
debt to the Russian masses. This refreshing return to the boldness of the 
60's, yet in a much less explosive manner, suffered the same severe repression 
from the autocracy, and the revolutionary movement crept underground once 
more, its lesson learned bitterly but well. 
Tkachev in Zurich in 187U was attracted briefly by Lavrov's appeal for 
the establishment of the new socialist society, but upon closer examination 
of the watchful waiting tactics of the propagandists, he launched a vigorous 
attack against Lavrov in his famous pamphlet "The Aims of Revolutionary 
Propaganda in Russia" (187U). Insisting upon forcible revolution and a 
conspiratorial organization, Tkachev was attracted to a group of Russian 
and Polish emigres, gathered together in The "Slav Circle," who professed 
the same ideas. Coming more and more into contact with the French Blanquist 
writings, the Russian Jacobinist elaborated upon his experience in the 60's 
and began to systematize his philosophy of revolution in accordance with 
the Blanquist ideology. A friendship struck up with the Poles Kaspar Tursky 
and Karl Yawitaky in the Slav Circle followed Tkachev into his ©rthodox 
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Blanquist stage, and with their collaboration he set up in 1875 in Geneva 
his own organ entitled Nabat (The Tocsin):  "Organ of the Russian Revolution- 
aries." Tkachev attacked both the "peaceful progress" of the Lavrovists and 
the disorganized agitation of the Bakuninists, writing his articles, not for 
the masses, but for the revolutionary minority, upon whom the program of 
Nabat was based.  Proclaiming the necessity for organized conspiracy and a 
dictatorship to establish the new society from above, Tkachev continued 
to seek unity in the revolutionary movement by appealing to anarchists and 
populists to adopt his program for the future society. 
Though an emigre doomed to perpetual exile from his native land, Tkachev 
remained closely oriented toward the planning of a Russian revolution. He 
kept in contact with the second Zemlya i Volya and the Narodnaya Volya, even 
asceding to the terrorism of the latter, a policy which was foreign to his 
Blanquist mentality which saw in terrorism only disorganized and unproductive 
attempts against individuals as opposed to the efficiently organized seizure 
of total power at the center. Tkachev's last attempts to link up with the 
remnants of Zaichnevsky's Blanquist following in Russia were his formation 
of "The Society for the Liberation of the People" in 1877, a small group 
which never penetrated significantly either in form or content into Russia 
itself, and also an abortive effort in 1880 to move the printing press of 
Nabat into Russia, the result being the loss of the printing press and the 
termination of Nabat. He then moved to Paris, where he collaborated with 
Blanqui in his journal Ni dieuf ni maftre, his most significant article 
being a tribute paid to Blanqui upon his death in 1881. From 1882 to 1886, 
Tkachev lay in a lunatic asylum, where he died on January It, 1886. 
TkacheVs career as a revolutionary publicist can be described in terms 
of his positive ideas on the nature and tactics of revolution, and on the 
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relationship of capitalism to the .tusjian economy,  and also his oolemics 
linst tne followers of Lavrov ;JIU Bokunin.    His prolific writings of 
tui years ld67-9, when ne baskea in tne c;rriea-over influence of Zaich- 
nevsky aim in nis collaboration witn the  extreme radical Wechaev,  mark his 
rirst plunge into revolutionary propaganda for tne Russian Jacooin cause. 
His iaeology was strictly Russian-orientea,   for he hau not yet met witn tne 
Blanquist current of Western Europe.    Venturi s_ys  of this phase  in Tkacnev' s 
revolutionary mentality;     "The Russian Jacobinism of Zaicnnevsky and Tkachev 
is a  political  phenomenon born  of the  discussions of the teixties wnich only 
later in the 'seventies joineu hands vnitn the movement in ,'iestern 3uroje.   .   . 
Tkachev.   .   .was  a Russian Jacobin before  oecoming an exiled ...lanquist."-*- 
His early articles never mention jlanqui's name,  though this coulu ce attri- 
bute^, to  the P.ussian censorship.    Tursky,  one  of Tkachev1 s Blanquist friends 
in Geneva, later  saiu after  the death of Blonqui:     "   'It is just because 
th • tsarist government understood the  universal significance of the prin- 
ciples representeu so eminently by ;.uguste Blanqui th^t it nad forbiuaen 
his name to be  spoken in Russi; .   .   . ■   "      It  seems  obvious,  howev-r,  that 
Tkachev hau only a general picture of lastern European revolutionary tactics 
and in  ihe main evolvea his Jacooin iaeas independently of  them. 
"A Programme of Revolutionary Activity" uates from  ohe Nechaev-Tkacnev 
period of collaboration,     nd Kozmin,  Tkachev's Soviet interoreter,   sees 
this   pamphlet as  the inspiration i'or  the   irogram of Nabat in the  1870' s.-> 
The "Programme'1 was formulateu in tne hopjs of a general uprising occuring 
on February 19,  1870,   the ninth anniversary of  the emancipation of the  serfs. 
The foremost task of the revolutionary Jtrty was to be the  ■   'annihilation 
^Venturi,   J• U03. 
2Ibia, p.   778n. 
3p#  N>  Tkachev.    Izbranniye  oocnineniya na Sotsialno-Politicheskiye Temi 
v cnetirekh tomakh, Izclatelfetvo Vsesoyuznofo Oo*Uest¥a politkatorzhan i Ssilno- 
Po-ielenisev,  ;.:0scow,  193- (a. P.  Kozmin,  ea.)  vol.  1,  p.  Id.     (Hereafter referree 
to  as Tkachev,  Izbranniye Sochineniya.) 
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of the nest of existing power,'   that is,   political revolution,   since a 
radical reconstruction of  social and economic relations was impossible unuer 
tne existing political system".   .   .'Thus,   social revolution, as our final 
6oal.
f  nU    The revolutionaries, however, were faced with an ignorant mass 
of  peasants,  unaware of tiie  necessity of  che revolution;   therefore,  in order 
th-t this blin.. BSSS  could be depen^a ujon as a revolutionary fore--,  it 
was the  duty of the revolution-ry party to  "hasten their  awareness,   to pre- 
pare it,  to attempt to act ujon tneir ..linas in such a way as to assure  that 
tnis awareness would appear  to them unex>ectea,  that  uiey light  act con- 
sciously,   if possible calmly, and not unuer the influence of fear, their 
eyes filled with blood."^   All important to this task was the creation of 
a high-quality revolutionary party, whose activity would consist in the 
"distribution of oroclamations, the collection of revolutionary funds, the 
establishoent of ties with the European revolutionary organizations,  and 
the  organization of  demonstrations and  'private protests.'   "°    The  rebellion 
for 1870 aid not materialize, due to TkacheV s SK-sst in March, ld69, but 
the guidelines of NechaeVs  suosequent activities ana of TkacheV s progression 
toward Blanquism were  already  manifest. 
In other articles written auring this period, coucheu in literary reviews, 
Tkachev's  language assumeu its most radical flavor.    The  bold efaalitarianis.:i 
of his days with the Olshevsky Circle was made more   sophisticated by Prouo- 
nonian anarchism and the  socialism of Louis Blanc.     In an article  entitled 
"Men of the Future  and Heroes of tne BourgeSisie"  (Ibbo),  Tkacnev uescrioed, 
in the tradition of Chernyshevsky and Fisarev,  tfal new men of the  future, 
the thinking elite: 
UIbid, p. 18. 
^Ibid, p. 19. 
^kachev, Izbraaniye Sochineniya, vol. 1, p. 19. 
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The uistinctive oign oi' tn^ men of the future consists in the fact 
tnat all their activity, even their entire manner of living is aeter- 
.nineci oy one wish,   one passionate iaea—to make tne majority oi' people 
happy and to invite a^ many   -artici jan^s as possible to the  ban .uet 
of life.    The realization of this idea becomes tne only t°al of their 
activity,   Decause  tnis idea is com letely identified with  their under- 
standing, of personal happiness,    kn^. everything is subordin:.:e^ to this 
idea,  everything yielded to it in sacrifice—if indeed one  may speak 
here of sacrifice/.   .   .Thus, the men of the future—neither ascetics, 
new egoists, nor heroes—are ordinary men, yet their excellent ideas, 
which they have  adopteu ana which rule-  over them,  .,lcce them in  such 
sharp opposition to all those who  surrounu than,  that  tne  neroes of 
the bourgeoisie can really take them for extraordinary men.    These 
excellent iueas, which constitute the inevitable, fatal result of our 
intellectu 1 civilization ,   demand for their realization,  first,  an 
intense fight,   second,  a very lively,  varied and not always  safe 
activity."    (translation mine) 
Ohernyshevsky' s Uakhmetov was one  of tnese  new men, completely wra   >eu  up in 
his iaea and his dedication to the bap iness of mankind,    From this tninking 
realist,  it was but one  step to Tkachev's revolutionary minority and the 
progra.n of :,auat. 
jjabat oegan publication in 1875; its distribution remained  snail because 
there  were fen Tkachev  supporters either abroad or in Russia  bo insure  its 
passage  ov.r the  boraer.    The paucity of  supporter* was attributable  to two 
factors:     the dominant stature of bakunin  and Lavrov in emigre circles,  and 
the disafiectation of almost all tne radical youth in the Russia of the  early 
1370's with the  call for political turnover before  social upheaval ana the 
manipulation of power by a revolutionary party beforej during, and after tnat 
political revolution,    oer^x Kravchinsky,  a member of  tne   seconu  ^e.olya 
i Volya,"  said on tne appearance  of Nabat:     ■  'Tkacnev is publishing, a journal 
under the name  of Nabat.    In essence its program will oe an abomination- 
political revolution,   out cloaked,  of course,  by social revolution.   .   .  In 
a revolution all genres  are good except Jacobins and autocrats.'   tf    Tkacnev 
himself  in  some  of his last writings justified both the  program and the 
limited distribution of his newspaper: 
7Ibia, p. 17U- 
^Tkacnev, Izbranniag Socnincniya, vol. 1, p. 181. 
quoted by Koz.ain, ibia, p. 26. 
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• I never gave  particular importance tdtne aistribution of 
i.aoat in hussia.   .   .Nabat was not an agitationary revolutionary 
pamphlet; its ourpose consisted only in turning revolutionaries 
to the  only practically valiu iueas anu principle! of revolu- 
tionary activity,  from which they,  under the influence  of  the 
reaction anu of the  anarchist and Lavrist  biuuerish, began to 
uisown.     These  iaeas  ana influences incluuea nothing new,  out were 
to remind them (i.e.,  revolutionaries)   that they ..ere not evil. 
Anu Nabat coula fulfil (and actually aid fulfil)  this  oasic,   la 
s jite  ( L  not being distributeu in RuMla*    It  ..as enough that only 
a few revolutionary activists  became  acquainteu with its program and 
basic principles, so tnat among ^hein it aroused talk anu activity; 
it was enough to re:nina a samll number of revolutionaries of for- 
gotten iaeas, ana then revolutionary activity woula not be slow to 
prove the wisdom and feasibility of the-e ideas and to cause  their 
uistribution among the majority of revolutionaries.    I know very 
well that in Russia there  ;.re few who have Ilabat in their hands, 
but its existence, its program,  its principles were well known in 
almost all the revolutionary circles.'10    (translation mine) 
Tkachev was certainly overly optimistic concerning the attitude witn ..hich 
these  revolutionary circles vi.weu what they knew of Nabat1 s program,  Out 
Kozmin co.amends him for tne  consistent propagation 01 nis unpopular tneories, 
in contrast to tnose revolutionary leaders (for instance, Bakunin) who hid 
their centralizing tactics behind broad stateaents of human equality anu 
freedom in order to please  the iue*lism of their uisciples in uussia."- 
These latter,  disillusioneu in the  auvisability of  a secret revolutionary 
elite by Nechaev,  escnewed both  authority ana internal uiscijline,   struggl- 
ing to reinstate tne  principles of loose federation anu inuiviuual  self- 
uetermination in their organizations.    Tkachev condeume^  this mentality, 
seeing in its uncoordinated activity an incapability of reaching quick 
decisions and pursuing strong action against the formidable,   organised 
autocracy.    Their emphasis upon the bourgeois concept if inoiviuualism, 
lOquotad by Kozuin in Tkachev,  Inhranniye  Sochineniya,  vol.   1,  P-. 
26-27. 
11. Ibid,  p. 52. 
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this "  'jlacing of personality nifeher than tne co..unon element,   singularity 
ni.her than the whole,  again higher than  selflessness,'   ■** left them 
vulnerable  to vasciliation onu compromise,  counter-revolution ana dei'eat. 
To Tkacnev x-he question of unifieu strength was a question of life or eeath. 
The  success  of   -ne revolution.   .   .is possible  only with  the  crea- 
tion of an organisation, uniting all the uncoordinated revolutionary 
elements in one  active  ooay,   acting on one  common plan,  suboruinat- 
ing itself to  one common leadership—an organization Dasea on the 
centralization o-i  power anu the uecentralisation of function.-'-' 
Tne creators of this organization must co.ue from the raznocnintsi, 
the intelligentsia rising from the lower olas^aa to positions of importance 
as  scholars and publicists of revolutionary propaganda.    Their qualifications 
are twofold:     ■  'This part of the intelligentsia, on one one hand, know well 
one  oeople's misfortunes and unuerstanj tne  urgent hopes of tne people,  and, 
on the other hanu,  they nave Bartered tne theorie.   expounded by tne best 
critical .ainds of the tfest.    This gives then the right to assuuc leadership 
of the  social revolution.'   nlu 
This description toucnes upon the controversial question of tne relation- 
al! j or  the revolutionary minority to the  masses of  the people.    Tkacnev was 
constantly under fire for nis ..parent -iscountxng of the eassss as a signi- 
ficant revolutionary fMrat, as evidenced b, Kravcninskys remark derogating 
Tkachev's  "Jacobinism,"  ana in line  ..ith the above mentioneu definition bf 
Karpovich  of a Jacobin,  i.e.,  an edTOOatS of political revolution uy an 
elite minus popular help.15    la*,  Kozmin inaicatea that this attack on 
Tkacnev was uajustifieu,   quoting nis stao.ment ■  The  attack u. on the  center 
of POT** ana its  seizure  by revolutionary hands,  if not accompanieu oy a 
12Ibid, p. 52. 
13Ibid, p. 52. 
looted by Kozmin in Tkachev,  Ijbranniye Sochineniya,  vol.  1,  p. 51. 
See above,   p. 
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oopul-r upheaval (even if only locol),  can lead,  only unaer extremely favor- 
aule  circumstances,   to any  sort oi*   positive,  durable results.'   "16    In 
ort of ibis justification,  Kozmiu in a footnote quotes this evaluation 
of Tkachev by I. A. Teodorovich, another Soviet historian. 
'It never  occurreu  to Tkacnev to «sk himself»    now can one 
connect tne one belief—that without the people it is impossible to 
seize power,  with the  other relief—that  without   iropagenda among 
the -ieo^le, i.e., without the people, it la possible to effect a 
forceful revolution.'!7 
And Kozmin concludes; 
Actually,   Tkachev did not give much  importance to :iropaganaa, 
considering  tiiat it by itself could not convert tne  masses into a 
revolutionary force,    /or the achievement of the revolution, not 
propaganda is necessary,  out uie creation of such conditions that 
the  people Would feel that uehind tne.a  stood strength and that 
this   strength was fully ca able of  supporting them.    The  people 
will  rise up,  in Tkachev' s •pinion,   v.hen fear of the existing 
jower is extinguished, in them,  ana they are convinced that this 
power in reality is not as  strona as it appears.   .   .   .Only thi- 
belief can unite  them;   once having united,  they will feel  strength 
-ven in themselves.   .   .Only then can the people  be  converted from 
a potential,   into an actual,  revolutionary foroe.ls    (translation 
mine) 
Revolutionary propaganda,  then,  is  pre-eapted la its revolutionary   signifi- 
cance for Tkachev by the organized activity of tne elite at the head of 
tue   jeoole. 
In this connection, Tkachev elaborated hie view of the people as 
instinctive revolutionaries in tneir looting,   ourning,  and killing of their 
landlord's jroperty and   erson, ana aLaost in the words of Bakunin, whe* 
he later criticized for his anarchistic views, Tkachev classified the up- 
heaval of  the people  in the revolution led by the elite  as an essentially 
destructive one,   since the people are only capable of destructions 
l6Tkachev,  Izbranniye Sochineniya,  vol.  1,  p.  Uo. 
17Ibid, p. Uon. 
l8Ibid, p. Wn. 
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' The relation ox' the revolutionary minority to the people and 
the participation of tne latter in the revolution   jerhaps is secured 
in the following manner:    the revolutionary minority, having freed 
the people from the yoke oppressing them oy fear and terror oefore 
the  powers  that ne,  ooens up for them the possibility of manifest- 
ing its obstructive revolutionary  strength,  and,   operating from 
this  strength,   ohrewoly directing it  toward the  annihilation of  tne 
iiiaediate ene.ies of the revolution,   th.  revolutionary udnority 
aestroys their (i.e., eneiaies of tne revolution) guardeu strongholds 
and rouS them of every metes to resistance  and opposition.    Then, 
using its  strength ana authority,  it introauces now,  progressively 
co.aaunistic elements into the fabric of the people's life.'1?    (Id75) 
(translation mine) 
It is uoon these  three  basis points of Tkachev's political philosophy— 
"Tne recognition of the tremenduus importance of the conspiratorial organi- 
zation oi!  tiie revolutionary minority.   .   .tne instructions on the necessity 
of the seizure,   Dy this   oinority, of the governmental po.ver with the purpose 
of the reconstruction of life  on new socialistic bases.   .   .tne recognition 
of the dictatorship of the revolutionary minority as the most realistic 
means for accomplishing this reconstruction,«20—that Kozrain bases his 
assessment of Tkachev as a  spokesman of Blanquism:     "Tne influence of dlanqui 
on Tkachev  stands beyond doubt. >"■ 
Tkachev's attempt to translate his extremely well-organizea theories 
into meaningful action resulted in ignominious ..'allure, uue to mistiming 
and to the lack of supporters in Russia.    The "Society for the Liberation 
of the People" was formed in 1577 on the  guidelines Tkachev had laid out, 
reminiscent of the "Programme" formulated by him in collaooration with Wecnaev 
in 1369.    Its purpose was to link up with the only Jlanquist organization 
in Russia at that time, Zaichnevsky- f Orel circle;   out by 1377 that circle 
""^Tkachev,  Izbranniye Sochineniya,  vol.  1,  p. 51. 
20ibid, p. 51. 
21Ibid, p. 31 
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was defunct, and ^aichnevsky had been transferred, to another province.    The 
character of the   "Society" was ultra-conspiratorial, with the meuuers sworn 
to keep secret both the existence of the orfaanization and his inemuershij 
in it.    Much in the tradition of riakunin's  "jecret Alliance," the   "oociety" 
Junctioneu under  strict discipline and a nierarchial framework,   ana its am- 
bers were permitted to join other revolutionary organizations only with tne 
purpose  of usurping their oower structure ana  subordinating them ultimately 
to the influence of the   "Society."    Though the   "Society" claimed ties with 
some of the activists in southern Russia, including I. ..[. Kovalsky (who 
wa.   actually a  aemoer  and who was executed at Odessa in 1878 for resisting 
arrest),   the ..leadership was limitea almost j.itirely  to  tiie  "liabatovtsi."22 
The true Blanquists,  laichnevsky ana Tkachev, were aestineu to ao the think- 
ing and talking, whil-  other held the real reins of revolutionary power. 
Concerning the methods of precipitating revolt, Tkachev stood in firm 
op .sition to the doctrines of both Lavrov and Bakunin.    From 187U,  when 
he published his "Tasks of Revolutionary Propaganda in Russia," attacking 
Lavrov1s  "peaceful   .rogress" toward revolution,   Tkachev was engaged in the 
battle with both these revolutionary tacticians.    Yet,   several of his arti- 
cles in the 1868-9 period set the stage for his more specific polemics in 
the Nabat period.    In preparing the grounawork for his Blanquist tactics, 
Tkachev in his article "Jaded Illusions" (18o9) aiscussed contemptuously 
the two views of revolutionary agitation and propaganaa, which, he claimea, 
shared an illusory idealization of the comaon masses.    Tkachev deviated 
fro., the populist ideology in his objective criticis., of the ignorance and 
reactionariness of the  peasants,   though we have  seen he was veiling to work 
through them in their capacity as destructive abents manipul.tea by the 
^2Tkachev,  Izbranniye Sochineniya,   vol. 1,  p.   2„. 
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revolutionary minority.    In lo6?, as in his later writing*, he consistently 
helu to this critically realistic view of the peasant and denounced any 
tendency to see in the peasant anything resembling a traineu revolutionary. 
The two oppo.;in^  tenaencies which he attackea in 1J69 were  the  roots of 
Lavrovist anu uakuninist ideologies in trie 1670's;  nis penetrating analysis 
of these currents reveals the weak points in the    o mlist fabric . na explains 
nis own courageous stand on the necessity for a political revolution preceding 
the social revolution: 
The idealization of the uncivilized masses—this is one of the 
most uangerous  and most wiaespread illusions,    it appears in two 
views, apparently in opposition, but in reality arising from one ana 
the same source and leaaing to one and the same result.    In the 
opinion of some, the uncivilized masses are still so coarse, ignorant, 
and so poorly conscious of their  situation that it is premature  to call 
them to action, that it is neoesssry to wait until thay grow wiser, 
until they ar^ fully emancipated from their environuent, that they 
will emerge from themselves and will know how to get './hat  they want. 
la the opinion of other, on the contrary, the uncivilizeu masses, by 
their own spontaneous purity, stand Lneoq arably higher than the 
civilized crowd; in thea is hidden the embryo of all glory ana great- 
ness;  it is not necessary to teach thea, but to learn from them,  and 
in them the civilizea people ought to search for a renewal of their 
strength;  to impose upon then the ideals they woula not have worked 
out for themselves, to push thea along the path they would not have 
chosen for themselves—this means to perpetrate a great crime,  to en- 
croacn upon their common sense and freeaom.   .   .Tne popular  spirit, 
popular  soul,  popular origins—these are i.oly things,  which the 
civilized crowd dare not touch with its unclean hands nor analyze 
or criticize with its evil mind.   .   .In such a manner, both views 
idealize reality; one attributes to the people tnose ideal traits 
which they ao not have at all;  the other, however,  aoes notidealize 
the masses,  but those conuitions of life in which they are immersed.   .   . 
One view says to the civilizea people:    wait, do not interfere in 
this matter;  you -re to ao nothing in this  situation for  the uncivilized 
masses, while  they grow wise enough,   nature enough on their own.    The 
other view  says:    wait,  ao not seek to be a teacher or leader of those 
whom you are unworthy of liberating,  you who  are merely straps from 
their ooots,  but attempt to .nerbe with the  uncivilizea masses,  to 
become imbued with their spirit, their origins, their soul and move 
together with them along that  oath,  down wnich they will move towara 
you.   .   .In such a manner, coth these illusions—the illusion of the 
people's self-development ana the illusion of the people's soul—lead 
finally to  one  and the  same result:     to passive  immobility,  to tue  sooth- 
ing oersuasion that it is not necessary to ao anything,  wnile  they uo 
everything for tnemselves.23    (translation mine) 
23Tkachev,  Izbranniye Sochineniya, vol. 1, pp. 326-327. 
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3oth these methods involveu beginning at the wrong enu; Tkachev's answer 
was i mediate revolution by a revolutionary minority,  who  oy demonstrating 
its strengtn and authority woula discredit the tsarist government in the 
eyes of the peasants ana attract them to the  uestruclive  oattle.    His later 
polemics against the Lavrovist "propagandists"  (people's sell'-development) 
ana the oakuninist '•rebels" (people's soul) elauorateu upon tnis initial 
statement of his revolutionary philosophy.    In his  "Tasks of Revolutionary 
Propaganda in Russia"  (lb?U),  Tkachev repeatea these arguments «nd ended 
by saying •' '.   .   .we cannot wait.   .   .la assert that the revolution in itussia 
is urgently essential,   and essential at tnis very time.   .   .It is now or 
very remote,   >erhaps neveri'   "21*   In the first issue of Naoat (lo?5) was 
added this statement:     "  'A revolutionary doesn't prepare a revolution, he 
•makes'  it.    Do thisl    Do it quicklyt    Any irresolution,  any delay, is crimi- 
nal.   .   .'   "25 
What is the reason for this urgency in Tkachev's call to revolution? 
The answer can be  found in his copious analytical  stuaies of the economic 
and oolitical situation in Russia.    A* early as 1861,, Tkachev was writing 
articles demonstrating his economic materialist leanings,   ana influenced 
by Prouah»n, Louis Blanc, and particularly Marx, whom he quoted at length 
in his writings,  he was persuaded of the necessity of a socialist rearrange- 
ment of Russian society.    Western  socialist theory, however,  coula not be 
transferrea in toto to Russia for iuueuiate application.    What pertinence 
did a  "oictatorship of the proletariat"  and the war afaainst bourgeois capi- 
talism have to Russia, where the uroan working class was a  small minority 
2i*obert V.  Daniels,   "Lenin and trie hu,si*n gevolutionary Tradition," 
Harvara °lavic Stuaies,  itautoo ana Co.,  T*e Hague,  Tne Ketherlanas,  19*7,  vol. 
IV,  oo. 3U3-3UL. 
and Lenx 
25Ibia    D    31*1*.    Daniels,  in attempting to link the ideas of Tkachev 
2^'  P;  i 1 T!+t-r Is saving in October,  1917:     »  'The ^olsneviKs.   . n,  quotes the latt-r as JW i    «±g g J^^   >   >J% ±s ;ay deepest 
oust  take oower immeoiately.   .   .To hesitate  i.**%»•'  J« Present 
.nnvi^nn that if v.e  "await" tne  Congress oi  ooyiets -nd let the  ^resent c onviction that ii' v.e 
moment pas;., we  ruin the revolution.'   "    (p. 3^*4; 
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and the entrepreneurial class oven fewer?    It was Herzen, tnen, who spoke 
to Xkacnev with his  "peasant  socialis.ii,» witn nis concejt of the  direct 
transition from the   leasant obsncnina to the  socialist  society of the 
future,  tnereby  skipping tne  capitalist  stage  of development.    Tkachev, 
Having imbibed the Marxian iueology ana hatrea for the  bourgeois .aentality, 
and firea with a passionate contempt for lioera# attempts at reform ana 
>arliamentary aeiaocracy in general,  assesses the  situation particular to 
ussia—ana denxea the  necessity for the ucvelopment and subsequent aecline 
ox" c. pitalism in Russia.     Jonsiaering the nature  of the .iussimi autocracy, 
Tkachev concludeu thtt motning faoo^ for  tne    eo ;ie  coula possioly emerge 
from its unequal  social system ana tight political control;   therefore,  the 
uevelo-uaent of capitalism,  oesides oein^ alien to   tiie   jreuomin*ntly peasant 
Russian society,  woula  serve  only to support ana strengthen tne  oppressors 
of the   ieoi)le.    Socialism ana tne  co.u.lete equality of  tne people mu^t ue 
establishea as  soon as  oossiole;  any capitalistic  encroachments u>on tne 
;ian society must be destroyed oefore it oecai.i>i permanently entrenjnea. 
This destruction cannot be aone peacefully,  for the autocracy ana capitaix   i 
in Russia are blood brothers and inseparable;  no Socialist reforms can be 
ejected from a privileged tyrannical power.    Tne oeasant class is the closest 
to the Marxian proletariat;  it must be galvanizea into  action immeaiately— 
no* or never—by the revolutionary ..dnority for the destruction of capitalist 
remains in Russia.    Only tnen could a truly egalitarian  ■ocialism be established 
by a aictaturship of the revolutionary minority.    Tkachev, in an effort to 
justify ideologically this obvious deviation from orthooix Marxism,  formulated 
his theory of historical  "jumps." 
In a review of irnst aecher's Labor rroulem  (1869;,  Tkachev attacked 
the author's belief in reform within a capitalist  state,  callea for « workers' 
state,   and noted the necessity of political turnover in order to accomplish 
an economic  reorientation.    It was a vicious  circle:     no material better..ient 
-without oolitical control,  and no   joliticsl control without economic inaejenu- 
ence.    Thus,  he   stated the necessity for a violent transition,   a "jump" from 
subordination to landlord,  bourgeois ca italists to the egalitarian ism ana 
freedom of socialism: 
•Under the normal oruer of things political control belongs to 
those classes wno comin.^te the economic  spnere.   .   .13ut tne  noraal 
order  can be  temporarily interruoteu,.   .   .ana then the vicious circle 
can be  broken.   .   .It is absura to expect a natural transition from 
the  old regime to the  new one,  because the  two arc ba;;eu an ..ia^etri- 
cally opposed   orincijles.   .   .Sverybouy ou^ht to know  that this transi- 
tion requires a certain ju-np,  ana everybody must   >reo.Te for it."10 
Tkachev in ,n earlier  series of articles  (1867-o),  gave nis theory legiti- 
laoy oy providing it with both an historical basis ana nistorical continuity. 
Analyzing the German Peasant Jars in the  sixteenth century,  he attributed 
the peasants'  defeat, not to the prematureness of their revolt or to the 
Utopian character of tneir hemands,  out rather to   the hesitation of their 
leaders ana their bourgeois allies to go -long with the radical demands of 
the peasants.     These aemanas aere more   >ractical than the  moderate ones,  for 
tha  simple reason that they were gearea to the establishment ox  an entirely 
new social oruer.    By emphasizing this    oint,  Tkachev denounces those  "his- 
torian-gradualists" wno  statea the necessity of society's hierarchially 
developing,   slowly from lower to higher  sta.,e,  ana he auueu new fuel to the 
Jire of his historical  "jumps «27 
,Vith these  "interruptious" in natural hevelopment and the Her.en-ins ,ired 
orinciple of an immediate  shift fro., .re-capitalism to  post-caoitalism, using 
the peasant as the revolutionary force,  Tkachev v.as forcea into the opposition 
**arpovich,   "A Forerunner of Lenin:    P.  ft.  Tkachev,"  ?P.  33b-339. 
27Ibid, p. 339-3UO. 
ranks against Marxism.    It it; important to note,  however,   that Tkachev,  unlike 
Herzen, never entertained the idea of avoiding industrialization entirely. 
He had been influenced enough oy   [arxism to aparecicite the significance of 
the development of  industry and a strong working class unaer the  auspices 
of a socialist system.    However, to him the   >eculiar conditions of Kussia 
demanded tht-t the revolution be conuuctea on the oasis of the agricultural 
laborer and the  prevention of a full-fledged capitalist  system.    Kozmin .nakes 
this concession to Tkachev,  when,  after condemning hia for i;is deviations 
from orthodox Marxism,  he explains the reasons behind them: 
The economic backwardness of Kussi. ,  the weak development of its 
factory industry,  the paucity »nd weakness of its working class—these 
are  the reasons why Tkachev was not given tne ciianc;--  to  axiojt the 
Marxist theory in its complete view,  to understand it as the  class 
doctrine of an industrial proletariat,  and to construct the olan of 
his revolutionary *ctivity in conformity nith it.    This is why tnose 
who  are ready to recognize  Tkachev as  the "first nussian liarxi.t" 
..lake  a serious mistake,    but a great mistake is maae  als_ by tho~e who, 
in  speaking of the ideological predecessors of Marxism in Russia and 
counting, in  these ranks ..ot only Chernjlttevsky but even partly Herzen, 
mention not a word about Tkachev.    If Tkachev war not a Marxist,  then 
no one in trie Russia of his time  .^rceiveu as  Ltron^ly and as deeply 
the  teachings of Marx as he,  excepting  oerhaps M.  N.   Ziuer,   the 
immediate predecessor of the legal Marxists of tne IcJQO's, who was 
significantly better than Tkachev in analyzing the  economic teachings 
of  tne  author of Kapital,  but not in understanding the  militant class 
character of   ,iarxism.    Where in the revolutionary attitude of Tkacnev 
ended the  influence of marx,  there began nis ulanquism, his Jacobinism, 
(translation mine) 
With tnis discussion of the motivation of Tkachev' s  "no.v  or never" revolu- 
tionary attitude and the   revious one concerning his views on revolutionary 
methods,  Tkachev"s Blanquism appears almost complete.    There is one ingredi- 
ent lacking,  however,  and that one is certainly tne .most  significant of all, 
for it distinguished Tkachev from all the other Russian radicals of nis 
time in revolutionary honesty and consistency of thought.     That ingredient 
is the dictatorship of the revolutionary minority after tne overtnrow of 
the tsarist government. 
28Tkachev,   Izoranniye  .behindniya,  vol.  1,  pp.  U6-U7. 
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This element of revolutioniiry expediency was based on Tkachev's view 
of the peasant,   as discussed above.    Assessing this peasant as a purely 
destructive force, Tkachev was deeply concerneu over the creation of the 
new egalitarian,   socialist  society after the  coup d'etat.    The  revolutionary 
minority,   conveniently holding the reins of power in its hand, was tne only 
capable body for assuring tne  success of both the destructive  ana constructive 
phases of  the  revolution.     In this concept,   as much as in the  theory of revolu- 
tionary conspiracy, Tkachev was inspireu by Blanquij it was the "Parisian 
dictatorship11  translateu into a "Petersburg dictatorship."    Consistently 
propagating  such an overt manipulation of centralized power,  Tkachev coulu 
not fail to come into conflict with Bakunin and the anarchists.    Their 
dream of the future society,  shared by Herzen, and Lavrov, was a loose feder- 
ation of free,  autonomous  societies,    RaadlMI to say,   this was Tkacnev's 
dream also,  egalitarian and  socialist as he consistently was,  but it was in 
the means of achieving that  society that ha differed from Bakunin.    The 
anarchist believed  that all phases of the autocratic  system,  anu especially 
the  government,  were  intrinsically evil,  ana therefore must be destroyed 
immediately,  totally,  in order to liberate the masses.    Hie vision clouded 
by a Utopian fog,  Bakunin  saw the  spontaneous establishment of the new  system 
by the instinctively socialistic peasants. 
Tkachev maintained a more practical view of the length of time required 
for instituting the principles of Socialism in a country newly freed from 
centuries of  autocratic rule  and the exploitation of landlordism.    The   social 
overthrow must be thorough;   it must reconstruct not only institutions,   but 
attitudes,   ideals,  morals to fit  the new system.    Such a revolution,  in 
Tkacnev's words,   ■   'wilx not oe accomplisneo. in one or two years,.   .   .it 
will require the work of a who.e generation,.   .   .it appears not ex_abru£to, 
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but is prepared and brought to life slowly, gradually,  step by ste.,.'   "2? 
At the   same  time,  Tkacnev warnea of the folly of believing that any revolu- 
tion,  even the  most violent,  can destroy at  DOS  ulow all tne enemies of the 
revolution.     They will constantly be organizing  jounter-revolutionary efforts, 
which the new society moot combat in order  to survive,    ouch ft dual uattle— 
the creation of a completely new society and the destruction of the enemies 
of the revolution—must be conducted by a boa/   ;ossessing great  strength, 
which implies in turn the power of manipulation. 
But power—as Kozmin interprets Tkacnev's opinions—is durable and 
mighty only when it is well-organized,  and th^t ia "tt»in*ble only under 
the centralization of every separate function of power and the differen- 
tiation of these functions.    And power organized ID  such a .aanner  is 
that which one chooses to call giflrernment.    This is why, rather than 
uestroy the governmental a    aratus,  tne revolutionaries,  in TKachev's 
opinion,   ought to use it in the achievement of the social revolution.30 
(translation mine) 
In this connection,  Tkacnev a6ain took up  the battle  against the anarchism 
of Bakunin and Lavrov.    The anarchist-  thou5ht that governaent i.   evil,  but 
Tkacnev  maintained that government was not the source,  out the  consequence 
of evil,    Irll  ..asejiateu in his Bind with inequality;  as long as inequality 
existeu,  government was necessary to protect the weak,  exploiteu clashes. 
A conuition of no-government or an-arohy was inconceivable without the pre- 
vious establishment of urotherhooa and equality: 
Thus,  in Tkacnev's opinion,   cov.rnment ueco..es  unnecessary anu 
abdicates only after comolete equality exists among the  people,  that 
is, vaien  che  be arming of co.amunism is estaulisneu.     In tne transition 
period,   the governmental power-is an indispensable weapon in the hands 
of the  revolutionary party.31    (translation .nine) 
Thus,  Tkachev,   the practical revolutionary tactician,  cognizant of the pit- 
falls of idealism in the realm of activity and of the impossibility of 
^'Tkachev,  Izoranniye   :ochineniya,  vol.   1,  p. 53. 
30Ibia,   o.  53. 
-^Iuia,  p.  ik- 
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estaolishing immediate anarch.,, committed the soue fallacy for the sake of 
his own ideal-egalitarianismj  in  snort, he failed,  like Herzen,   to aakf the 
logical conclusion of his ideas  on revolutionary uictatorsnip and to hee^ 
the warning of Bakunin on the danger of passing from an old tsarist dictator- 
ship to a new  socialist Dictatorship of tne revolutionary ..dnority.    Kozmin, 
naturally, writing in 1932 in the very midst of a Stalinist dictatorial 
government, was cautious with his    .raise of Tki~chev as a Leninist prototype. 
He emphasized clearly his subject's theories on the necessity for dictatorial 
power in the  transition period, without at the same  time   aentioning the oan^ar 
of Tkachev's temporary dictatorship becoming a permanent institution.    Stalin 
was the logical conclusion of Tkachev's theories,   though the latter would 
have shuddered at the unnecessary ruthle-sness of the former. 
Thus, Kozmin takes issue with those who criticize Tkachev for his anar- 
chism, beginning with Sngels, who  treated Tkachev as an adherent of dakunin. 
Tkachev's   "Open Letter" to angels in 1070 gave the  latter grounds for this 
belief,  but Engels was not reading this letter in context with Tkachev's 
earlier polemics against bakunin  ana Lavrov.    Kozmin sees in Tkachev's v,ish 
for destruction of the  tsarist    ower tad the  eventual abdication of the 
revolutionary government  something very different from anarchism.     It was 
more  similar to the Marxist  "dictatorship of the proletariat" than to 
Bakuninist pan-destructive  anarchism.    He paraphrases Lenin's The state and 
the Revolution,  inspired oy Marx anu Angels of course,   on the differentia- 
tion between anarchists and socialists: 
.   .the difference between the anarchists anu socialist! comes 
not to tne  fact that tne  first negate  tne st*te while tne  second accept 
it,   out to the  fact that the   socialists,  in opposition w> tne  anarchists, 
in tne first    lace,  recognize  governmental power as an indis.,ensaole 
weapon in the  course  of the  transition period for the reconstruction 
of  society on the roots of communism,  and in the  seconu   dace,  tney 
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consider thvt the  government renders itself unneces:.  ry and auuicates 
only ..hen the reconstruction of society is finished.    Taerefore, 
Tkachev's conviction that in tne future,   government is ueotineu to 
„isa ;ear still uoes not justify calling niui «n anarchist." 
Kozmin also  sees the justification of Tkachev's Blanquist principleI in the 
uegree with which they were adopted oy revolutionary activist! after the 
failure of the  "to the people" movement in lo7a.    The  second  "Zemlya i Volya," 
formed in lti7b,  based its jarty structure upon centralized i uthority and 
internal discipline in a genuine adaptation of Tkachev's conspiratorial 
principles,  and the organ of  "Narodnaya Volya" proclaimeu both orthouox 
populist ideas and the alanquist views of Nab at on trie necessity for the 
preparation for the  seizure  of power by a revolutionary  jarty—in  other 
worus,  political revolution before  social revolution.     Kozmin fails to ob- 
serve,  nowever,  that tne 6oal of "Narodnaya Volya" was not a ulanqui t dic- 
tator snip,  uut the ixieui-te  convocation of  .  Constituent rtsse..iuly,  in the 
election of wnich the revolutionary ^arty woula campaign legally for its 
program,    This point will be discussed in the fortneoming chapter on "haro- 
anaya Volya." 
It is  in connection with this  latter organization,  uowever,  that an 
interesting epilogue to Tkachev's revolutionary tactics occurreu.     "Narodnaya 
Volya,"  though proclaiming  socialist goals,  had chosen to conuuet a   .olitical 
revolution in order to reacn  those  goals quicker *nd efficiently,  and the 
principle element of its attack upon the tsarist government w*s in its use 
of terror or assassination against  governaant  officials.    Tkacnev and tne 
"Nabatovts" were opposed to individual terror, for these uncoordin^teu aote 
led, in their opinion, only to the dispersion and weakening of the strength 
of the revolutionary party.    His fears were realizeu for "Narodnaya Volya," 
32rk-chev,  Izbranniye ^ocnineniya,  vol.   1,  pp.  54-55. 
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when in the repression after each assassination, their force was depleted 
drastically,  culminating in the complete destruction of the aarty in the 
aftermath of the  assassination of Alexanuer II.    In only one respect did 
Tkachev agree  to the  application of terror—against government  spies. 
In the  soring of I8d0,  however,   two members of the Executive Committee 
of  "Naroanaya Volya," N.  A. Mcrozov anu Gerasim Uomanenko,  appeared oefore 
Tkachev and  suggested an alliance between their organization and the   "Society 
for the Liberation of the People."    Tkachev grasped the idea enthusiastically; 
iiere was another opportunity to link up with the Russian revolutionaries, 
with the most  significant and most active revolutionary party in itussia at 
ti...t time.     The  "Society'1  oi'fereu   ioaey ana a printing press,  but it was 
soon discovered that Morozov ana aomanenko v.ere  leftist deviationists from 
the views of the Executive Committee, with which they haa argued and indeed 
severed all relations.    The "Hi roaovoltsi" shunnea any agreement with Tkachev 
and the  "Nabatovtsi,"  prejuoiced as they v,ere  against his ideas on dictator- 
ship,   though making use of Blanquist tactics in their conspiracy.    The two 
aeviationists began to function seoarately M  "socialist-terrorists,"  publisn- 
ing two pamphlets in Geneva advocating terror ana "disorganization"  to force 
the  government  to make concessions.    Kozmin  speaks of tne reaction of the 
"Nabatovtsi" to this pro  agana*: 
To  the  aaherents of a conspiratorial organization with the goal 
of the  seizure  of p.wer-the  "Nabatovtsi"--the thought oi«*    sta- 
tion  of  the  task of the revolutionaries to one terroristic activity 
was  completely .lien.    0UTC was not a single  qrapathizer among tne 
"NabaJovtsi" with tne idea of tne aavisaoility of terror as the 
means for conaucting the political struggle ,J-» 
It seems clear  that not only Tkachev but tne Whpl. of uis iiaoat following 
,as oppoMd to the idea of terror.    »t,  there is . curiou- inconsistency 
indent which is  roppoaad to hare occured two years before, here,  concerning an in^ic 
"33 Tkachev,  izoranniye Sochineniya,  vol.  1,    >•   *, • 
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Kas jar Tursky, Tkachev's Polish collaborator on the   jublication of Nabat, 
was an advocate of terror, according to Kozrain, ana duringthe course of 1J77- 
,,  hi wrote   several articles calling for   iass terror against all suJjorters 
of the ola regime in Russia.    Tkachev attacked his articles    ad refused to 
print them,   but Tursky gathered together hi.,   su sorters from the "Nabatovtsi" 
and delivered an ultimatum to Tkachev:    either print the articles,  and there- 
by recognize the use of terror, or leave Naoat.    Tkachev, faced with this 
threat of his expulsion from the jnly sounding board for his dlanquist views, 
gave in to the majority and  thereby relinquished his  josition as leader  of 
the "Nabatovtsi."-5'4   Either Kozmin is mistaken in his description aafca&tta* 
of tne earlier incident,   or Dy one  spring of 1680,  Tursky and the  "Nabatovtsi" 
had become disenchanted 'with the idea of terror,  which fact  seems highly 
unlikely. 
At any rate,  Tkachev's consistent opposition to  the use  of terror is 
nade clear by these two incidents,   in  spite of txie  comion ^au. false accusa- 
tion against  all orthodox Blanquists for their advocacy of terror.    Kozmin 
is obviously anxious to absolve Tkacnev of this stigma,  much in the orthodox 
Leninist line,  for in '.That is to be gone?    (1902),  Lenin makes a curious 
reference to  the  "terrorism" of Tkachev.    Anxious to discredit Madezhdin 
(who in aabocncye Delo (The Workers'  Cause;  in April,   1901,  had sounded a 
passionate call for attack against the tsarist government with a flagrant 
lack of olanning),  Lenin differentiated between Tkachev'■ and Nauezndin's 
"terror": 
It is  said that history -oes not repeat itself.    But Nadezhdin 
exerts every effort to cause  it vo repeat itself anu he  zealously 
imitates  Tkachov in  strongly condemning "revolutionary culturism," 
in  snouting about  "sounoing tne tocsin «nu about - special  "eve-of- 
the-revolution point of view," etc.    Apparently, ne nad forgo .ten 
3Uibid, p.  29. 
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the well-known maxim that whila an original historical event repre- 
sents a tragedy,  its re.lica is merely a farce.     The attempt  to  seize 
power, which was prejared by the preaching of Tfochov and carried 
out Dy means of the "terrifying" terror that did really terrify, had 
granaeur,   out the  "excitative"  terror of a Tkachov toe Little ia  si.iuly 
luuicrous,   particularly so what) it is  su plementea with the idea of 
an organization of average people.35 
Obviously,   the  Tkacnev-inspired "terrifying"  terror referred to by Lenin 
jossesses ^ .iiore  exaltea uJia justifiable character than  the individual 
terror of Tursky, luorozov, ana uomanenlca and the "excitative"   terror of 
Nadezhdin.    It is a question of terror or revolutionary activity conducted 
with olanning and organization,  with tne power to back up inflammatory ..ords 
with decisive action.     Lenin' s ./hat is to ue uone? could very well have been 
partially inspired by Tkachev,  though there  is no other direct reference  to 
the  latter in the  pamphlet besides the one mentioned above.    Lenin's elite 
of professional conspiratorial revolutionaries, hia insistence  upon tne 
necessity of a  seizure of power by that elv&e,  and the  oolu assertion that 
tne  elite must  then use its    ower zo reeducate the  masses to the  socialist 
faith are all echoes of Tkachev.    „iichael Karpovich,  in his article compar- 
ing the  tactics of Tk«cnev and Lenin,  makes tnis evaluation: 
men  some  of his Mensnevik eritics accused Lenin of going 
back to  the conspirator!. 1 methods of the terrorists of the 1870'a, 
he  accented the challenge and ooldly asserted that What was needed 
was a   'Social Oemocratic toeli*bov.'     (one of leaders of "Narounaya 
Volya")     ..ith an equal right ne could h.ve  spoken of a  'Social 
Oemocratic Tkachev.'3° 
Kozmin does not  emphasize the  connection uetween Tk-cnev and Lenin,   i/vriting 
aa he did under a Stalinist iatardiot upon -11 non-Marxist roots of Lenin 
and the Soviets and after tne elimination of toe Pakrovsky School,   toe 
foremost propagators of toe Russian Blanquist*.    But the implications of 
35V.  I.  Lento.  Collected .forks,  foreign Languages Publisnin6 House, 
Moscow, 1961, vol. 5,   -   • i>iu-pll. 
36.1A, Forerunner of Lenin:    P. N. Tkachev," p. 3u7. 
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influence  are clear,   and Kozmin is emphatic on the  necessity of including 
Tkachev among the .ius.-ian revolutionary "greats." 
Certainly  the most outstanding contribution of  rkaehev's career as a 
revolutionary publicist and tactician lies in the purity and remarkable 
consistency ox' his ideas,     iucn a passionate concern for the  equality and 
freedom of the masses and the clear statement of motivation,  tactics,  *na 
goals could not have failea to  att.\ct the mind ana heart of Lenin.    That 
such a pure mind and passion should have been so ill-respected bj  his con- 
temporaries is inconceivable;  the Russian revolutionaries  of the l860's and 
l.;70's were nurtured  uy and functioned only unuer exalted iaeals.    However, 
Tk chev's honesty soundeu foreign to them,  especially since  the only other 
prominent Russian figure who propagated iaeas similar to Tkachev'L was 
Hechaev, who besmirched the purity of Jlanqui-t theory with his ruthless 
actions.     "Blanquist" became a dirty word to the revolutionaries, nd the 
heritage  of Tkachev lay in the dust,  to be  revived only in the twentieth 
century by Lenin.    Tkachev, the grand old man of Russian Blanquism,  destined 
to be misunderstood by his contemporaries, was thus somewhat of an intellectual 
martyr to the Russian revolutionary cause,  a man who regarded the compromise 
of his theories  as inconceivable. 
PART II 
THE APPLICATION OF THE TH20R- 
The "Organization" and "Kell":    Immature Devils 
With Herzen, Bakunin, and Tkachev destined to play the role of per- 
manent exiles abroad, communicating with Russian revolutionaries only 
through the illegal press, and Zaichnevsky persecuted by the Third Section 
into relatively useless activity in the provinces, the instrument of 
revolutionary power passed into the nands of figures less significant in 
their contribution to theory but more successful in organizing radical 
forces for revolutionary action.    Chernyshevsky's and Pisarev's "new men" 
received and modified the heritage of the "raznochintsi," the uprooted 
intellectuals of the ldUO's and l850«s, and, allied with a sense of 
revolutionary urgency, this heritage passed on to a new generation of 
activists who wielded the dangerous weapons of conspiracy, demanding of 
themselves the most ruthless and most precious sacrifice-their very lives. 
From the remnants of "Zemlya i Vol,a," dead since 1863, arose a new 
secret society called the "Organization."    Its founder Nikolai Ishutin 
was born in Serdovsk on April 3, 181*0, and entered Moscow University in 
1863.    Ishutin idolized Chernyshevsky:    "'There have been three great men 
in the world...Jesus Christ, Paul the Apostle, and Chernyshevsky.-l 
Modelling himself after the heroes of What is to be done?, Ishutin fell 
into that anti-intellectualism which superficially appeared to be inspired 
by Pisarev's nihilism, but which in reality ^harbored an inherent popular 
distrust of the isolation and bourgeois mentality of the university, 
educated Russian.    Ishutin attracted similar young radicals, who also had 
made the "voluntary sacrifice" of their schooling and even of their normal 
lQuoted in Venturi, p. 331. 
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living comforts, and he soon made up for his lack of superior intellectual 
ability and publicist talent, in leadership qualities.    His group, fired 
with an intense desire to meet and aid the oppressed people, founded 
Chernyshevskian cooperative associations among the students, workers, and 
artisans, and even formulated schemes for running small factories in order 
to finance the revolutionary cause and for creating OWenite colonies in 
Siberia Ishutin, unprepossessing, hunchbacked, "nicknamed 'the General',"2 
became interested particularly in the factory workers of Moscow, encour- 
aging the formation of a workers'  cooperative, enhanced by a labor 
exchange and a professional school for training sons of members.    His 
every attempt to organize these deprived masses, either for agitation 
through demonstrations or for peaceful communal experiments, was stymied 
by some legal technicality. 
Frustrated by this failure to reach the people through legal organi- 
zation, these ascetic anti-intellectuals turned to propaganda in the area 
potentially most dangerous to the State—elementary education.    Dismissing 
contemptuously the normal "culturizing" curriculum, Ishutin helped to 
organize a boys' school in the slums of Moscow with the purpose of instilling 
discontent in the young minds: 
Here a slanted variety of elementary instruction was 
offered.    Thus, the teacher, after pointing out that the eagle 
was a bird of prey, would observe that a government flaunting 
the eagle on its coat of arms (Russia was, of course, such a 
one) only proved thereby that it was as rapacious and blood- 
thirsty as that bird.    The arithmetic teacher, having led his 
pupils to admit that one was less than seventy-two million, 
Indeed, an insignificant quantity in compariso"' ™^ ^ 
•Well, we have one czar, but there are seventy-two million of 
us!'    Ishutin is said to have remarked:     'We will make r.volu- 
tionaries out of these boys.'-* 
2Yarmolinsky, Rnad to Revolution, p. 136. 
3Yarmolinsky, pp. 136-137. 
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It was merely a resuscitated "Sunday school," but the ideology of the 
future "Organization" lay nascent within it:    hatred for the tsarist 
government and regicide. 
The "Organization" came to life on this basis between 1665 and 1866. 
"The General" was its leader in Moscow, and it was linked with a similar 
group in Petersburg.    Within the "Organization" itself functioned a 
smaller core of leaders, called "Hell" and admittedly a terrorist group. 
Both centers of the secret society proclaimed vague plans for the social 
revolution, but the Petersburg group, under the leadership of I. A. 
Khudyakov, placed its hopes in a political revolution from above and the 
establishment of an indispensable democracy, while Ishutin's terrorist 
group in Moscow denounced Western constitutionalism and never went far 
beyond planning the assassination of the Tsar.    It was from within the 
Moscow group that Dmitri Karakozov arose and independently planned his 
attempt upon the Tsar's life. 
Karakozov,  Ishutin's cousin, born in the Saratov department on 
October 23,  18U0, was "a morose, self-centred youth, deaf in one ear, 
whose grey eyes were set in a lean, sickly face"!*..."'a pale and tired 
face, hair flowing on to his shoulders; he was noticeable for the care- 
lessness of his clothes.'"5    After attending Kazan University, from which 
he was expelled in 1861 for participating in student riots, Karakozov 
came to Moscow in 186U, where he again was forced to leave the university, 
this time for lack of funds.    He came under the influence of Ishutin, was 
briefly a master in one of the latter's schools, but, fired with an in- 
tense hatred of the aristocracy and an equally intense passion for the 
%armolinsky, p. 138. 
^Venturi, p. 3WA. 
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liberation of the masses, he was drawn more to "Hell" and to regicide 
plans.    Yarmolinsky says of his presence at the meetings of the secret 
core group:     "At the gatherings he listened carefully, but hardly ever 
opened his mouth.    The talk of self-immolation, of daring action, fas- 
cinated him.    He was a soul possessed.    The cause of the common people was 
this ruling passion."6   Seriously ill during the winter 1865-66, he was 
plagued with the thought of dying before he could contribute to the cause. 
Karakozov retired temporarily in February, 1866, to the monastery of the 
Trinity and Saint Sergius near Moscow, but then returned to the group and 
announced his decision to kill the Tsar personally. 
"Hell" was nonplussedj the realization of their idle talk was a 
staggering thought.    Although the others attempted to dissuade him, 
Karakozov left in March for Petersburg with a gun.   Associating with stu- 
dents and workers, Karakozov wrote a manifesto "To Worker Friends," in 
which he foolishly explained in simple language his intention of killing 
the Tsar who was responsible for the sufferings of the people and who had 
betrayed them by his false reforms in 1861.    It was an amateurish 
anarchistic polemic against the State, and as such it should have alarmed 
the Petersburg officials, who, however, ignored it as harmless. 
Khudyakov, with whom Karakozov had come in contact, was naturally 
opposed to the assassination, for the program of the Petersburg group had 
been "long-term propaganda and infiltration among the people,"7 a decidedly 
more propagandists and, for that matter, more populistic strategy. 
" II11 III    |  passionate dedication, however, could not fail to inspire the 
radicals, and their strategy-planning was transformed immediately into the 
"Yarmolinsky, p. 138. 
7Venturi, p. 3U7. 
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formulation of tactics for the popular uprising to accompany Karakozov's 
act.    The sense of immediacy clouded their perspective, and surprisingly 
they decided to attribute the assassination to the nobles who were dis- 
satisfied with emancipation, thereby encouraging the peasants to rise up 
against the nobility.    This attitude was exactly what "Narodnaya Valya" 
attempted to avoid in 1881, preferring their act to appear as the ex- 
pression of a party of, by, and for the people.    Peasants here and there 
in 1881 actually did blame the nobles for the death of the Tsar, but they 
did not rise up.    The purity of Karakozov's motivation was thus fruitlessly 
sullied in a Machiavellian manner by the Petersburg group. 
Khudyakov meanwhile went to Moscow and informed the "Hell" of 
Karakozov's activities, whereupon two Muscovites traveled to Petersburg 
to bid the aspiring assassin to return to Moscow.    On March 2$, 1866, he 
was in Moscow, being exhorted to give up his plan, but on March 29, he 
was back in Petersburg, where on April h, he shot at and missed the Tsar 
in the Summer Garden.    Caught by the police and members of the crowd, 
Karakozov is said to have shouted; "'Fools, I've done this for you;'" 
when asked later by the Tsar if he was a Pole, he said, "'Pure Russian;"1 
and when questioned for his reasons, he said, "'Look at the freedom you 
gave the peasants I'"8    Though Ishutin, under intense interrogation, never 
revealed any names, his discovered papers led to the "Organization" in 
Petersburg and Moscow.    Karakozov was obviously deranged, and he himself 
had addressed a plea for mercy to the Tsar, claiming the equivalent of 
temporary insanity; but his death sentence was not commuted, and he was 
hanged on October 3, 1866.    Ishutin was condemned to death also, but his 
sentence was commuted to forced labor for life in Siberia, where he died 
8Ibid., p. 3h7. 
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of consumption on January 5, I879.    Khudyakov was banished to Siberia, 
where he died of mental illness on September 17, I876.    The aftermath of 
the attempt was a repressive "White Terror," during which all revolutionary 
societies were driven underground, the most significant group being the 
"Academy of Smorgon," which carried on the Chernyshevsky and Karakozov 
cults and whose leaders were arrested in November, 186°, reportedly for 
attempting to blow up the Tsar's train.   Previously, they had made efforts 
in I867 to establish contact with the "European Revolutionary Committee," 
which Ishutin had claimed was the "Organization"'s European counterpart, 
but the effort resulted only in the smuggling back into Russia of 
Bakunin's first issue of Narodn»e Delo (The People's Cause), which inspired 
the underground circles, but which resulted in the arrest of the smugglers. 
Ishutin's "Organization" is treated only in passing by the Soviets, 
but the germs of Nechaev's secret society activities and the assassination 
attempts of "Narodnaya Volya" were obviously present in the brief and 
tragic existence of this group.    Significantly, the strategy of a 
Beauquist dictatorship with the purpose of building the socialist society 
of the future is lacking in the ideology of this secret society.    Rather, 
the tactics of organizing a secret society, based on authority, obedience, 
and discipline, with the goal of instigating a social revolution, were 
foremost in the minds of, at least, the Moscow radicals.    It has already 
been mentioned that the two centers differed on political orientation. 
Khudyakov was a true populist, for he possessed a genuine love, almost 
idolization, of the peasant masses.    His interests were ethnography and 
folklore, and he made use of fables and even Bible maxims in his propa- 
ganda to reach his ignorant readers.    He favored political revolution, 
not in the sense of an authoritarian party overthrowing the Tsar and 
r 
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dictating the measures necessary for achieving a socialist system, but in 
the sense of going among the people and agitating for a shift to democracy 
and socialism based on the peasant obshchina.    His ideas were not well- 
defined, but perhaps this fact is attributable to his various methods for 
awakening the dormant desire for democratic government.    In The Self- 
Teacher Khudyakov spoke of a democracy, believing it necessary for the 
advent of socialism, in spite of the evils inherent in Western-style 
democracies, and he idolized the government of the United States."    In 
For True Christians.    A Work by Ignatius, he delivered these Bible maxims, 
doctored to suit his own sentiments: 
■Any nation which does not elect its own officials and does 
not keep count of their activities, is the slave of its super- 
iors'....'The Bible demands that Kings should be elected. They 
must be chosen by the people and their power must be limited'.. 
..'The Lord, when he gave his people land in Palestine, ordered 
them to farm it collectively and divide it among themselves in 
equal parts.' **• 
In another instance, he addressed an appeal to the Tsar for continued 
reforms and the convocation of a Zemsky Sobor.    His entire orientation was 
toward the peasant, his freedom, his obshchina, and for that reason it 
would be more correct to call him a peasant socialist in the Herzen tra- 
dition, with a penchant toward peaceful evolution from above by a consti- 
tutional monarchy^ than to label him an advocate of violent revolution from 
below, destroying everything in its path.    It is obvious that Khudyakov 
does not fit in the category of Russian Blanquists, in spite of the freak 
instance with Karakozov, in which he attempted to apply his idealistic 
propaganda in an uncharacteristic Machiavellian maneuver. 
The Moscow "Organization" and its executive body "Hell," on the other 
9Venturi, p. 3U0. 
10Ibid., p. 3U2. 
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haad, relied almost solely upon Machiavellian tactics.    The goals of the 
larger body were moderate enough:    a peasant revolution prepared by pro- 
paganda among the people by an organization based upon a central body 
instructing groups dispersed among the provinces, where the revolutionaries 
would build up libraries and societies of discontented peasants, artisans, 
students, and seminarists.    Ishutin himself planned to go live among the 
Cossacks and workers,  spreading revolutionary socialist propaganda.    But 
the provincial groups never materialized, and Ishutin and his followers 
fell more and more into the role of revolutionary terrorists.    Determined 
to promote a radical economic revolution, Ishutin scorned a political 
revolution from above based on liberal constitutional reforms and censured 
the State and liberalism as enemies of the people.    From this point of 
view, it was but one step to advocacy of terrorism—"a compound of revol- 
utionary Machiavellianism and extreme Populism.    The killing of the Tsar 
was to be the shock which would incite a social revolution or would at 
least compel the government to make substantial concessions to the 
peas ants." 1-i 
At this point in the development of his ideology, Ishutin encountered 
stiff opposition from members within his own -Organization." There were 
some who echoed the Petersburg group in their desire for long-term, peaceful 
propaganda, and there were a few extremists who, like Ishutin, "pleaded 
for 'bang, bang,' instead of talk."!* The iatter formed "Hell" as a 
terroristic band dedicated to such ventures as the planned escape of 
Chernyshevsky from Siberia, the blowing up of the Peter and Paul fortress, 
and finally the assassination of important State officials, including the 
^•Venturi, p. 335. 
12Yarmolinsky, p. 137. 
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Tsar.    "Hell" was a secret commune of students, limited to thirty selected 
revolutionaries, whose purpose was to keep watch over the "Organization" 
and to infiltrate other revolutionary organizations in order to subordi- 
nate them to their control.    Funds were to be obtained in a ruthless 
manner by individual expropriation:     robbery of merchants,  poisoning of 
parents to receive legacies earlier.    "Hell" functioned under the severest 
discipline: 
A member of "Hell" must live under a false name and break 
all family ties;  he must not marryj  he must give up his  friends; 
and in general he must live with one single, exclusive aim:    an 
infinite love and devotion for his country and its good.    For 
his country he must give up all personal satisfaction and in 
exchange he must feel hatred for hatred, ill-will for ill-will, 
concentrating these emotions within himself.    He must live by 
feeling satisfied with this aspect of his life.W 
Disobedience or error justified the punishment of death.    An assassin was 
to be chosen by lot, would employ any number of disguises and diversionary 
tactics to achieve his goal, would use chemicals to change his face to 
avoid recognition, would carry a manifesto in his pocket to explain the 
reasons for his action, and would poison himself after his attempt, 
yielding his place to another "Hell" member who would carry on his work. 
Later, Kravchinsky epitomized well the impact of such terrorists upon 
Russian society, when he said upon the appearance of "Narodnaya Volya": 
Upon the horizon there appeared a gloomy form, illuminated 
by a light as  of hell, who, with lofty bearing, and a look 
breathing forth hatred and defiance, made his way through the 
terrified crowd to enter with a firm step upon the scene of 
history.    It was the Terrorist.11' 
Ishutin contributed to the mysterious aura surrounding this secret 
society by spreading rumors within the "Organization" that, upon elimi- 
nation of the Urals garrisons, Siberia was geared to secede from the 
^Quoted in Venturi, p. 337. 
Sergei Kravchinsky, Underground Russia, Charles Scribner's Sons, 
New York, 1883, pp. 28-29. 
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Empire and assume protectorate status under the United States, and that 
their society was affiliated with a European Revolutionary Committee 
dedicated to the assassination of European monarchs. Alexander II later 
discovered this rumor and communicated it to Bismarck with a request for 
police surveillance over Russian emigres. This tactic on Ishutin's part 
sounds not unlike the maneuvers of Bakunin in connection with his own 
"Secret Alliance" and with Nechoev's secret cells. 
The attempt to terrorize his own "Organization" in order to elicit 
fear and respect for "Hell" led Ishutin to a fierce internal struggle. 
The "peaceful" propagandists, fighting for their very lives, resorted to 
talk of physical violence and murder against the members of "Hell" in 
order to force them away from their terrorist activities into the propaj**- 
dist camp, and "Hell" responded with similar threats. Venturi sees in 
this internal clash the germ of the propagandist-terrorist dichotomy 
within the ranks of "Zemlja i Volja" in 1879, leading to the schism into 
"Chernyi Peredel" and "Narodnaya Volya."15 
On the question of the future society and its administration, Ishutin 
and "Hell" were even less specific than Khudyakov. The members of "Hell," 
assuming an outbreak of revolution following the death of the Tsar, planned 
to continue their terrorist activities against oppositional and unnecessary 
elements and to control absolutely the political icrces instigating the 
revolution. Nothing was said about the political form that was to succeed 
the present government. Fired with a violent hatred for the tsarist 
State, these extremists were incapable of theorizing on any new administra- 
tion. Venturi assesses this failings 
^Venturi, p. 338. 
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It was both an act of extreme lack of confidence in the 
State and a confession that the revolutionaries themselves were 
too immature to replace it with an organization of their own. 
It was only when the theories and psychology of anarchism had 
been consolidated that this tacit confession of immaturity was 
countered with the declared intention of not wanting a substi- 
tute for the State.    In other words the anarchists welcomed as 
an asset what was in fact a symptom of temporary weakness in a 
developing revolutionary movement.*• 
Zaichnevsky had been more mature, and Tkachev and the leaders of "Narodnaya 
Volya" were to be more realistic in their plans for the future. 
These young extremists, whom Yarmolinsky, seconding Venturi, calls 
"an explosive mixture of irresponsible talk and adolescent thrill-seeking,"1' 
were obsessed with the necessity for immediate action, action at the ex- 
pense of theory, of preparedness.    With their asceticism, their severe 
discipline, their utmost secrecy, and their amoral tactics,  they speak 
loudest as revolutionary Machiavellians or even,  for that matter^ae rev- 
olutionary Jesuits.    "Hell'1 inspired the temporary insanity of Karakozov 
and the permanent insanity of Khudyakov, and the entire Russian revolutionary 
movement felt the terrible repercussions of the government's answer to 
the assassination attempt.    In the highest sense,  their activity was purely 
destructive and tragic beyond their imagination, but their revolutionary 
urgency and organizational ability passed on to a more dispassionate 
generation.    The "Organization" and "Hell" phase was the troubled childhood 
of the adult revolutionary movement in the Russia of the 1870's. 
^Venturi, p. 335. 
^Yarmolinsky, p. 138. 
Serjei Nechaev:     The Monster of Conspiracy 
If the childhood phase of Russian revolutionary activity had 
passed in 1866 and its maturity was  destined for the decade of the 
1870's,   then the Nechaev conspiracy 1869-71 can only be termed the 
transitional adolescent period.    In many ways Nechaev held desper- 
ately to  the Ishutin variety of revolutionary activity and expressed 
all the groidn ;  pains of the Russian movement.     While most disillu- 
sioned young radicals were beginning   to  seek peaceful means of 
communicating  with the people through propaganda and a first-hand 
absorption of their customs and mentality by livin ;  amon ;  them, 
Nechaev and his  small ,-roup of followers  ■ought contact with the 
famous Russian emigre .lakunin and maintenance of terrorist activity. 
Nechaev was born in Ivanovo on  September 20,  1847,   where he 
helped his father in house-pain tin _-;,   waiting on tables,   and carrying 
messages  for a  factory.     Anxious to   escape from the boring lowliness 
of his  surroundings,  Nechaev came to  i-ioscow in I865,  and proceeded 
to fail an examination for a  schoolmastership.     iiovin,  to  Petersburg 
in April,  1866,   he  jained a position as instructor of religion in a 
parochial  school.     He enrolled at the university as an unclassified 
student,   and became attracted to a radical group of students  who  were 
just beginning to  function  with the losing of the  "White Terror." 
Student unrest was leadin-_■  to  demands  for mutual aid societies and 
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cooperative dining rooms for the poor students, but such demonstrations 
were too mild for these extremists,  determined to carry on the tradition 
of Karakozov.     Nechaev,   reading  with them Buonarotti's The Conspiracy of 
Equals  (on Gracchus Babeuf■ s movement) and the first issue of Bakunin1 s 
Narodnoe Delo smuggled into Russia in 1868, began to look upon 
Karakozov* s act as the beginning of a new element in the revolutionary 
moment.     This anarchist and HLanquist literature  sounded a responding 
chord in Nechaev1 s peasant-like hatred for the existing  system,   for 
which his comrades accepted him willingly into their midst.     Nechaev 
soon began to  command the respect of his fellow students as a leader, 
not by pretty speeches,  but by a certain character trait which distin- 
guished him during this period and remained consistently with him 
throughout his remarkable career.    Max Nomad epitomizes that trait in 
this description of the young peasant radicals 
He was a  slight youth,  with thick blond hair and coarse 
but by no means repellent features; he was neither strong 
physically, nor brilliant in any respect,  and his 
intellectual equipment was  scant.    Only later did his 
associates become aware of his tremendous energy which 
transformed his hatred into  deeds,   while they,  for the 
most part,   were content to  dream,   talk or  write. 
This energy made him "'a revolutionist of the deed and not of the 
2 
word,,B    and his few simple words at the gatherings took on a fanatic 
note as he simultaneously called for a break with the bourgeois  system, 
a movement to  and among the people,   and the ruthless murder of all 
xApostles of Revolution, p. 219. 
Statement made by Spa*ovich,  lawyer in the trial of Nechaev1 s 
followers in 1871.    Quoted in Apostles, p. 219. 
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enenies of the revolution.     It was Balcunin and HLanqui with a  special 
Nechaev twist. 
These literary influences upon Nechaev were reinforced by per- 
sonal friendships with the anarchist Vladimir Cherkezov and the 
Hlanquist Tkachev.     That the opposing idealogies of these two men 
worked a lasting synthesis in Nechaev1s mind is testified to by both 
Nomad ("Nechayev... was forever to remain under the influence of the 
apparently contradictory ideologies of the two men."*') and Venturi 
("Nechaev made a  violent and primitive attempt to hold anarchism and 
Jacobinism in the same harness."   )    Nechaev*s collaboration with 
Tkachev led to the planning of the peasant revolt for  February 14, 
18?0,  to be directed by a  "Committee of Action"  (or the  "Central 
Committee" or  "The Committee of the Russian Revolutionary Party"), 
whose actual existence was questioned later by historians,  but whose 
organization and goals  were defined by Nechaev and Tkachev in A Pro- 
gramme for Revolutionary Action (I869).    In the arrests of the 
leaders of this group in I869,  including Tkachev, Nechaev was the 
only one who  escaped. 
Arriving in Moscow, Nechaev left behind him the first in a long 
series of notorious events in his revolutionary career.    In two 
cleverly  written notes,   winding up in the hands of Vera Zasulich, 
then a revolutionary acquaintance in Petersburg,   Nechaev made her and 
^bid., p.  218. 
L 
Venturi,   p.   330. 
^See above chapter 4,  pp.  72-73- 
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a small circle of their friends believe that he had been arrested and 
taken to the Peter and Paul Fortress.     Shortly after,  he invented more 
stories to the effect that he had escaped from the Fortress  (a virtu- 
ally impossible feat)  to Moscow where he had been  arrested again and 
once more escaped,   this  time from several tall,   strong Russian gen- 
darraes  (Nechaev being  a  frail youth of twenty-two).     This tactic was 
one that Nechaev would use constantly in the remainder of his active 
career.     The reason for it was  simply that he had made the decision to 
become an exalted,   courageous,  glamorous leader in the Russian revolu- 
tionary movement,   which was  sadly lacking  such a  figure,   and he needed 
a reputation of mystery and heroism in order to  enhance his prestige 
and to  elicit the respectful obedience of his  followers. 
Considering  Bakunin the grand patriarch of the Russian revolu- 
tionary movement,  Nechaev traveled to  Geneva in March,  1869,   to meet 
the author of Narodnoe Delp.    Nechaev reoresented the defunct'Committee 
of Action" as a lively and extensive revolutionary organization in 
Russia,   and he appealed to  Bakunin with his attractive charm and in- 
domitable energy,   enhanced,  naturally,  by his  spurious arrests and 
•scapes.     The aging Bakunin was flattered by Nechaev1 s attention and 
jumped at the chance to  reestablish relations with the revolutionary 
movement in his beloved homeland.    He began calling Nechaev affection- 
ately "Boy" and "Tiger Cub," induced Ogarev to dedicate one of his 
poems to Nechaev,  and inducted his young protege into a completely 
non-existent alliance with a membership card dated May 12,  1869, 
reading: 
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The bearer of this certificate is one of the accredited 
representatives of the Russian section of the World 
Revolutionary Alliance.     No.  2771. , 
Mikhail Bakunin6 
It was not merely a Geneva or European Alliance,   but a  World Alliance, 
which Bakunin invented especially for Nechaev,  implying  that he was 
joined by 2770 other members all over the world.     The certificate was 
stamped with a seal  saying in French "European Revolutionary Alliance, 
General  Committee," another fictitious body representing no one but 
Bakunin himself.    It was a curious,  and almost humorous, instance of 
one master-schemer matching  wits  with a worthy apprentice,   with the 
result that both were fooled. 
The most fruitful consequence of this  strange collaboration  was 
a series of eight publications,   consisting of pamphlets,  manifestoes, 
and the first issue of the organ of Nechaev's newly-formed revolu- 
tionary society,   "Narodnaya Rasprava"  (The People's Vengeance).     Only 
three of the publications  were  signed,  by Ogarev,   Bakunin,   and Nechaev 
respectively, leaving the authorship of the others in dispute.    All of 
the publications had the same orientation:     abandonment of studies; 
agitation among the people  for  immediate uprisings against the State; 
planning of the revolution  which would be totally destructive  ("'Our 
task is terrible,   total, universal and merciless  destruction.•""' 
hatred for reformism and the "*Socialist-conspirators,  young  doc- 
trinaires,  bookish revolutionaries,  arm-chair revolutionary-statesmen, 
and future dictators,   who play at revolution but are incapable of 
Quoted in Robert Payne,   The Terrorists,  Funk and Wagnalls Co., 
New York, 19571 P« 15. 
'Payne,  The Terrorists, p.  26. 
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raaking it"1;" and the advocacy of Bakunin's anarchism over Blanqui's 
revolutionary dictatorship in the administration of the future society 
("•By revolution,...we mean a radical upheavals.New forms of life can 
spring only from a complete amorphism. ■"y)    The most notorious of the 
works was The Catechism of the Revolutionary, a code of ethics for the 
professional revolutionary,   which Nechaev carried back into Russia and 
which later  was revealed at the trial of the  "Nechaevtst'1  in 1871 by 
the prosecuting lawyer,   coming as a surprise to most of the defendants 
and weakening their morale.    Its authorship is disputed,  though Max 
Nomad claims that Michael Sazhin,   Bakunin's young  protege,   revealed 
in his Reminiscences that he had seen the original in Bakunin's hand- 
writing.        The Catechism is a description of the revolutionary proto- 
type which Bakunin believed Nechaev to be,   and which the latter like- 
vase believed himself to be. 
Nechaev,  having written open letters to  "friends" in Russia 
describing the frenzied activity of the "World Revolutionary Alliance", 
(thereby purposely compromising 387 people in Petersburg with the 
police),  returned to Moscow in August, 1364,  to build up the "Great 
Russian Section" of "Narodnaya Rasprava."    All of the groups were 
organized in  secret cells of five members,  modelled after a plan in- 
spired by Mazziar for the Polish revolutionary movement.     Each cell 
was unaware of the content and purpose of the next highest group in 
the hierarchy,   with the ultimate authority being  vested in a fictitious 
^enturi, p.   361. 
10Aposties,  p.   229. 
9Ibid.. p.   369. 
. 
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"Committee11, i.e., Nechaev himself.    The young fanatic continued to 
build up the Nechaev cult by posing as Anton Petrov, a worker,  and 
spreading  fictitious tales of Nechaev1 s exploits in Siberia and even 
of his death.     The result was immensely  successful,  as the self-pro- 
claimed hero assumed mammoth prestige among the revolutionary circles. 
The goal of "Narodnaya Rasprava"  was to  prepare the masses for the 
social revolution but,  in spite of its propaganda efforts, the 
"Nechaevtsi" never communicated with the people and were restricted 
almost solely to the iloscow area.    On November 21, I869,  the begin- 
ning of the rapid decline of Nechaev' s conspiracy was consummated in 
his personal assassination of Ivanov,  one of the  "Nechaevtsi,"   who 
had refused to post an inflammatory leaflet on the walls of the dining 
room of the Moscow School of Agriculture for fear  the government would 
respond by shutting  down the place.    This disobedience evoked Nechaev* s 
anger,  and he promoted this internal assassination presumably as a means 
of asserting the  "Committee' s" authority,   thereby assuring it of the 
fear and respect of its  subordinates,  and of binding  the perpetrators 
in a compromising act,  thus blackmailing them to maintain their silence. 
Fleeing to  Petersburg  and finally to  Switzerland in December, 
Nechaev left just in time to avoid the discovery of the body by the 
police and the subsequent mass arrests.     The  "tiger cub"  renewed rela- 
tions with Bakunin,  managed to  extort money,  as he had also done on his 
previous trip,  from the Bakhmetier fund,   (Left to Hew en and Ogarev by 
a rich young man  who thus renounced his inheritance and emigrated to  a 
South Seas island to  set up an Owenite colony),  revive Kolokol briefly 
with the help of Herzan's daughter Nataljja,   blackmail Bakunin and 
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others by stealing  several of their compromising letters and documents, 
and spend an eventful winter (1870-1) in London,  charming the ladies and 
jentlemen of the emigre' revolutionary circles and publishing two issues 
of the communist-oriented Obshchina  (The Commune).    Meanwhile,   Bakunin 
had discovered the news of the murder,   realized he had been tricked,   and 
wrote warning  notes to his  friends in London.     Everywhere Nechaev began 
to be condemned as a common murderer,  and the Swiss government on August 
14,  1862,  allowed him to be extradited as  such by the Russian Third 
Section.     The trial of the "Nechaevtsi"  had already taken place in 1871, 
with the result  that the  fellow murderers had been condemned to  several 
years*  hard labor in Siberia,   while peripheral elements of the con- 
spiracy,  obviously duped and manipulated opportunistically by Nechaev, 
received lighter  sentences. 
Nechaev was tried in  January,  I873i   and defended himself passion- 
ately by refusing to recognize the procedure against him as a common 
criminal and claiming the rights of a political prisoner.    He was found 
guilty and sentenced to twenty years'   hard labor and life-long  exile in 
Siberia,  but,   following the official removal of his civil rights on 
January 25, he was secretly transferred to the Alexeyevsky Ravelin in 
the Peter and Paul Fortress,   where he was placed in  solitary confine- 
ment.     His nine years in prison were fantastic ones.     Scratching appeals 
to the Tsar on the walls with a spoon;   slapping in the face a general 
who had been sent to question him; organizing and exercising control 
over the peasant guards in his  section,   to  the point that they smuggled 
letters in and out for him;   establishing  contact  with "Narodnaya Volya"; 
encouraging their work and planning his own escape and an accompanying 
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uprising  within the Fortress;  then supposedly sacrificing his own 
freedom for the sake of the assassination plot (though it is more 
probable that the "Executive Committee" never seriously entertained 
the thought of planning Nechaev*s escape)—these remarkable activi- 
ties of a man isolated in a cell and periodically deprived of books, 
writing materials,   and even  food speak more loudly than his earlier 
escapades  for the  self-sustaining  energy and indomitable  strength of 
will of this inveterate revolutionary.     He demonstrated personally 
during these years the fanatic, ascetic characteristics of the revolu- 
tionary prototype described in the Catechism.     His corruption of the 
guards discovered by a new management of the prison,  Nechaev was 
placed on a starvation diet and died of  scurvy on November 21,  1882. 
It is difficult in many places to  distinguish the anarchist from 
the dlanquist trends in Nechaev' s ideas,   for he equalled Bakunin in 
his spontaneous  shifting  from one orientation to its complete opposite, 
depending upon the facet of revolution under emphasis.     His first 
introduction to revolutionary activity in Petersburg during the years 
1868-9 was dominated by an anarchistic urge, and,   surprising,  in view 
of what was to  come,  A Programme for Revolutionary Action,   co-authored 
by Tkachev and Nechaev,   dwelt upon the necessity of keeping  the revolu- 
tionary organization as decentralized as possible: 
'It must be constructed in accordance with the spirit of 
decentralization and the law of movement,   i.e.  its members 
must change posts after given periods....Decentralization 
must be understood in the sense of a weakening of the centre 
and the granting of considerable scope for action to the 
provincial centres.* 
^Quoted in Venturi, p.   362. 
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This statement is in complete contradiction to  the stand taken by 
both Tkachev and Nechaev in their later writings, but it must be 
remembered that they were more concerned at  this point in  effecting 
a wide-spread peasant upheaval on February 19,  1870;   therefore,   they 
were cautious for fear of scaring  away both the revolutionary proto- 
types  who  were to lead the revolution and the masses  who  were ex- 
pected to participate. 
The characteristics of revolutionary leaders outlined generally 
by Tkachev and Nechaev in the Pro.-ramme,  i.e.,  sacrifice of property, 
family ties,  occupation,  or anything that might hinder the cause, 
received more detailed treatment from the latter in his publications 
under Bakunin's influence in aeneva during the summer of 1869.     The 
anarchistic  element is prominent in all  these  works and tends to 
corroborate the evidence that Nechaev was attempting  to ingratiate 
himself with the veteran revolutionary,   who in turn was using the 
medium of Nechaev1s energetic theories to  further his own  struggle 
against Ilarx.    In an article signed by Bakunin,   "Some *rds to our 
Young  Brothers in Russia,"  he urged students to leave their studies 
and go to the people: 
'Learn from the people how to serve it, and how to conduct 
its cause to the best advantage. Remember, friends, that 
the educated youth ought not to be the teacher, the bene- 
factor and the dictatorial leader of the people, but only 
a midwife for its self-emancipation, the unifier of its 
forces and of its efforts.*12 
Later in  "How the Revolutionary Question  Presents Itself," unsigned, 
but obviously Bakuninist,   the author emphasizes his hatred for liberal 
-^Quoted in Apostles,   p.  228. 
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reforms and the overriding necessity for the complete annihilation of 
the existing order.     For this task,  it was necessary to unify all the 
discontented and potentially revolutionary forces,  and the ensuing  dis- 
cussion of the variety of these  forces could only have been  written by 
Bakunin: 
•Brigandage is one of the most honored aspects of the 
people's life in Russia....The brigand is always the hero, 
the defender,   the avenger of the people,  the irreconcilable 
enemy of the entire State regime,  both in its civil and its 
social aspects,   the life and death fighter against our 
statist-aristocratic,  official-clerical civilization....The 
brigand,   in Russia,  is the true and only revolutionary— 
the revolutionary without phrase-making and without bookish 
rhetoric.    Popular revolution is born from the merging of 
the revolt of the brigand with that of the peasant....Such 
were the revolts of Stenka Razin and Pugachev....The world 
of brigands and the world of brigands alone has been in 
harmony with the revolution.     The man who  wants to make a 
serious consniracy in Russia,   who  wants a popular revolution, 
must turn to that world and fling himself into It.'^ 
The words may have been Bakunin1 s, but they suited well Nechaov*s 
Ishutin-inspired tactic of taking opportunistic advantage of any group 
of dissatisfied people. 
The article signed by Hechaev,   "To the Students of the University, 
of the Academy,   and of the Technological Institute," merely echoed 
Bakunin"s  similar appeal,  and the two  articles  signed by "The Russian 
Revolutionary Committee" in the first issue of "Narodnaya Rasprava" 
were a variation upon the main theme of the unsigned "Principles of 
Revolution."    This latter pamphlet was based upon the anarchism pro- 
pounded in the other articles,  but the methods of destructive revolu- 
tion sounded a new note of ruthlessness,   typical of Nechaev: 
13Quoted in Venturi,  pp.   368-369. 
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*>fe recognize no other activity but the  work of extermination, 
but we admit  that the forms in  Which this activity will show 
itself will be extremely varied - poison,   the knife,   the rope, 
etc.     In this  struggle revolution sanctifies everything 
alike.'14 
And it was Nechaev,   not Bakunin,   who  endorsed terrorism by  "sword and 
fire" as a means of preparing the revolution in Russia. 
Yet,   on the question of the future administration of the revolu- 
tionary society,   it  was  Bakunin*s ambiguous  prophecies  which set the 
mood of  "Principles":     "'It is our exclusive  task  to  destroy the  exist- 
ing social system;  to build up is not our task; it is up to those who 
will come after us.'" Since the revolution would be negative,   the 
revolutionary generation  would function under  such an influence and 
could not be entrusted with reconstruction.     Any attempt to plan that 
distant society was a  "criminal"  affront to  the new creative generation. 
This idea  was consistently Bakuninist,  but it conveniently failed to 
express Bakunin's tacit recognition of the  supreme authority of his own 
"Secret Alliance" before and during the revolution.     As  we have seen 
also,   Bakunin was less reticent on both earlier and later occasions in 
formulating  plans for the an-archist federated society of the future. 
More important,   for Nechaev it  was Ishutin's immaturity all over 
again,   the obsession  with the organization of the  secret society and the 
destructive overthrow of the old regime with no  serious consideration 
of the practicality of abolishing all government in the wake of the 
revolution.     Bakunin's oversight  was perhaps more  excusable,   for all 
evidence  seems to  point to  the fact that he actually believed in the 
14Quoted in Carr,  Michael  Bakunin,  p.   395> 
15Quoted in Apostles,   p.  228. 
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spontaneous  (though distant)  and instinctive move of the people toward 
a condition of ultimate freedom and equality,   i.e.,   a  society minus 
the inherently evil State.     Nechaev* s horizon did not extend beyond 
the revolutionary organizations-secret,   disciplined,   omnipotent;   the 
p«M-destruction  was a mere concomitant of that organization,  a raison 
d' &tre manipulated in  such a Machiavellian manner by Nechaev that it 
is difficult to  determine  whether the secret  society existed for the 
sake of destruction or vice versa.    Likewise,  an-archism seemed a 
pretty conclusion and a fitting cover for his own  "will to power" and 
Nechaev liked even better  for these reasons  the vagueness involved in 
a refusal to  postulate upon  the new forms.     In addition,   Bakunin's 
prestige had a great deal to  do  with Nechaev's temporary shelving of 
his  developing  Blanquist tendencies. 
The most convincing proof of this phase of Nechaev1s ideology 
can be found in  The  Catechism, of the Revolutionary,  the last in  the 
series of publications dating  from that summer of I869.    Max Nomad 
calls it "a code of ethics drawn from Machiavelli  and the disciples 
of Loyola and Escobar,"       thus  characterizing  Tkachev as a Jesuit 
chieftain possessed of all the ascetic  fanaticism notorious to  that 
;roup.    As a  statement of rules by which a revolutionary must act, 
live,   think,   it was a phenomenal contribution to   the history of 
revolution in human society and the human mind,   and as such its 
composition attracted the passionate and undivided attention of 
Bakunin and Nechaev.     In this ideal world of revolutionary ethics, 
both could escape the pretenses of living and battling against one's 
16 Apostles,   p.  21*1. 
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colleagues and opponents,  and lose themselves in playing  with revolu- 
tionary prototypes modelled ideally after their own personalities. 
Bakunin1 s dream never came true,  at least not in his lifetime,  but 
Nechaev1s vision was destined to be born into the harsh light of 
reality,   with Nechaev as midwife,  only to  die after taking its first 
gulping breath. 
1? The Catechism      consists of twenty-six statutes divided into 
four sections:     "The Duties of the Revolutionary toward Himself," 
"Relationship of the Revolutionary toward the Revolutionary Comrades," 
"Relationship of the Revolutionary toward Society," and "The Duties of 
our Society toward the People."    The first section can be summarized 
in terms of the first paragraph:    "The revolutionary is a dedicated 
man... .Everything in him is subordinated towards a  single exclusive 
attachment,  a single thought and a single passion—the revolution." 
This revolutionary criterion  separates the ethical from the unethical, 
i.e.,  what helps and what hinders the revolution.     The revolutionary 
must sacrifice everything,  including his life,   for the  sake of this 
Good. 
In the second section,   the revolution determines the friend- 
ship between members,   expendable or inexpendable,   and the final 
reliance upon  the self in all matters.     The paragraph explaining the 
motives to consider in seeking  the rescue of comrades,   i.e.,   whether 
he is useful and whether his rescue  would further  the cause,   is 
interesting  in the light of two incidents in Nechaev1 s career.     In 
'See Appendix A 
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1872,  when a group of Russian and Serbian revolutionaries wanted to 
free Nechaev forcibly from his captors,   Bakunin stated that the  sacri- 
fice of life did not justify the action and quoted this paragraph of 
■I Q 
the Catechism;       and in 1881,   when Nechaev had established contact 
with "Narodnaya Volya" and the possibility of their effecting his 
escape was raised,   they,  and possibly he himself,   were forced to cal- 
culate impersonally the relative usefulness of a freed Nechaev versus 
an assassinated Alexander II:    the latter won. 
The third section of the Catechism defines categories of people 
external to  the organization,   from those  who must be ruthlessly 
eliminated to  further the cause to  those liberals,   doctrinaires,  and 
women whose slogans and aid can be utilized temporarily and then cast 
aside.    Paragraphs 19 and 20,   describing  this opportunism,  are con- 
sidered by Max Nomad as  "the most harmful and the most dangerous... 
(since) they present the Scriptural  sanction...of what was to become 
known and generally condemned in the Russian revolutionary movement 
as  'Nechayevshchina1   (Nechaevism)—the method of Machiavellian and 
Jesuitic deception and double-crossing applied to  everyone with whom 
a revolutionist comes into contact." ^    Ishutin had toyed with this 
idea in theory,  and Lenin on occasion and Stalin as a matter of course 
did not scruple to  employ this ruthless means of utilizing and then 
eliminating  their opposition. 
The last section returns to classic  Bakuninism:     the deprecation 
of Western-style political  revolution,   where one predatory bourgeois 
18 
Apostles,   p.  232m. 19 Anosties,  p.  235* 
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State is replaced by an equally oppressive revolutionary government. 
Paragraph Zk is particularly noteworthy in this respect: 
The Association therefore does not intend to  foist on the 
people any organization from above.     The future organization 
will no doubt evolve out of the popular movement and out of 
life itself.     But this is  the business of future generations. 
Our business is destruction,  terrible,  complete, universal, 
and merciless. 
".fl.th this remarkable code of revolutionary ethics implanted 
firmly in his mind and with these  words  from the  first issue of 
IJarodnaya Rasprava  sinking  in his  ears:     "'Great is our work I 
Ishutin has taken the initiative.    And now it is time for us to begin, 
before his hot tracks have cooled,'"       Nechaev returned to Russia to 
translate theory into  action.     The immediate goal of "Narodnaya 
Rasprava"  was the preparation of that same peasant uprising on 
February 19,  1870,   that he and Tkachev had envisioned.     This point 
should be emphasized,  because it was never an  explicit task of 
Ilechaev's conspiracy to assassinate the tsar or any other official. 
True, he had justified terrorism in "Principles of Revolution," but 
"Narodnaya Rasprava"  was too  short-lived to organize effectively for 
that purpose.    Nechaev's dream remained in the realm of a general 
popular revolution aimed vaguely at the establishment of socialism, 
but paradoxically his activity focussed around the building of a 
powerful  secret society isolated from the masses. 
The organization of the society into groups of five has already 
been described.     Its cent»frs were in Moscow and Petersburg,   though 
the former remained the most important since Nechaev constituted 
20 Quoted in Venturi,   p.   373> 
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the nucleus of that group.     Bakunin later noted the hierarchical 
structure of the society, in which different elements were assigned 
superior and inferior status.    In was never centralized in the formal 
sense,   for the  "Central  Committee,"  which was to  be selected by the 
various  sections,  never came into  existence,  and throughout its  short 
career  "Narodnaya Rasprava"   functioned under the cleverly concealed 
directives of Nechaev himself.     The society's chief task was to   send 
its members among the workers,   students,   and peasants and propagandize 
for the coming  revolution,  but its one and only accomplished activity 
and claim to notoriety was the murder of Ivanov,   and that was done by 
Nechaev himself,   with a handful of his cohorts assisting. 
It was this murder,  its discovery,   the subsequent trial of the 
"Nechaevtsi,"  and Nechaev1s arrest and trial which inspired Dostoy- 
evsky1 s novel The Devils  (sometimes translated as  The Possessed).     In 
it, according to 2-iichael Prawdin,  a Nechaev biographer,  Dostoyevsky 
"tried to  solve the problem of how it came about that Nechaev could 
have been accepted with such readiness by the young intellectuals. 
He gave a biting picture of Russian society with all its emptiness, 
21 
its false sentimentality and its aimless cynicism. " But more 
important was Dostoyevsky* s description of the activity of the secret 
society and his  striking  characterization of Verkhovensky—Nechaev 
and Stavroi;in Bakunin.     Stavrogin is the real hero,   the young in- 
Hlchael Prawdin,   The Unmentionable Nechaev,  George Allen and 
Unwin Ltd.,  London,  1961,   p.   71.     Prawdin  quotes  Dostoyevsky's actual 
words from The Diary of a Vfriter on  this matter:     "The figure of my 
Nechaev has no  similarity with the real Nechaev.     I merely sought to 
raise the oroblem of what,  in our astonishing and continually changing 
society,   could not only produce a certain Nechaev but   generally made 
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tellectual obsessed by his  sin,   the idealist disgusted with his own 
life and that of every human bein;,   the man to  whom Verkhovensky offers 
the role of pretender-tsar in his conspiracy, and the suicide who rids 
the world of his  seemingly  worthless presence.    It is a fairly accurate 
picture of Bakunin,   embellished with several lurid details to fit the 
situation;  but it is  in the figure Verkhovensky that Oostoyevsky 
captures the primitive violence and instinctively authoritarian 
character of Nechaev.     The passage quoted at the beginning of this 
paper was the thesis of Shigalyov,  the theorist of Verkhovensky's 
secret circle,  and in the chapter where Verkhovensky expands upon this 
thesis,  it is  the heart and soul of Nechaev speaking* 
'Listen,   we'll create political disturbances....We shall 
create  such an upheaval  that the foundations of the State 
will be cracked wide open....Shigalyov is a geniusl...He*s 
invented "equality"!.. .He's got everything perfect in his 
notebook,...Spying.     Every member of the society spies on 
the others,   and he is obliged to  inform against them. 
Everyone belongs to all  the others,   and all belong  to 
everyone.     All are slaves and equals in slavery.    In ex- 
treme cases  slander and murder,  but,  above all,   equality.... 
Slaves must be equals     without despotism there has never 
been any freedom or equality,   but in a herd there is bound 
to be equality—there's the Shijalyov doctrine for youl... 
To level  the mountains is a good idea,  not a ridiculous 
one.     I'm for Shigalyovl     Vfe  don't want education.     We have 
had enough of science....The thin;  we want is obedience. 
The only thing  that's  wanting  in the world is obedience. 
The desire  for education is an aristocratic  desire.     The 
moment a man  falls in love or has a  family,  he gets a desire 
for private property.     Vfe will destroy that desire;   we'll 
resort  to  drunkenness,   slander,  denunciations;   we'll resort 
to unheard-of depravity;   we shall  smother every ^enius in 
men like him at all possible;  and how it could happen that these 
Nechaevs could win adherents.     I myself am really an old Nechaevist, 
for I,  too,   have stood on the  scaffold."    As shall be seen  shortly, 
it is my contention that,  on the contrary,   Dostoyevsky's Nechaev had 
a remarkable likeness  to  the real Nechaev,   probably more so than 
Dostoyevsky himself could have imagined. 
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infancy.     T*fe  shall reduce everything  to one common denominator. 
Pull equality. ...Only  what is necessary is necessary;  that's the 
motto of the whole world henceforth.     But a shock,   too,  is 
necessary;   we,   the rulers,   will take care of that.     Slaves must 
have rulers.     Complete obedience,  complete loss of individuality, 
but once in thirty years Shigalyov resorts to a shock, and every- 
one at once starts devouring  each other,  up to a certain point, 
just as a measure against boredom.     Boredom is an aristocratic 
sensation;  in the Shigalyov system there will be no  desires. 
Desire and. suffering  are for us;   for the  slaves—the Shigalyov 
system.*^2 
It is a primitive communism,  and Verkhovensky recognizes it as a dis- 
tant ideal;   therefore,   he abruptly dismisses Shigalyov*s doctrine as 
impractical for immediate activity and shifts priority to his  secret 
society,  ruled authoritatively by himself.     In conjunction with the 
latter move,  he surprisingly offers to make Stavrogin the leader of this 
destructive force in the role of Ivan the Crown Prince: 
•life shall  say that he is  "in hiding"... .Oh,   what a  wonderful 
legend one could spread!     And the main thing is—a new force 
is coming.    And that's  what the;/ want.     That's  what they are 
weeping for.     After all,   what does socialism amount to?    It 
has destroyed the old forces,   but hasn't put any new ones in 
their place.     But here we have a force,  a  tremendous  force, 
somethin; unheard of.     We need only one level  to lift up  the 
earth.    Everything will rise upI...He is bearing a new truth 
and he is "in hiding"....Our small groups,  our small groups 
of five—we don't need newspapers....And the whole  earth will 
resound with the cry:     "A new and righteous law is coming," 
and the sea will be in a turmoil and the whole trumpery show 
will crash to  the ground,  and then we  shall consider how to 
erect an edifice of stone.     For the first time:     We shall 
build it,   we,   we aloneI'" 
The "we" being  Stavrogin and Verkhovensky,   the latter is approaching 
dangerously close in these passionate  words  to  the concept of SLanquist 
22Fyodor Dostoyevsky,   The Devils.   Penguin Books,   Baltimore, 
Maryland,  1953,  i960,  pp.  kY?-k1$.   (tr.  by David Magarshack) 
23Dostoyevsky,  The Devils,  pp.  hZZ-WlJ,. 
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dictatorship,   whether by an Ivan the Crown Prince or a revolutionary 
society.     In Verkhovensky1s  words can be seen an appreciation for the 
Russian peasant's i-norant,  instinctive loyalty to  the tsar,   and his 
constant hoping  for a new law from above.     As  such,  Verkhovensky was 
a Nechaev completely divorced from Bakunin.    It is at first  glance 
curious that Dostoyevsky,   an inveterate reactionary during  this period, 
should have sensed so  penetratingly the  soul of Nechaev and his 
followers.     But Dostoyevsky had a remarkable knack  for dissecting the 
criminal soul,  and in such a masterful  way that his Devils  emerge para- 
doxically as hero-like as i-iilton's  Satan.     And in  the  "Ivan the Crown 
Prince," maneuver,   Dostoyevsky was not far off the mark,  in  spite of 
the fact that in the course of the trial there was no mention of such 
a plan.     Rather,   he had in mind probably the Pu^achev rebellion and 
perhaps  even Bakunin's appeals to Nicholas I and Alexander II. 
At any rate,  in the concept of an  "Ivan the Crown Prince," i.e., 
an omnipotent revolutionary leader,   Dostoyevsky prophesied uncannily 
the orientation of Nechaev's ideas in the period following  the Ivanov 
murder.     The serm of Blanquisra was there in Nechaev1s authoritarian 
leadership over  "Harodnaya Rasprava"  and in the threat to his supreme 
authority by the disobedient Ivanov. 
Bakunin,  horrified by the terrible incarnation of his own 
theories,  noted these HLanquist tendencies in Nechaev in a letter 
written in 1871 to his friends in London,   warning  them of his  former 
protege's dangerous personality: 
•Yet it remains true that he is one of the most active and 
energetic men whom I have ever met.     T.*ien it is a question 
of servin-  what he calls  "the cause," he does not hesitate 
or stop at anything and is as pitiless with himself as with 
everyone else.     That is the exceptional quality that 
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attracted me and for long  drove me to  try and keep in touch 
with him.     Some  say that he is just an adventurer.     That is 
not true.    He is a fanatic,   full of dedication, and at the 
same  time an  extremely dangerous  fanatic.     To join with him 
can only lead to  results that are ruinous  for all;   and this 
is  why:    at first he joined a clandestine committee  which 
really existed in Russia,  but now this committee no longer 
exists,  as all its members have been arrested.    At the moment 
only Nechaev has remained,  and he himself constitutes what 
he calls the committee,     '/ftien the organization was  destroyed 
he tried to create a new one abroad.    All this would be 
absolutely natural and normal as  well as  extremely useful; 
but the methods he has used for this purpose deserve every 
censure.     He was terribly affected by the catastrophe of the 
clandestine organization in Russia,  and has 'gradually con- 
vinced himself that,   to  found a serious and indestructible 
society,  it is  essential to build it on Machiavelli1s policies 
and adopt the Jesuit system.     For the body—only violence; 
for the soul—lies.     Truth, mutual trust,  real solidarity 
exist only among  a dozen people  who make up the sancta 
sanctorum of the society.     All  the rest serve as a blind, 
soulless  weapon in the hands of those dozen men  who have 
reached an agreement among  themselves.     It is allowed, 
indeed it is even a duty,   to  cheat them,   to compromise them, 
and in cases of necessity to have them killed....He is a 
fanatic,  and fanaticism has made him chanje himself into  a 
complete Jesuit,   when he is not at certain moments merely 
stupid.     His lying is often naive.     3ut despite this he is 
very dangerous.     He plays at being  a Jesuit as others play 
at revolution.'^ 
Here is contemporary evidence of Dostoyevsky1s accuracy is assessing 
the personality of the real Nechaev.     It would appear that Bakunin was 
very bitter about nurturing  in his own bosom a viper that lashed out 
at his own person and brought out into  the open the very dangers in 
his own theories he was attempting to ignore. 
Fleeing to Switzerland in December, I869,  Nechaev began to turn 
out furiously a number of appeals to  the army,  the Ukrainians,   the 
women,   the peasants and workers,   and even to  the lower middle classes 
2/+Quoted in Venturi,  p.  386. 
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of the cities and towns,  begging  for immediate and total destruction 
and the establishment of socialism.     Bakunin,   as noted above,   had 
broken with Nechaevj  now the latter felt free to  expound the primitive 
communism and Hlanquism budding  in his active mind.     In the article 
entitled "He "Who  Is Not With Us Is Against Us" in the second issue of 
Narodnaya Rasorava  dated winter 1870,  Nechaev described his propagan- 
dists activity in Russia and invented his  death as a result of betrayal 
by a liberal,   "'a disciple of golden mediocrity.1 nZ5 Using  this fla- 
rant continuation of the Nechaev legend,   the author  warned all liberals 
either to become  spies  for the radical organization or  suffer  the certain 
vengeance of the people.     In an attempt to  justify the Ivanov murder, 
Necheav renewed his  insistence upon a powerful revolutionary organiza- 
tion and the necessity for eliminating  anyone who  threatened the 
efficiency of its activities.     Finally,   Nechaev committed anarchism to 
the winds and propounded openlr  for the first time the indispensability 
of the Revolutionary Committee of the  secret organization maintaining 
absolute power,  not only before and during  the revolution,  but,  more 
important,  after the revolution  for the sake of establishing  the ideal 
communist society.        This is indeed conclusive proof that Nechaev was 
a living  Verkhovensky.     Nechaev went on  to  explain his vision of the 
completely egalitarian and well-regulated Communist Society and re- 
ferred blatantly to I-iarx1   Communist Manifesto as the source of his ideas. 
The emphasis on primitive and violent Communism received further treat- 
ment in the two issues of Obsfcchina published by Nech«*v in London in 
1371. 
25,/enturi,  p.   383. 
26Ibid.,  p.   383. 
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The KLanquist note was thus prominent in Nechaev's mind in 1870; 
an incident in 1881 proved that it continued to  influence him through- 
out his imprisonment.     In 1881,   when Nechaev had established contact 
with the Executive  Committee of "Narodnaya Volya"  and suggested various 
impossible schemes  for effecting  his escape,  he took the liberty of 
advising  them on the most effective means of conducting the revolu- 
tion.    Nechaev insisted that the Executive Committee convert itself 
into a revolutionary dictatorship and nominated Zhelyabov,   one of its 
leaders,   as dictator.     Power must be assumed over all elements of 
society and manifested in order to  cow its enemies and demonstrate to 
the masses that the Committee was  capable of supporting a popular 
uprising.     This point was central  to  the Blanquist idealogy of Tkachev, 
but it represents a conclusion drawn independently by a man cut off for 
ei ht years from any communication  with even the  Petersburg revolu- 
tionary circles,  much less  the emigre    "Nabatovtsi."    At that time, 
Nechaev was still capable of plotting opportunistic measures for ligh- 
ting the  spark of revolution;  he  suggested to the  Executive Committee 
that they issue a  series of spurious manifestoes:    one in the name of 
the fsar,   restoring   serfdom,  prolonging military service,   and destroying 
the churches of the Old Believers and other  sects;  another in the name 
of the Holy Synod,   informing the clergy of the insanity of the tsar; 
still another (and the most outrageously false manifesto,   in the light 
of Nechaev's own recommendation for a revolutionary dictatorship)  in 
the name of the National Assembly,   proclaiming  the murder of the tsar, 
the insanity of the Crown Prince,   the redistribution of the land,  and 
the freeing of all  soldiers from military service;   and finally another 
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in the name of the National Assembly,  urging  the  soldiers to  revolt 
since the Tsarina and the country's generals were in opposition to  the 
decrees of that body.   '     But the falsity was alien to both the tactics 
and philosophy of "Narodnaya Volya,"  for it is  fair to  say that,   when 
they spoke of a Zemsky S«bor,   they were in earnest.     Consequently, 
they rejected Nechaev's advice for  fear that such underhanded maneu- 
vers might discredit their party and the entire revolutionary cause 
in the eyes of the people. 
This mention of a Zemsky Sabor was not novel to Nechaev in 1881, 
for as far back as April-May,   1370,   when he and Natalya Herzen revived 
Kolokol,  Nechaev was  writing  in moderate terms,   calling  for more exten- 
sive propaganda,  urging  the necessity for united action by a coalition 
of forces  "'from the so-called constitutionalists to  the Socialists,'"28 
and proposing the idea of a Zemsky S«fror as a possible unifying  slogan. 
At his trial in January,  1872,  Nechaev was the picture of liberalism; 
his  statements abounded in talk of a constitution,  and when his 
sentence was read,   he shouted to  the court  "'Long live the Zemsky Sabor. 
Down with despotisml'" " as he was bein,g  dragged from the room.    Soon 
after,  in a letter to  the Chief of Police protesting his ill-treatment 
at the hands of the gendarmes,   Nechaev's words assumed political over- 
tones: 
'Leaving aside dreamers and those  who believe in Utopias, 
one must reco  niae that Russia is now on the eve of a 
political revolution...Like a child whose teeth have,   have 
'Prawdin,   The Unmentionable Nechaev,   pp.  103-1C4-. 
28 Quoted in Venturi,  r>.   385* 29 Ibid., p.   38^. 
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inevitably  jrown,   Society,   when it reaches a  certain level 
of civilization,  unfailingly  feels the need for political 
ri hts.     Russia is on  the eve of a constitutional revolu- 
tion....! leave for Siberia in the firm conviction that 
millions of voices  will soon cry "Ion; live the Zemsky 
3»bor."'30 
It is difficult to  determine the decree of sincerity in these liberal 
statements.     Venturi feels  that his unsuccessful experience in Russia 
and the newly discovered influence of Marxian  Communism led ilechaev 
to the realization that more extensive propaganda efforts had to be 
made,  that  the masses must be included in a democratic movement,   and 
that the social revolution  could not be achieved until the political 
31 atmosphere had been chanjed radically. These were the same problems 
that faced "Narodnaya Volya"  ten years later and caused their decision 
to  shift their orientation toward a political revolution with terrorism 
as its ajent.     But political revolution is a tricky word in revolu- 
tionary ideology because of the various methods of achieving it.     The 
political revolution sou;ht by Herzen throughout the 1860's and by 
Khudyakov in 1866  could better be termed an evolution toward demo- 
cratic institutions within the realm of a constitutional monarchy, 
achieved by the self-imposed liberalization of the Tsar and lon^-term 
propa;anda amon ; the masses.     This attitude is inconceivable in 
connection  with Nechaev1 s ideology and activity,  and particularly In 
view of the words  shouted by him to  the crowd on the occasion of his 
civil execution:   "'Before three years are over  their heads will be 
hacked off on this very spot by the first Russian guillotine.     Down 
^Quoted in Venturi, pp.  386-387. 
^Ibid.,  p.   384. 
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with the Tsar!     Long live freedom!    Lons live the free Russian 
people!"1-^    This was an explicit call to  terrorism.     Perhaps Nechaev 
had va^-ue sympathies for the concept of a national Assembly,  but this 
idea would be highly inconsistent with his former anarchistic  state- 
ments for destruction of all State forms and with his later appeal to 
"Narodnaya Volya"  to  establish a political dictatorship.     This latter 
instance,   coupled with his radical views on the  establishment of a 
thorough    oin ;  Communism,  hinted at in  The Devils and called by fegals, 
when he had read the details of Nechaev's plans in Obshchina,   "Barrack- 
room Communism,"-'-' seems to  warrant a  conclusion that political 
revolution to Nechaev had a  Blanquist rather than a Herzenist orien- 
tation and rested upon the violent overthrow of the old regime by a 
powerful revolutionary organization which would continue to  assert its 
power in  the form of a  dictatorship for the sake of the establishment 
of an ideal communistic  society.     The call  for a Zemsky S»bor wmld seem 
to be,  as it was in 1881,  an opportunistic manipulation of a liberal 
slo ;an to appeal for a temporary alliance with the moderate forces, 
one of the salient points of the  Catechism and a maneuver  employed 
successfully by Lenin in October-November,  1917. 
It would be futile to  equate Ilarxist terminology such as the 
"dictatorship of the proletariat" or the "witherins  away of the  state" 
with Nechaev1 s communistic  statements,   for   he   never reached that staje 
of maturity in his ideolo:y.     Obsessed,  like the revolutionary proto- 
type in the Catechism,   with only one thought—the revolution—and the 
practical means of achieving  it,   Nechaev could not see the forest of 
32 Ibid.. p.   387- 33prawdin,  p.  191. 
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the consequences of his activity,  Max Monad,  in his usual cryptic 
fashion,   pinpoints this weakness in Nechaev's ideolo ;y: 
It was Mechayev1 s personal  tra;edy that he  was altogether 
uninhibited in the application of Machiavelli* s precepts at 
a  tine when some discretion  was  still necessary.    At the 
inception of the  socialist movement,   he acted as if it 
were on the point of seizing all the power and thus in a 
position to place itself "beyond '^ood and evil"... .Trajic 
as Mechayev' s fate was,  it is overshadowed by a tragedy of a 
much higher order:     the essential contradiction in the very 
idea of revolutionary Machiavellianism as a weapon in the 
■tmgglM of the telling masses.     For that unholy gospel 
implies the vesting of supreme leadership and unlimited 
power in the hands of a benevolent minority usinr;  the 
methods of deception for the benefit of the deceived. _ 
History knows of no such disinterested ruling minorities.-^ 
It is only necessary to  remind the reader that,   while it may well 
be said that Nechaevism was Tkachev1 s Russian 2Lanquism in practice, 
Tkachev was circunspect enough to  consider these difficulties,   thou;h 
his final   ;oal  was in certain respects as idealistic as  that of 
IJechaev's concentration upon the activity of the clandestine revolu- 
tionary organization has attracted successive phases of praise and 
condemnation in  Soviet historiography.     Michael Prawdin bases his 
entire book upon the thesis that there is great significance in the 
comparison of Nechaev1 s and Lenin's methods in organizing  a  small, 
disciplined,  centralized,  conspiratorial ~roup for the purpose of 
conducting the revolution.     If the Bolsheviks were "Mechaevists and 
nevertheless insist(ed) on callin;; themselves Marxists,  this  (was) 
one of the  subterfuges used by Lenin to  create confusion in the ranks 
of his oononents??..Nechaev's  world order presumed a dictatorship. 
3^ Ar»osties,  p.   256. ^Prawdin,  p.  184. 
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Lenin called it  'democratic  centralism'."3°     The  first Soviet eulogist 
of Uechaev was Michael Kovalensky,   who  in 1923 said, 
•"What a   .randiose  fijure on the road of the Russian revolution! 
Tremendous revolutionary  enerjy,   gigantic organisational talent, 
declaration of pitiless  war against the wliole old world,   which 
is condemned to  decline and disappear.     Rejection of the suprem- 
acy of the old bourgeois morals,   which  will be replaced by a new 
ethic of revolution for the success of which all means are 
justified...   ",fi.th the thunderin     slogan  "Everything for the 
revolution!" this super-revolutionary appears before us.     With 
every means at their disposal his  subsequent followers in the 
battle try to renounce him,  but the men of  "Land and Freedom" 
and of "People's  WU1"  can do nothing  else but follow his steps. 
The stamp of his genius impresses itself upon the whole of the 
Russian revolutionary movement.' 37 
The influential Pokrovsky continued the praise in 1926 by attributing 
Lenin's methodology to  a plan which appeared first,   "'though still in 
a naive form,   in Nechaev's circles,1"  and which was later realized 
"'word for  word on October 25,   1917.' ..38 Alexander jambarov,   however, 
was  the most enthusiastic  eulogist of Nechaev,   emphasizing in 1926  his 
hero's  "'undoubtedly brilliant anticipation of the character and content 
of the character and content of the contemporary Communist movement,1" 
and concluding  that  "'history will not only rehabilitate him,  but has 
already Ion;   since rehabilitated him,  as a distant forerunner of 
Russian  Bolshevism.'"-^       But jambarov,   supported by Yuri Steklov, 
Bakunin*s biographer,   attempted at the same time  to ,;loss over the 
reprehensible methods used by Uechaev,   and even to  justify them as 
expedient in the name of the revolution. 
Stalin's battle with Trotsky,  and his  ensuing  struggle to achieve 
a dictatorship alon-' his own lines in the name of Marx,   precluded any 
^Ibid., p. 186. 
3 fbid*.  P-  187. 
37 Quoted in Ibid., p. 188. 
39 Quoted in Varlamov,  pp.  10-11. 
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such justification of similar methods on the part of Nechaev.     The 
P^krovsky school fell,   and Hechaev was ousted from the Soviet   .enealo y. 
In 1932,  Boris Kozmin returned cautiously  to  the subject of Nechaev, 
praising his ener-y and remarkable endurance while  sufferinj  in 
prison, but he condemned ^ambarov1s justification of his shortcomings, 
thereby assessing llechaevism as morall;   danjerous  and an abnormal form 
of revolutionary activity based upon the specific necessity of com- 
batting hostile  elements in the mentality of radical jroups in the 
1860's and 1870's.        Emigre" Russian anal/sts did not suffer under the 
Stalinist restriction,   however,   and sharply condemned Bolshevism for 
its Nechaevist character.     S.  P.  MaL^unov,   writing in Paris in 1929. 
pinpointed the Machiavellian and Jesuit elements in the 3olshevik 
revolution:     "'Notorious Leninism...is nothing more than old Russian 
Nechayevisra,   the particular Russian brand of Blanquisra,  modernized by 
.Marxist terminology and deepened to  incredible dimensions.     This is the 
real origin of Bolshevism.' " Mel ;unov ^oes on  to accuse Lenin of 
borrowing from Nechaev* s Catechism and blames both Nechaev and Lenin 
for demonstrating contempt for the masses by seeking to manipulate 
them at the will of the dictatorial party. Meanwhile, in the Soviet 
Union, as late as 195^, the article on Nechaev in the second edition 
of Great Soviet Bncyclonedia is concluded with these words, quoted by 
Prawdin: "•Nechaevism is a system of conspiracy, mutiny and unprin- 
cipled terrorism dictated by disbelief in the possibility of organi- 
zing the masses  for the fi^ht a2ainst Tsarism.     It was  sharply con- 
^"OVarlamov,  pp.  lL-1^. 41 Ibid.,   pp.  22-23. 
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deraned by Marx and Big els.'"    And Prawdin bases his own conclusion 
on that Soviet definition:     "Thus  did the label of lNechaevism, 
become once again the traditional  epithet of abuse,  the mark dis- 
tinguishing a pseudo-revolutionary from a true Leninist.     Such 
official disparagement served to put an end to preoccupations with 
ho 
Nechaev in Russia." 
Thus  suffered Nechaev in the opinions of his contemporaries 
and in the annals of Soviet historiography.     The  HLanquist element 
is clearly defined in Nechaev's ideology,  but it becomes  warped and 
loses its Tkachevist purity in  the transition to  practical activity. 
This is not surprising  in view of Nechaev's monomania for the organi- 
zation and destructive mission of  "Narodnaya Rasprava"—the  People's 
'/enjeance,    Nechaev had his dreams,  but unfortunately they were not 
consistent with the demands of the revolutionary situation in Russia 
at that time.     He was an inveterace activist at a  time  when Russia 
needed more theorists;   thus,   he suffered martyrdom at the hands of 
an irrevocable law that determines  the metamorphosis of any theory 
into action.     "Narodnaya Volya"  was to  suffer the  same martyrdom; 
but theirs  was a genuine product of the times,   while Nechaev* s was 
a case of honeless,tragic mistiming.     But the  "Narodovoltsi," as  well 
as many who condemned him then and have so  done  since,   could not fail 
to admire the sheer strength of Nechaev's  self-inspired and self- 
sustained energy and will throughout his revolutionary career. 
kZ Prawdin,   p.  191. 
"Marodnaya Volya": Russian Blanquism in the iuise of 
Political Terrorism 
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In June, l879> Qt Lipetsk gathered a small group of members of 
the secret revolutionary society "Zenfya i Volga." The purpose and out- 
come of that portentous meeting became clear soon after the course of 
the general meeting of "Zemlya i Volga" at Voronezh.  As a result of the 
Voronezh confererce, the Lipetsk group formed a society named "I.arodnaya 
Volga" (The people's Will), while its opponents concentrated themselves 
in a group known as "Cherngi Peredel" (The Black Earth Partition).  The 
orientation of the latter was long—tern propaganda based on the prepara- 
tion of a social revolution redistributing the land to the peasants under 
a Socialist System, while the former was bent on the overthrow of the 
iresent tsarist regime in order to make use of political power in instit- 
uting the desired socialist society.  It was within the conspiratorial 
framework of this last group that the Blanquict cu Tent of the l860's was 
continued and embellished by the revolutionary activists of the l670's. 
This schism of "Zemlya i Volga" had been preceded by several years 
of frenzied activity in the Russian revolutionary moment. The Chaikovsky 
' ation among the workers in Petersburg,1871-3,had blossomed into the 
spontaneous movement "to the people" in the summer of 1874, which had 
evoked the immediate response of the government to the tune of thousands 
of arrests.  There then followed another underground period, during which 
propaganda was carried on carefully, secretly, but continuously, among 
the workers and peasants. Richard Pipes, in his article discussing the 
Jcs of the word "populism" in Russia, describes this period 1874-8 
as the truly Populist phase of revolutionary activity because it based 
itself upon the premises of this slogan:  "'the achievement of a social- 
economic revolution for the people and through the people. . .and in 
accord with its age-old and ardent wishes.'"1  This meant simply that the 
propagandists would neither teach socialism to the peasants (Lavrovism) 
nor subordinate themselves entirely to the peasant instirct, thereby 
them to revolt (Bakuninism), but would encourage their natural 
desires by living among them in the hopes of organizing their forces for 
•"■"■arodniohestvoi  A Semantic Inquiry," Slavic Review, vol. XXIII, 
no. 3 (September, 1964), p. 444. 
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a spontaneous,   but  controlled peasant uprising.    Disillusionment with 
this policy,   caused by peasant  mistrust of,   and in many cases peasant 
reports  to  the police of  the activities  of the young propagandists, 
convinced   the  "populists"   to change  their tactics. 
This  change  of  tactics  took many  forms:      the  increased  emphasis, 
particularly in  the South,  upon  introducing  terrorism  e local 
officials  and upon resisting arrest  through  violent  means;   the  attempt 
by Alexander Solovev upon  the Tsar's  life  in  February,   1879;   and  finally 
the  overwhelming desire  to unite  all  forces  in  ore  single  all-Russian 
or  anization  for  the  sake  of a more 1 battle  with  the omnipotent 
.1   government.     This  last  attitude  was by far  the  most   important 
factor  in  the  evolution of  "Narodnaya Volya,"   for  it  shifted  the  entire 
orientation of the young radicals  fro:    social   to  political   revolution. 
Vera Figner,   a propagandist and  later member  of "Varodnaya Volya",   in  her 
memoirs expresses well  the  general  conviction  of  the   "populists"  in  I878 
on  this point: 
We already saw clearly that our work among the people was of 
no avail.  In our persona the revolutionary party had suffered 
a second defeat, but not by any means through the inexperience 
of its members, not through the the««tical nature of its pro- 
gramme, not through a desire to propagate among the people 
aims foreign to it and ideals in-ccessible to it, not through 
exaggerated hopes in the forces and the preparation of the 
popular masses; by no means.  We had to leave the stage while 
fully aware that our programme was applicable to life, that 
its demands had a real foundation in national conditions, and2 
that the trouble was merely in the lack of political freedom." 
Vera Figner, Memoirs of a Revolutionist, International Publishers, 
Hew York, 1927, p. 63. 
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Faeed with a system that allowed no popular participation in the law- 
making process, and denied even the right of popular petition for the 
redress of grievances, most of the radicals on the periphery began to 
•itate toward Petersburg where they might consolidate their forcec, 
while a few brave ones intensified what they considered the only means 
left them of convincing the system of the necessity for politioal and 
social reform:  assassinations. 
Since 1875, a unifying force had already been evident in Petersburg 
•song the underground groups, and in December, I876, it emerged as the 
motivating force of the demonstration in front the Kazan Cathedral, where 
the name of Chernyshevsky and other revolutionary martyrs was evoked and 
a red banner bearing the words "Land and Liberty"was waved.  It was the 
beginning of "Zeralya i Volya" as an All-Russian revolutionary organization. 
Its prograiB of 1877 revaled its essentially socio-economic orientation 
I its orthodox populist attitude; it demanded in the name of the 
existing desires of the peoples three basic objectives:  the transfteral 
of all the land into the hands of the peasant, and its redistribution on 
the equal basis of the obshechina, the self-determination of all national- 
ities within the Russian Empire; and the autonomy of the obshachinas. 
On this latter point, the authors of the program reco: razed that, since 
the people were morally and intellectually unprepared for such a move, 
a temporary and limited government, elected by the people, would be 
necessary.  The program concluded with an explanation of its methods: 
'Our demands can be brought about only by means of a 
violent revolution.  The methods to prepare this and 
bring it about are, according to us:  (l) Agitation— 
to be carried out both by word and above all by deed— 
aimed at organizing the revolutionary forces and 
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developing revolutionary feelings (revolts, strikes; in 
general, action is in itself the be t wny to organize 
revolutionary forces and developing revolutionary forces). 
(2) The disorr.animation of the State.  This      ive us 
;G hope of victory, in view of the strong organization, 
ch will be created by agitations in the early future. 
The germs of a centralised organization and the use of terrorists were 
already evident in this program. 
Gathering strength during 1877 in spite of frequent arrests, "Zcmlya 
i Volya" managed to turn the government's maneuver to expose the horrors 
of the revolutionary circles by means of open trials into sounding boards 
for their humanitarian and egalitarian coals.  The trials "of the fifty" 
ar.d "of the 193" contributed greatly to the prestige of "Zemlya i Volya" 
through the fine speeches made by the defendants; particularly noteworthy 
■ Ippolit Myshkis's speech in the latter trial.  By I878 the secret 
BOOiety had laid out ite^tatues for organization, chiefly under the author- 
ship of A. D. Oboleshov and Alexander Mikhailov.  The result was a wide- 
spread body consisting of a center in Petersburg and complementary 
regional bodies of professional revolutionaries, dedicated to the cause 
and obedient even in personal matters to a small executive committee 
elected by all the members.  But the decentralization of function -..- I 
predominant, and in actual practice the autonomy of the regional groups 
was exercised more often than the tightening of organizational ties to the 
central body, probably because there was considerable opposition to possibly 
Blanquist element. 
A;itetivc propaganda continued apace, but gradually the "dIsorganization" 
function of "Zemlya i Volya" began to assume paramount importance as the 
government repression became more and more rigorous.  "Disorganization- 
Quoted in Vents,ri, pp. 573-574. 
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included the liberation of follow revolutionaries from prison, the 
destruction of informers, and above all the assassination of officials of 
the hated tsarist regime.  These assassinations were not carried out upon 
directives from the central bodyj rather, they were independent, spont- 
aneous acLs of self-defense and revenge.  Such was the attempt by Vera 
Zasulich against General Trepor, Chief of Police in Petersburg, on January 
24, I878; this act and the ensuing trial, which s- w Zasulich acquitted 
by a jury of her peers, was considered the beginning of the nihilist- 
terrorist period of the l870's by later evaluations, foremost among them 
being that of Kravchin3ky, a terrorist himself:  "Thi3 occurrence gave 
to the Terrorism a most powerful impulse.  It illuminated, it with its 
divine aureola, and gave to it the sanction of sacrifice and of public 
opinion."'1  Kravchinsky goes on to characterize the terrorist in those 
terms: 
He is 'noble, terrible, irresistible, fascin-itin,';, for he 
combines in hi:nself the two sublimities of human grandeur: 
the martyr and the hero. . .Pie has a powaful and distinctive 
""  individuality. . .He fights not only for the people, to 
render them the arbiters of their own destinies, not only 
for the whole nation stifling in this pestiferous atmosphere, 
but also for himself. . .He fights for himself.  He has sworn 
to be free and he will be free, in defiance of everything. 
This was .just this individual terror that was destroying the organization 
from within; uncoordinated acts, lacking accompanying security measures, 
were leaving the members increasingly vulnerable to arrests and executions. 
Kravchinsky, Underground Russia, p. 36. 
^Ibid., pp. 39-42. 
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As "Zenlya i Volya" began to I03A its members one by one to the 
police, it3 leaders, particularly Mikhailov, began to advocate the stricter 
centralization of the society for the sake of the most efficient coordina- 
tion of these terrorist efforts.  Much more was implied in this attempted 
tightening of party authority and discipline; terror was becoming the 
foremost tactic, and along with it emphasis was shifting from the social 
to the political revolution.  Adding fuel to this flame, the discontented 
provincial propagandists beran swarming into Petersburg, professing their 
belief in conducting the struggle for political rights. The result was 
a head-on collision between the political terrorists and the socio- 
economic propagandistS, and it was at this time that terms such as Jacob- 
inism and Blanquism began to be bandied about frequently in the revolut- 
ionary world. 
From Vera Zasulich's attempt to the Lipetsk and Voronezh Congresses 
was a short year and a half, but the time was filled with battles between 
is two opposing forces.  In one sense, they were similar, for the 
common goal was the establishment of a free, egilitirian, socialist 
society; and, since it was not likely that the tsarist government would 
make the necessary concessions from above, it was necessary to promote 
■ violent revolution from below.  But there the similarity ended.  On 
one side were the orthodox populists, such as Dmitri Klements, Georgi 
Plekhanov (his conversion to Marxism Has still five years away), and 
Sergei Kravchtnsky, who were strictly apolitical, scorning- the weak- 
kneed liberal attempts to extort constitutional reform from an autocrat 
committed to the uncompromising maintenance of his sole and supreme 
authority.  Besides, the peasants were not morally or intellectually 
capable of understanding, much less participating in a democratic form 
of government.  They must be prepared by propaganda they can understand, 
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i.e. promises of the redistribution of the land and self-government 
through the obshschina.  On the other side were those called "renegades" 
by the orthodox populists (who were called in turn "peaceful loafers" and 
"ne'er-do-wells" by the terrorists); they considered it of utmost import- 
ance that the people be allowed to govern themselves and posse;;.; all the 
freedoms guaranteed in a democratic society. Therefore they sought a 
Zemsky .Sabor for the people; but, since the people were so ignorant and 
co oppressed, a conspiratorial party would have to do the pre    ory 
work for them, taking care not to lose sight of the distant goal.  Only a 
free people could enjoy the fruit3 of a socialist system) therefore, the 
party must first liberate the people from the yoke of tsardom and _then 
start it on the path to socialism.  Since legal means of conducting tie 
fight were deniedfcem, the conspirators were compelled to resort to terror 
against the State in order to force concessions from the Tsar, and 
•nized, efficient terror demanded a strong, centralized conspiratorial 
society.  The leaders of this "political" group were Alexander Llikhailo*, 
Nikolai KOPOZOV, Alexander Kviatkovaky, Nikolai Kolodkevich, Stepan 
Khalturitt, Andrei Zhelyabov, Sophia Perovskaya, and Vera Pigner (all later 
members of the Executive Committee of "Narodnaya Volya.") 
Kravchinsky     I be first to draw the difference between the two 
lo a fine point.  A terrorist himself, he was delighted at the news of 
the Zasulich attempt, writing from abroad that it was time to strike out 
against the bourgeoisie and the rise of capitalism in Russia.  Returning 
to Russia, Kravchinsky assassinated General Kezentsov, head of the Third 
Section, on Auguet 4, 1878, after which he wrote the pamphlet "A Death 
for a Death," declaring that KezentsoVs death was an act of revenge for 
the ex- cution of Kovalsky in Odessa two days before.  He was careful to 
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explain  that  the   asei atlon  also had  a deeper purpose:     a  threat  to 
the bourgeoisie  in the name of  the  approaohing popular revolution,   and, 
surprisingly enough,   a somewhat  naive  warning  to  the  government to remain 
ner Ln  the battle between  the  socialists  and  the bourgeois-capitalists.6 
This  flagrant  indifference  to  the  existence of the   tsarist government was 
•vpical   of  the  orthodox  populist mentality.     While   Nikolai  Mikhailovsky 
and  other moderates  were  calling for a Zemsky Sobor,   Kravchinsky ignored 
the political  question and   addressed  himself to  the  socio-economic 
problem.     His  articles  in  Zemlya i  Volyai   were  saturated with   this  sense 
of immediacy  in  promoting the  revolution for   ' :e  of preventing the 
further  development of capitalism  in Russd   . 
As  mentioned  above,   Kravchinsky was  a  terrorist  "loner,"  one  who 
killed  for  the  sake of justice  and claimed  the  right of his  own  indep- 
endent  activity and  individual  freedom.     When  that  freedom was  threatened 
by the  planned  tightening of the  secret  organization,   Kravchinsky balked 
like  any moderate.     He  continually fought   those who wished   to  use   terrorism 
against   the  State  and  even  the Tsar himself,   claiming that  a popular 
revolution was  the  foremost consideration,   before  whose power   the  Ta 
would certainly grant  concessions.     Kravchinsky was  afraid  that the  over- 
throw of  the  State  and  the  Tsar  would  open  the door  to bourgeois constit- 
utionalism,   which  would  prevent   the  advent  of Socialism.     He  accused  the 
terrorists  of Jacobin  tendencies  of seeking  to conduct  the  revolution 
without   the  help of the masses:      "'This  is  not  the way by which  we  will 
liberate   the  people.   .   .Against  a class,   only a class can rebel;   only the 
Venturi,   pp.   610-611. 
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people can destroy  a system.1"       He  fought contralizai-ion and main- 
tained  that  the  terrorists must serve  only as  the  instigators and 
protectors  of  the  people.     The  political  rights advocated by the   terror- 
ists  that  would not  free  the  people,   but  rather their  own  instinct 
for freedom motivating  them  to revolt. 
Paul  Akselrod,   writing  from Switzerland  in December,   1876,   recognized 
this  as a critical  moment  in  the revolutionary  development  in Russia. 
He condemned Jacobinism  for  its  failure  to  appreciate   the  revolutionary 
significance of  the  people  and  attributed  its  rise  to  the  lack of 
preparedness both  in the  revolutionaries'   and   the  people's  mentality. 
Akselrod  deplored  the concentration upon  the  political   struggle,   but  he 
recognized  its   inevitability  in the  existing  Russian situation: 
If we  must,   whether  we  want  to  or not,   fight  absolutism, 
and  therefore,   indirectly,   win political Tights  for the 
bourgeoisie,   we must  none  the  less  take  every possible 
step  to  avoid  being carried  away  from our Socialist course: 
for" this  would  lead  to  the utter disintegration of such 
elements  of Socialism  as  exist   in Russia. 
Thus,   the  political   struggle  and  socialism were  supposedly  contradictory; 
but meanwhile  in Russia political  assassinations  in  the  name  of Socialism 
were being  stepped  up,   particularly  in the South,   and Horozov and Lev 
Tikhomirov,  both supporters  of  terrorism,   were  putting out  a special 
Listak  (Bulletin)   of Zemlya  i  Vol|tal   claiming a'"political  assassin-lion. 
.   .is  above  all  an  act  of revenge,   the only means of defence  in  the 
existing situation,   and  at  the  same  time  one  of the best weapons  of 
'Quoted in  Ibid,   p.  621. 
o 
Quoted in Venturi,   p.   625. 
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ation.*"  And on April 2, l879> Alexander Solovev fired at and 
r.issed the Tsar, later justifying; his deoision '"because of the benefit 
it would bring- to the peasants. . .1 could think of no more powerful 
means of bringing the economic crisis to a head.1"  The attempt set 
off a furious battle within the ranks of "Zemlya i Volya"; Morozov, 
llikhailov, and Tikhomirov had supported warmly Solovev's independent 
, but others, including Plekhanov and M. R. Popov, had condemned it 
as rash and foolish.  The final decision of the crou was to allow 
individual collaboration in assassination attempts aa long as the name 
of "Zeralya i Volya" was not involved, but the bitterness of the irre- 
concilably opposite Views rankled in the mind3 of all present; the stare 
laid for Lipotsk and Voronezh. 
Soon after the Solovey controversy, the terrorist sympathizers, under 
the leadership of Morozov, Tikhomirov, but especially Stepan Shiryatev, 
formed a politically extremist grou" called "Liberty or Deathl" within 
"Zemlya i VolyaV  Its activity was more theoretical than practical, but its 
existence ac a secret society within a secret society only contributed to 
the hostility between the two /-rpup3.  Soon, rumors of an approaching 
general congress to decide the future of "Zemlya i Volya" were passed 
around, and the two opponents began gathering forces from all over the 
country to support their respective causes at the Congress.  The political 
terrorists set the June, 1879 meeting at Lipetsk,and to it came all the 
Petersburg advocates and a new contingent of terrorist veterans from the 
South. 
9Ibid., p. 630. 
10 Ibid., p. 632o 
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Included in this latter groupras a young revolutionary from 
Odessa, Andrei Zhelyabov, This young man. born a eaoant in 1850 in the 
Feodosia district, wont to the university at Odessa, from which he m 
oiled for organising a student protest against a certain intolerant 
• :'essor.  He then engaged in propaganda efforts on his own among the 
workers and was influenced simultaneously by contitutionalism and 
-air.ian nationalism.  Arrested in 1874 and released in 1875, he returned 
to Ode:    oting sadly the increasing isolation of the intellectuals 
:.. the revolutionary movement over two crucial questions:  the auto- 
y or unity of the splinter groups, and political conspiracy versus 
socialist propaganda.  A growing interest in the Balkan and Polish striv- 
ings for independence gradually turned him sour on a purely propagand- 
ists approach.  Nor did he approve of the instinctive approach of the 
uninst "rebels," resulting in the uncoordinated terrorism of its 
'horn representatives.  Venturi states that "■ •rt Zhelyabov 
docided for conspiracy, battle, and a centralized organization," 
yet the orthodox populist and the constitutionalist in him vag»* a strong 
battle with the terrorist principles implied in that decision.  Arrested 
Sin in 1877 and acquitted in January, 1878, Zhelyabov emerged from that 
experience, firmly comtaoed of the evil:; of the existing political system 
and the necessity of overthrowing it by any means, including terror, so 
long as it was effectively organized.  It is from this interim period 
of ZhelyaboVs life (January, 1878, to June, l879,) that David Footman, 
Zhelyabov's biographer, quotes a conversation that the future terrorist 
leader had with one of his radical friends.  It is interesting because it 
reveals ZhelyaboVs resolute choice to take the reins of action in his 
11 Venturi, p. 646. 
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hands, and it sounds strangely like statements made later by both Lenin 
and Stalin: 
•History,'   said  Zhelyabov,   'moves  too  slowly.     It  neods 
a push.     Otherwise  the  whole  nation will be  rotten and 
one  to   seed  before  the  liberals get  anything done.1 
'What  about  a constitution?' 
'All  to the good.' 
'Well, '.:hat do you want—to work for a constitution, or 
to give history a push?' ., . 
'I'm not joking.  Just now we want to give history a push. 
lent urge for action is there, and so is a disgust v;ith liberal 
banter about constitutions.  But this did not mean that Zhelyabov had 
foregone his populism and constitutionalism; indeed, he was firm in hs 
meat with the section in the program of "Narodnaya Volya" which 
mentioned the convocation of a Constituent Assembly; and when approached 
by a representative of the Petersburg terrorists, inviting him to Lipetsk, 
he agreed to participate in the s;      ic planning of a single coup, i. e. 
the assassination of the Tsar, provided he could be dismissed after that 
act so as to return to the orthodox populist fold.  Zhely4bov always 
dreamed of a genuinely populist revolution, one granting equal political 
and eoonomio rights to the people, but the nature of the autocracy turned 
him into a practical terrorist, the only agent considered capable of making 
those dreams come true. 
The terrorists gathered at Lipetsk were of varied revolutionary back- 
grounds, but all agreed on their purpose for being there:  to form a 
strong, conspiratorial organization aimed at eliminating by terror the 
political evils of the existing system.  Zhelyabov distinguished him- 
12Red Prelude, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1945, PP. 86-87, 
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r.elf at the policy session by a speech, condemning the impotent liberals 
and entrusting to a social revolutionary party the task of overthrowing 
the government and establishing a situation of political liberty where 
onposing ideologies could clash freely.  He continued: 
•We can only. . .attain our end by a resolute attack. . . 
A oarty must do all in its power.  If it has the power to 
overthrow the despot by means of a revolution, it should 
do so.  If it has only the power to carry out the death 
nenalty on him personally, then it must do that.  If even 
this is beyond its strength it must at least make a vigor- 
ous protest.  But we shall have the strength—make no doubt 
about that—and the more resolutely we act the sooner we 
shall have it.'13 
The speech showed a high potential of leadership, a role that Zhelydbov 
quickly assumed, yet strangely enough at the next session, concerning 
the party's constitution as a centralized body.  Footman says Zhelydbov 
did not participate in the discussion and explains this silence by quoting 
Tikhomirov's statement:  '"At Lipetsk. . .he was not yet a confirmed 
centralist.'"14  What did "centralist" mean to the terrorists?  In its 
statutes, the organization was centralized in a manner closely resembling 
the model conspiratorial groups of Zaichnevsky, Ishutin, and Tkachev. 
There was actually only one experience Blanquist in the entire group; 
Maria Oshanina had been a devoted follower of Zaichnevsky and was a 
"centralist," which word Venturi defines in the context of the times as 
"the word then used to describe those who were convinced that power would 
have to be seized by a conspiracy which would then make u.« of the mach- 
inery of the State to direct the social and pbLitical revolution from the 
centre."15 Oshanina had forsaken the "perfect conspiracy" in order to join 
13 
14 
15 
Quoted  in  Footman,   pp.   100-101. 
Ibid.,   p.   101. 
Venturi,   p.  644. 
. 
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"Zemlya i  Volya,"  where  the  action war;;   now the  opportunity  was  arising 
in ufcich she  might  again function for  the  sake  of such a conspiracy.    She 
I  the only  formal  Blanquist,   but  in sentiment  there were  others* 
Alexander Mikhailov had  flirted  with  the  ideas  of a Rustsian Jacobin group 
in I876,  but  found  them lacking  in strength and purpose  and  left   them  for 
more  active  areas.     And Yarmolinsky  includes  this  incident  from  the his- 
tory of  "Zemlya  i  Volya": 
Late  in  1878,   at  a conference  of  the  ditors  of Land and 
Liber!.;/,   Morozov  remarked  that  he intended  to contribute 
an article  to  Nabat.     A fellow editor recoiled  in  horror. 
•There   isn't  a  single  revolutionary  in Russia,1   he  cried, 
•who would  approve  the   seizure  of  the government by a 
■ouo  of conspirators.'     Morozov ventured  to  doubt  this, 
and  justly.     'If tgere  are  such,'   was  the  response,   'they 
are  our  enemies!' 
Yet,  Vera Zasulioh,  Kravchinsky,   and Yakov Stefanovich—all  individual 
terrorists  of "Zemlya  i Volya"—denied any connection with  the  "liabatovtsi," 
and,   ae vc  seen  in  the  ohi pter on Tkaehev,   the Executive Committee 
later scorned  any  association with the Ti«homirov's  reference  to  Zhelyabov's 
reluctanoy  to  accept  "centralism."     The  latter had been an orthodox pop- 
ulist until   the  influence  of Morozov and  others  had  turned  him  in  the  dir- 
ection of politic:!  extremism;  but  he  never lost  that populist mentality 
and,   through  his role  as   theoretician of both  "Zemlya i  Volya"  and 
»    rodnaya Volya," synthesized the populism terrorism of the  former c 
the  political-social  revolutionary  goals  of the latter.     In  the  case  of 
the  program  for  "Narodnaya Volya,"  Venturi  claims  that  Tikhomirov  "looked 
to Tkachev and  the Jacobin  tradition for  the  elements  to make up  this 
synthesis. ..17 
Road   to  Revolution,   p.   219. 
"^Venturi,   p.  643* 
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Then,   at  least Morozov,   Oshanina,   and Tikhomirov are   reported  to 
■•vo  had  "centralist"  sympathies,   and yet  the Executive  Committee  of which 
they were  a part  repudiated Tkachev.     This  seems  to he  a  3trang contrad- 
iction,   but upon closer  examination  it becomes  less  surprising in view 
of the  circumstances  surrounding it.     Tkachev could  advocate  his   strictly 
centralized  partly and  revolutionary dictatorshi-  openly  and boldly,   for 
in exile  and  need  not  fear government  repression.   "Narsdnoya Volya" 
enuinely Russian  party,   susceptilte  to the constant   threat  of arrest, 
but  that  consideration  was obviously  not as  significant are,   for  the 
organ  of the  party did call  openly  for  the  overthrow of  the  autocracy. 
Rather,   the  Executive  Committee  suffered  limitation  in its  public  state- 
ments because  of possible  reprecussions  from  two  groups,   the  masses  and 
other revolutionary'  circles,  both  of whose  support  ":7arodr.aya Volya" 
needed   to continue its  activities  against  the autocracy.     Tkachev's  theories 
on clandestine  organization reminded  the revolutionary intellectuals 
too much of  the  terrible  methods of TTechaev—internal  spying,   strict 
•     line,   and  elimination  of  the disobedient.     On  the  other hand, 
Tkachev*S  proposed  seizure of  power by  a centralized  conspiratorial  party 
seemed  to  the  ""arodovSltsi"   to preclude  the  participation  of the  masses 
(though,   as  indicated  in the  discussion of Tkachev,   this  was  an unfair 
interpretation of  the letter's  words),   and  this was  alien   to  the  contin- 
uing populist  strains in  the  minds  of  the  leaders of  the  Executive 
Committee.     And Zhelyabov was  one  of those   populists,   tbt his   idc- 
on seizure  of political   power  were  consistent with  the Tkachevist  ideo- 
y» 
At Lipetsk, the emphasis was not so much upon the nature of the 
revolutionary government (through Mikhailov made a token reference to 
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Narodopravlenie, i. e. popular BOV     rty) as upon the organisation 
and tactics of the conspiratorial party.  And, like it or not, the 
structure was definitely in the Blanquist tradition, due to the influence 
of Hikhailov, MoroKov, and Tikhomirov.  All of the members present were 
to form the Executive Committee, the arm of the party, while the brain of 
the party wan to reside in the Directive Comnittee of three members 
• 9(3  . the body; actually the Directive Conr-dtlee never functioned, 
so all power lay in the hands of the Executive Committee.  Members were 
to dedicate themselves wholly to the cause and guard well the secret of 
the existence of the Executive Committee, though they might, if necessary, 
reveal themselves as mere agents of that body.  Strict discipline and 
obedience to the will of the majority of the Committee were to be main- 
tained, and all members were bound to irrevocable membership until the 
■ ceo■!p] '• shment of the party's goals.  Candidates for admission to member- 
ship had to a ;reo to the entire program of the party before acceptance 
and had to serve as second-cl ass agents before admission to the Executive 
Committee.  Recommendations for membership had to be submitted by five 
existing members of the Executive Committee and voted upon in an open 
county where each negative vote equalled two positive ones. Morozov 
ested a more simple process in practice:  "'When admitting anew 
member we never asked his views on socialism or anarchism.  We asked, 
"Are you ready at once to offer your life, your personal freedom, and all 
that you have?"  If he said ye3, and if we believed him, we took him 
on.-"18 
18 
Quoted in Footman, p. 102. 
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Beneath the Executive Committee existed a hierarchy of party agents, 
the lowest group being Grade I to avoid their knowledge of the total 
number of grades. 
The conference ended with a discussion of tasks, and the one agreed 
upon in principle by all was the assassination of the Tsar.  The 
unanimous decision of those present at Lipetsk had been to conduct a 
struggle; with this in mind they confronted the remainder of 
"Zemlya i Volya" at Voronezh with the ultimatum wither to join the 
Executive Committee or split up the organisation.  Pleklianov and the other 
orthodox populists were shocked at such a perversion of the socialist 
revolution, and, upon the silence of the group when he confronted them 
with a copy of Listok in which Morozov advocated political terrorism, 
Plekhanov left the conference.  That left a few populist-socialists 
arrayed against a majority of terrorists of all descriptions.  Deich, 
one of the former, divided the latter into three oategarleaf  terrorists 
for revenge purposes (Perovskaya); terrorists for sensational purposes 
(i.oroaov); and terrorists for political purposes (Zhelyabov and Mikhailo*), 
His description of Zhelyabov at the Voronezh conference and at the side- 
line debates in Perovskaya's temporary residence is classic: 
•Tall, magnificently built, broad and with strongly 
marked features, he     hen -ot thirty but looked 
older.  Just by hia appearance he stood out from the 
rest of us.  He was a man who compelled attention at 
the firs I glance.  I first met him at Perovskaya's. 
There were ten of us altogether.  There was a lovely 
and heated argument on terrorism.  Zhelyabov and 
Plekhanov wore the chief protagonists.  Zhelyabov spoke 
auetly. in a low full bass, with determination and 
conviction, on the necessity of terror.  He saw no 
immediate nrosnect of success by work among the peas- 
ants.  He was for concentrating on the more progressive 
classes. He was all for fighting for political 
emancipation—a course to which we Uarodniks were opposed.' 
^Quoted in Footman, p. 106. 
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Again,  Zhelyabov made  a resounding  speech,   in which he  shocked  even 
ids  comrades  on  the  Executive  Committee by asking for a constitution 
for RUE: 
•I know  a number  of peasants.   .   .with intelligence 
and  energy and  interested in village  affairs.     But 
things are  now they will  never come  out  in  the 
open.     They know  they cannot do  any good  and  they 
do  not want  to  make  themselves  martyrs for  the  sake 
of a dream.     They are practical  men;   they refuse  to 
iisk all   they have  for a will-o'-the-wisp.     A con- 
stitution would  give  them  the  chance  to come  out  in 
the  open—and  they would  take  it.     They would  have 
come   tangible  objective   to  fight for;   and   Lhey would 
be just  as  stubborn and  just  as  persistent as  any 
of our  sectaries  have-be^n.     That is  the  way  to build 
up a popular party.1 
This  speech provoked  a new controversy between  the  politicals and 
socialists,   and even  the revenge-and   sensation-3eeking terrorists were 
afraid that  a Constituent Assembly would be usurped by bourgeois politicians 
and financiers.     Both  the  latter group and  the  propogandists preferred  the 
free   federation of autonomous  peasant  obshachinas  so dear  to Ilerzen and 
Bakunin.     The  terrorists,   for  the  sake  of unity,  urged Zhelyabov to  put 
the  damper on  his constitution- ]   »i l.husiasm,  but  this  attitude,   born years 
earlier in  Odessa,   could  not  be  repressed  so  easily;   it was  one  of the 
.f  points  included  in  the  liter program  of  "Narodnoya Volya"  and became 
its  strongest  defense  against  attacks  BOftUBing them  of Jacobinism. 
Once convinced  of  the  necessity  of including the  convocation of a 
Constituent Assembly  in its  progrnm,   "Marodnwya Volya"  utilized  every 
ible  instance  to  publicize  this  fact  for the benefit of  the  neople, 
as if  to prove  that  their political   terrorism did not divorce  them  from 
the  genuine  aspirations of the  masses.     On  ITovember 22,   l879,   after  the 
20 Quoted  in Footman,   p.   104. 
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unsuccessful  attempt   to bomb  the  Tsar18  train on the Koscow-Kursk 
railway,   the  Executive  Committee  issued  its  first manifesto   to  the 
Russian people,   chiefly  to infor i  of  the  attempt  and  to  use  this 
ce  to discredit  the  Tsar,  but  also  to reassure   the people  that   the 
Committee  was  acting in  their best inte- 
•He  once  more  assert Alexander II  to be  the  personification 
of  arbitrary,   cowardly,   bloody,   and  ever more violent 
despotation.   .   .He  has merited  the death penalty by  the 
' n he  has  caused  and   the  blood  he ;>cd.   .   .But  our 
concern is not with him alone. Our aim is the freedom of 
the people and the .-rood of the people. If Alexander were 
to recognize  the  evil  he  has  done  to Russia, _if_ _he  were   to 
• nd  over  his   po:.'cr  to _a General  Assembly  chosen by   the   free 
vote  of  the  people,   then we  for our part  would   leave  him  in 
pe; ce and  for/rivc; ast  misdeeds.     But,   till  then,   impl.-ic- 
able war.'21^'^""'^ 
The  part  about'leaving Alexander  in  peace"  and   "for "  him sounds 
nd  indeed  the  last sentence  indieatec  that the  Committee co  sidered 
a reform  from  above  completely   imossible;   but  the National   Assembly 
idea is  obviously  there  as an  inseparable  part  of "rarodovoltsi"  ideo- 
logy. 
In February,   1880,   after   '-he  explosion  in  the Winter Palace  set 
off by Khalturin,   a member of the  Executive  Committee,  Alexander  II  made 
•    1] I  ;ht concession  to  the revolutionary movement by  appointing Count 
Loris-Kelikov as  head  of a special  commission  to restore  order and  investi- 
8  the  possibility  of reforms.     This  "Dictatorship  of  the  Heart"  marked 
a period   of lull  in  the   terrorist  activities  of   the Executive  Committee, 
for which Footman cites  four reasons:     the  hope   thr.t  a cessation of attacks 
'   ht  influence  the  Tsar  to  lessen  the  penalties  of  those   "Narodovoltsi" 
awaiting trial;   the  difficulty of planning an attempt  on  the  Tsar while 
21Ibid,   p.   126. 
- 
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he resided at  his  summer resort at  Livadia;   the  necessity for a respite 
in order to  attract  new members and collect funds;   and  last,   hut  not least, 
the belief  that  a  let-up of pressure  on Loris-Melikov might  enhance  the 
possibility  of a constitution being granted.     This  latter  hope  is  evidenced 
in a resolution,   passed  after heated  discussion and  signed  oy Zhelyabov 
and  the  other members  of  the  Executive  Committee: 
•To  avoid  anarchy,   no attempt  whatsoever  is  to be made 
to  overthrow or  to undermine   the  authority of the Cons- 
tituent  Assembly.     In consequence,   should  the  Constituent 
Assembly  decide  to ain  the  imperial  regime,   this 
regime  is  to be  acknowledged  and recognized on condition 
•   the  party be  allowed  to continue its      -0   I      nda by 
all  normal  methods.1 
Perhaps   this  was  a  si tactic  and  a bit  of opportunistic  publicity, 
for it  is doubtful  that  the  party  actually would   have  accepted  the  main- 
tenance  of the  imperial  regime,   as   the  resolution  so mag».|nimously  offered. 
•tly  thereafter  the  terrorist  struggle  was  renewed,  with intensified 
efforts  to  destroy  the  Tsar. 
But  the  appeal  for  the  convocation of a Constituent Assembly  was one 
of the  most  consistent  factors  in  the  publicity surrounding "IJarodnaya 
Volya,"  and   theoretically,   this constitutionalism disproves  the Blanquist 
accusations  directed against  it.     There  is  one  instance where  the  repudia- 
tion of dictatorial   seizure  of power was  not  only theoretical,  hut  actual. 
In early 1881,   when  ITeohaev sought  to  induce  the Executive  Committee  to 
ume  a revolutionary dictatorship,   with Zhelyabov  as diet-tor,   and 
thereafter  to make  a mockery  of its  basic constitutionalism,   the  Com- 
^   tee  refused   to  entertain  the  ider;  for fear  that  it would  discredit 
itself as a popular party and  los*  the  support  of the  masses. 
Quoted  in Footman,   p.   157• 
-1*. 
Constituent Assembly idea received its final and most eloquent express- 
ion in the ideology of "Narodnaya Volya" in the famous letter written 
by Tttchomirov in the name of the Executive Committee to Alexander III on 
pi 
March 10, 1881.    After asserting the continuation of its revolutionary 
strength and the consequent terrori a     r-.ty and the convocation of a 
National Assembly,  it in:'     upon the complete freedom of the election 
process and the granting of the political freedoms of press, speech, 
■nbly, and electoral programs, and ended with these words: 
'a is the only way in vhioh Russia can be restored to a 
course of norma] and peaceful development.  We solemnly 
declare before our native land and all the world, that our 
party will submit unconditionally to the decision of a 
Popular Assembly which shall have been chosen in accord 
with the above-mentioned conditions} and in the future we 
shall offer no armed resistance whatever to a government 
that has been sanctioned by the Popular Assembly.  And so, 
your Magesty, decide.  Before you are two courses.  On you 
depends the choice; we can only ask Pate that your reason 
and conscience dictate to you a decision which will conform 
only to the good of Russia, to your own dignity, and to your 
duty to y ur native land. 
Here again was the appeal to a reform from above, so inconsistent with the 
avowedly terrorist and conspiratorial orientation of "Warodnaya Volya." 
These were the brave and foolish words of a dyina organization, written 
by a man who «*l more a theorist than a practitioner of terrorism and 
therefore less concerned with the practical necessities of its perpe*- 
tration, and yet they express well the constant and uncorrupted idealism 
of all of the Committee members throughout their terrorist careers, even 
in the face of both the measures demanded of them for the sake of successful 
activity, and of their waiting martyrdom, which in spite of its honor and 
iory would signify also the final defeat of their cause. 
23 See Appendix B. 
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The  short year  and  a half  from August 29,   1879,   when  the  Executive 
Committee  formally  sentenced  the  tsar  to  death,   to March 1,   1881,   when the 
sentence  Wl ried  out,   included  seven   1    • '   plans  to  assassinate 
Alexander  II,24but  it  • by more  than  that.     It  was  a  time  also  of 
■ on  of ideolocy  and  strateg;  - ted by  the  necessity  of 
defendinc  the  very  existence  of  such an 0  Lsation opponents, 
Already in late summer,   1879,   the shaky compromise,  resulting from the 
Voronez erence for the oontinu) tion of "Zemlya i Volya" upon the 
24Phe  first  three  were  unsuccessful  attempts   to blow up  the  Tsar's 
train:     the  first  took place  at  Odessa in September,   1879,   under  the 
leadership of Kibalchich;   the  second,   at Alexandrovsk m  October,   1879, 
under the leadership of Zhelyabov,   who posed   as  a tanner under the name 
of Cherenisov;   the  third,   at Moscow in  November,   1879,   unaer the  leader- 
shin of Alexander Mikhailov,   who  could boast  only the  destruction  of 
-car's ba brain.     The people knew only of the last attempt. 
Executive  Committee  in a  public  manifesto  on  November 
??,   1879.     The  fourth  attempt  occurred   shortly after  the  Odessa failure, 
Zhelyabov organised a bomb at  ach on the Kamenm Bridge over the Bkater- 
in8kv C etersburg.over which the Tsar would pass to the rail- 
on,   but  the bom4>s  were  never set  off due  to  the_ tardiness of 
one  of tho  participants.     The  fifth plan  involved Khalturin^ Posed 
Lrman  and set  explosives  in   the  dining room  oi   the Winter 
:ce?  On February  5,   1880,   the  spark  was  set,   but   the  Tsar had been 
I   in  another room,   and  the  ""arodnaya Volya"  fgjjJ*"«*f     ** 
fa nlan was  set  in a cheese  shop on Malaya  Sodovf* Street,   where  a 
tunnel", ; underground  and  explosive,  ^re  placed  ««°*£ j£«   the 
BPot wh, ocander  II  would  ride  on  his  way  ♦•"J"^*^*" 
the KaneVe.    The  seventh  plan was  an alternate  to the  sixth       two 
"llarodovSlsi"  Carrying bombs  were   to be  stationed on another  street 
in cas^the Tsar chanced his  route.     Zhelyabov       B in charge of  this 
SKH    -H:i=S: SSSSes 
the  second one beine fatal   to  both  Alexander II  and  Gnnevitsky. 
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basis of mere recognition of the necessity of overthrowing the tsar, 
had been broken by  the final  schism  into  "Chernyi  Peredel"   (Black Earth 
Partition)   and  "Karodnaya Volya"   (People's  Will).     According to  Venturi, 
"it was  said  that  of  the old  name,'Zenlya i  Volya,'   the  land  remained 
25 
vdth the  first group,   the  fre  dorn and will  with the  second."  ■      The 
efforts  of  "Chernyi Peredel"  to spread  socialist  pro   1   8 ida  among  the 
workers  and  peasants  siffared  the   same   failure  as  those  of  "Zemlya i 
Volya,"  but Plekhanov made valiant  efforts  to  justify his  position in 
the few publications  of Chernyi Peredel.     He  reasserted  the  orthodox 
populist  stand on  the  necessity for conducting a long-term and systematic 
study of  the  genuine  economic  needs  of  the masses  and  for propagandize 
for rarian revolution based on  the  equal  redistribution  of  the land, 
Lob would  lead in time  to  a thoro oi ■ list-socialist  society. 
Supported by Akselrod's  pamphlets  from Switzerland,   he condemned  the 
political  stand  of "ilarodnaya Volya"  and claimed that  a Constituent Ass- 
embly would be  threatened by bourgeois usurpation,   thereby  forcing the 
;,y  to  assume dictatorial  control   through  the State  and  therefore  to 
Lats  itself even more  from  the  people.     Recognizing these   adverse 
effects  of a constitutional  movement,   Plekhanov also  saw in  it  the possi- 
bility of awakening the real  anri      I        oread  indignation of  the people 
with all  peaceful  political  forms,   when faced  with  an overwhelming 
bourgeois reaction against  the  social-revolutionary program presented 
legally  in  the  electoral  campaign.26    The  failure  of  "Chernyi  Peredel" 
^venturi,  p.  657.    The  Russian word  "volya"  can be  translated as 
both "will"  and  "freedom* 
26 'Venturi,   pp.   658-664. 
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diverted Plekhanov to the road of Social Democracy. 
anwhile, the necessity of gathering strength for the a33ault 
uuon the Tsi •     the politic1    ten he represented was diverting 
M . .,,    • Volya" imperceptibly to the road of Blanquisra.  It3 charter 
of August 29, l879» hegan with the words:  "'We are social'    and 
-.arodniki hy convifction. . .The welfare of the nation and the popular 
i these are our two sacred principles, never to be separated from 
one another.'"  The section on propaganda and agitation continued this 
definition of party orientation:  '"Our propaganda muwt aim to popularize 
11 olasses the idea of a democratic political revolution by means 
28 of socialist reforms. . . •"  Vera Figner has given a concise explanation 
of this highly significant wordifl 
From bhe very first we decided in our program on the 
definition: »We are PopuliBtB-fiooialistB.'  It emphasized 
our revolutionary past, the fact that vre were a party 
not exclusively political; that political freedom -. 
for us not an end, but the means of breaking our way 
through to the people, of opening up a broad path for their 
development.  On the other hand, by combining the words 
•socialist' and 'populist,' *» indicated that, as socialists 
we pursued not the abstract, ul'     aims of the socialist 
teaching, but the attainment of those conscious needs and 
wants of the people, whioh in their essence included princ- 
iples of socialism and freedom.  Considering the mcorp- 
on of socialist ideals in life as a task of the more 
or less remote future, the new party plaoed as its nearest 
roal in the economic field the transfer of the chief mstru- 
of production, the land, into the hands of the peasant 
r.o:   and in the political field, the substitution of 
the sovereignty of the entire people for the autocracy of 
one man.  In other words, the establishment of such an or 
as would make the freely expressed popular will the £«»>•»* 
id only orbiter of all social life.  The most suitable means 
^Quoted in Payne, The Terro. .: . p. 157 
28 Ibid., p. 1?8. 
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which presented  itself for  the attainment  of  the 
aims  war;  the  removal   of  the existing organization of 
power  through a revolution.  " 
According to   the  charter,   this  revolution was  to i  by a secret, 
centralized,   conspiratorial  organization u.: -o       o   .'emonatrate  to 
the  government  the  strength and  tenacity  of the  party*s  atr ,   to make 
the  people believe  in  the  party's  capability  of  supporting  a popular 
unrising  (clearly  a Tkachevist  principle),   and   Lo  develop bh  for 
internal  combat.        Needless  to  say,   the  Executive  Committee's  terror 
' eved  not  a  single  one  of  these   goals*     Alexander II,   though conced' 
Loris-IIelikov's  "Dictatorship  of the  Heart"  in 1880  and  agreeing in March, 
1881,   to  a constitution  granting a  limited consultative  asnembly  to  the 
people,   never  cowered before  the  strength  of "Narodnaya Volya,"   and his 
tragic  carelessness resulted in a more  stringent  repression  of revolution- 
ary activity by his reactionary  successor.     Though  it  was  fully  intended 
by the Executive Committee   to  maintain contact with and gather  support 
from  among the  military,   the workers,   and  the  peasants,   and   thou 
initially efforts  were  made in  this  direction,   the party directed  its 
main  forces  into  the attempts upon  the  life  of  the  Tsar  and  remained 
isolated  from  the  people. 31 
' empire of a Revolutionist, p. 78. 
30Payne, p. 159. 
31There was one incident in the history of "Narodnaya Volya," how- 
ever, which threatened to divert the energies of the party away from the 
assassination plans toward the organization of a peasant revolt.  Zhelyabov 
called a meeting of the Executive Committee in November, 1880, to disousc 
the possibility of manipulating pear-ant discontent over the failure of the 
1880*harvest to stir up a popular revolt.  Zhelyabov saiu in that mjeting. 
"•I consider it essential not to lose the opportunity for action 1 nch 
these conditions offer us.  I pespese to go myself to the Vo ga previnces. 
and place myself at the head of a psasant revolt.  I am confident 
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Rather than strengthening the internal power o' the organization, terror 
depleted its force rapidly and drastically in the face of the numerous 
and executions, prompting Zhelyabov'  laintive remark:  "We 
are using up our capital."  Tkachev opposed terror for its dissipating 
effects upon the strength of the revolutionary party, and his fears 
were realized in the total destruction of "I.arodnaya Volya" because of its 
almost monomanic insistence upon terror. 
Zhelyabov, nevertheless, at hia brial in late March, l88l, defended 
stubbornly both the terroristic methods and the centralized organization 
of the dying "Uarodnaya Volya": 
•According to the prosecutor the task we then set ourselves 
was to attempt to kill.  This is untrue.  The task we set 
0 "selves was not so narrow.  Our basic principle. . .was 
that the Social Revolutionary Party should b-     ut a 
revolution.  To thi3 end we wore to organise revolution 
forces on the widest possible scale.  Up till then I b 
not seen the necessity of organizing*  Like other simple 
socialists, I had felt that certain matters, the supply of pro- 
hibited literature for      oe, should be organized.  Other- 
wise I had relied on individual initiative.  But onoe we had 
set ourselves the task of carrying out an armed revolution 
it was obviously necessary to establish a strong, centralized 
machine, and we—myself ircludod—devotod v     .ore time 
effort to this work than to  re 1   g as:      tions. 
After Lipetsk I became a member of the body at the head of 
which stands the Executive Committee, and I devoted all my 
ers to the creation of a strong centralised organization, 
31   (con't) 
that  I  possess  the  qualities  necessary for carry:.- •  out  this  task. 
I  have  the  firm  hope  that  I  shall  at  least  succeed  in  forcing  the  Adminis- 
•   ion  to rcco.-nise  the  people's  right  to relief.1"     (Footman,   pp. 
169-170.)     This  incident  shows  the  oontinuJ lulist  strain in Zhelyabov'i 
ideology;   but  the  Executive  Committee knew that  it  did  not  have  the 
strength to carry  on  the battle  on a double  front.     Zhelyabov's  suggest- 
ion,   to  postpone  the  assassination attempt,   might mean  its complete 
cancellation;   the  idea of a peasant  revolt was  abandoned. 
I 
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oonsisting of a number of semi-autonomous    roupa working 
a common plan  and  inspired  by a common  idea. "sonal 
••'-,   the  object  of my life,   had been  to work for  the  common 
good.    I   tried first to do a.    Later on 
I  was forced  to  turn to violence. 
Yet,   Zhelyabov,   while admitting the terror and the obviously Blannuist 
structure of the party, was more reticent aboi t revealin- the party1s 
on of the  political  nature  of the  future   society.     Anxious  to defend 
■      or  anization  i    i '-  the  prosecutor's  eh.- rgc  0 -chism,   he  did 
' :       luohl 
•I  maintain   thi ' I P     ' "  of ordered    ovornnent,   not 
am  • •   '        •     I     Ls an old story thi •    We 
affirm  thi Ion '     are common interests  it  will be 
to     aintain a    ov« ' •   •   • ■e are    tot anarobists. 
We  stand" for Federal  Government.     Wo  idvocate  a Constituent 
r;embly.    Ho-.: oa    we  then be regarded as anarchists.' 
He ating   the words of the charter which the firm belief 
of "Harodnaya Volya"  in the  necessity of maintaining the  State,   but      -ans- 
Ting its  power from  the hands of  the  tsarist  regime  to  the hands  of 
Freely,  universally elected Constituent Assembly,   as the party had 
outlined  its campaign  pro;;ram,  very similar  i     ' ■ to  Lenin's 
"April  "hes«s"-ropular sovereignty,   local political  and   economic  auto- 
,   popular  ownership of  the  land  and  industry,   the  personal  freedoms, 
unrestricted  electoral  law, the  tea    l ' tier,  of  the  army into 
34 lopular militia. 
This was a fitting response to the centr-lised  tsarist government, 
}2Quoted  in Footman,  pp.   232-233. 
33Ibid.,   p.   228. 
34. payne,   p.   158* 
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but there were several vital ooraplioations that rendered their constitut- 
ionalism  I   virtual  dead—letter.  Kravchinsky,   who  ire  have  Been was  apoliti- 
cal  in 1886  was  in  London  to  justify   the  "r:' ■ ] ' st-terrorist"  phase  in 
the Russian revolutionary movement.     Certainly,   ho  -.. leaking  for  him- 
aelf and   the  othe liticals,   but ords  helped  to  harden the  epithet 
of anarchism  already levelled t  the  "T'arodovoltsi"  at  their tr' 
in 1381: 
'        care  nothing for forms  of government.     We don't  object 
to  room   -0  . ■   or even to  the Tsar,   by  himself.    What we 
want  Popular  Government  for is  that  it  may be a means  to 
an  ond—that  it may wake  our people  to  a  sense of 
deerjrtlfon,   and  of their natur hts.     That  done, 
lei Tnment  may arise  that can.     We  are  not  ser- 
iously prejudiced  in favor of  any^theory.   .   .Our  first 
La   to destroy  the  tyranny.' 
Already 0] Bakuninist,   KravchJ infused  the  orthodox  an-archist 
tion b B that  the  administration of "uture   BOOiety  he 
vested  in  a federation  of autonomous  entitities,   modelled  after  the 
■rnment of  the United States. 
This  anarchist  modification of  the constitutionalism of  "Narodnaya 
Volya"  was  :r tched by one of a diametrically  opposite  bent,   that is,   the 
Blanquist  revolutionary  dictatorship.     It will  be remembered  that Krav- 
chinsl-y  had  suggested in 1&78  that  the  government  remain neutral in  the 
■   ;ht between  the  socialise  and  their bourgeis enemies  and  had warned 
the  first  articles  in iferodna^a Volva repudiated Kravchinsky's  first 
,ion as  impossible,   ,ince  the     overnment war,  the   true  enemy of the 
people,   but  the  warning considered  carefully by  the  party members. 
Even in  the  charter,   the Executive  Committee  modified   its  advocacy of  a 
3 V Earl Hodgson,   A Nigjvt  with  a Nihilist,   Cupar-Fife:   Fifeshire 
Journal  Office,   London,   p.  9-1!• 
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o    a Constituen ibly with 1 ords:   M*Though  this is far from 
being the  ide.il  form by which the  popular will  may be manifested,   it  is 
at the  present  time  the  only  possible  and practical solution.'"-'     The 
succeeding articles  in I-Tarodnaya Volya recognized  the  bourgeois  threat, 
slnoe  the  people  were unprepared  politically  to  exercise  their ri Ind 
render  the  Constituent Assembly full  justice as  a democratc body.     There 
means  of remedying  this  weakness:     prepare   the masses  throu 
;anda on  a long-term basis or  strike  against the  State   immediately in 
a thoroughgoing revolution in whiih power could be  seized   from  the  State 
and  its bourgeois  supporters.     The Executive  Committee chose  the latter 
ns,   because,   even if  the  people  were  not ready for revolution,   the 
"llarodovoltsi"  felt  therasolves  fully prepared,   anc,   the urgency of  the 
litioal   situation demanded  that  decisive  action be   taken bo"ore   "it  is 
too late,   while  there  is a real  possibility  that  power oan in  fact  pass   to 
i»37    Even the  termino Li 
the   people—Now or  never;   that  is  our dilemma. 
is  that  of Zoichnevsky and Tkachev;   convinced of the   necessity  of  immed- 
revolution and yet  faced  with  the  imj ; Lvity  of both 
nts  and  intellectuals,   the Executive  Committee  was  forced  into  the 
Blanquist nosition condemned  so bitterly by its  leaders  and ideologues: 
38 
-The  party  must  take  the  initiative of a political  revolution on itself.'" 
By  this  decision  "Narodnaya Volya"  actually  advocated  a potential 
divorce  from   the masses,   but  this  did not mean  that  they were ready  to 
36 
37 
38 
Payne, p. 158. 
Quoted in Venturi, p. 671. 
Ibid., p. 673. 
-163- 
aooept such a conclusion.     After  all,   they  had bean  just  recently  prop- 
Bts  themselves,   and  the  clas|| with Ple'rhanov and  his  associates  was 
11    'oo  close   to permit  a scuttling of their populist  beliefs.     The more 
the struggl*  seemed  to deepen between centralized  State   and  centralized 
•-,   the more  intensely  the Executive Committee  sought   to  maintain its 
1.-th  the ■  and  the  socio-economic  go- " I   in  the  party's 
H.     The  articles  in Narodnaya Volya pictured  the  party  as a hero 
battle  alone  against  the  c of the  oppressed   people,   and 
.ificantly they returned  again and again  to  the  subject  of political 
revolution  necessarily  preceding  the  socio-economic   transformation.     In 
article  "The  Political  Revolution and   the Economic Problem,"   N.   I. 
a   Loh,   Executive Committee  member and  explosives expert,   evaluated 
the politic   ]      osition  taken by  the  party: 
h  our  fundamental,   socio-economic  object:.ve,   we 
o  have  to  assume  that of dec  royi.        oil    Lo«      despotism. 
In  other words,   we  have  to  do already been  done  long 
everywhere  else  in Europe,   not by Socialist ;,   but b 
bourgeoisie.     For this reason  there  la  nc ,000 
ialist  narty in Europe which  has   to wi je^ao   0 ive  a 
B     0  and  offer  up so ran;' vietiM..' 
■   *v would  have been proud  of such  a conclusion,  but  Kibalchich  was 
V  <■   Wful  to distinguish  the  simultan- I I bi* ^-economic 
battle of  "^arodnaya Volya"  from both  the  exclusively political  determ- 
ine.,,   i.   e.   the  dictatorial  "Statists"  influenced by Thachev,   and   the 
exclusively economic  determinists,   i.   e.   the  Plekhanovites  influenced 
by .     "Narodnaya Volya" combined  the best  of  these  two  worlds   of 
thought: 
•^Quoted  in Venturi,   p.   679 • 
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'An      'inally,     ■    re is the pal 
Thir reoi   roci ion 
of economic  and   political   factors.     It  c! - the  social 
Lo     '"      0       '   ' ied  out  without  certain  political 
tr; ons;   nor,   vice  vc .■■     ,  can free political  instit- 
utions be maj        Lned without some  historic) : on 
in   the  economic  spher . ' 
. Executive Committee repudiated the   two iurr in 
Western revolutionary  thov 'ooked  into  its  own backyard,   Mother 
• ,    to     ' :;cover   the   traditions  of Stenlza  Razin and Pugachev—a truly 
popular revolt,   led  and  supported by  tl._        oial revolutionary party,   BO 
e  at  the  focal  point  of itB oppre:    Lo   :     the  tsarist 
State.     This was Ikhomirov's main line,   that  stra . e  combination of  _>op- 
ulism and  politic:;,   ..choed by Alexander i-lov  in  a letter   lo  1 
Co; .       t before  his  trial  in February,   1C82,   when  it  was  already 
too late:      '"Do  not be  carried  a fine  theories.     There  is only  one 
' :i Russia:     to acquire   freedom  to  own  the  land;.   .   . t!-ere  is  only 
/l 
one way  to  do   this:      fire at  the  centre.1"' 
But   the Blanquist implioi   ions of their policy were clear,   and the 
Executive  Committee,   sensitive  to  the  reperoussions  that  the epithets 
of purely  political   terror:' sm,~"conspiracy,"   and  a Blanquist  revolutionary 
dictatorship-mi;;ht  have  upon  the  people,   Bought  to puree   the  semblance 
of these  elements  from  their activity.     Alreadj ,     orozov,   whose  emphasis 
upon  sensational  terrorism bore   no real  consider-tion  of the  social   goals 
to accompany    he  sei-.ure  of political  pewer,   had  antagonized  his  comrades 
and  chose  to emigrate   to Geneva,   where, as been noted  in  the  Tkachev 
pter,   he plagued briefly  the  "ITabatovtsi"  wit], his  pure  terrorism. 
4°Ibid., p. 679- 
41Inid..  P. 708. 
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Treading cautiously,   the party continued  to proclaim  the necessity of 
conspiratorial  activities  aimed  at  the  "d' >izution"  of  the  State  in 
order     o  force concessions  from  it,   but it was  more reticent  on  the  nature 
of that  "disorganization."     Secretly,   it was promoting  the  idea of a 
military coup d'etat  among  the garrisons of Petersburg temporarily.     Openly, 
bese 0   Loal  measures  were  tempered by the  theory  that  such  a seizure 
Io only  the  first  Bti an extensive popular revolution: 
•Let us  suppose,   then,   that  the party  haa  or-  anized enough 
forces,   and,   anticipating a general movement of  the people, 
seised   the  central  power.     What must  it   then  do?     Create 
a new structure  for the State  and     so •  e the  reforms  which 
are  indispensable?    We  say  no.     Only in the  most  unfortun- 
.   o Lf the body of the people  were  to  show not  even 
a  spark  of  life,   could  such  a step be  considered  necessary. 
In  normal   times  the  party would be  obliged   to use  the  power 
a  it  had  won  so as  to upturn  the whole  of Jiussia and 
to  appeal  everywhere   to  the  people  to realize  its century-old 
demands.     It would hove to help the people wd 'oroes 
and  retair  control  of  the central power only so  as  to  help 
the  people  to organize  itself.'' 
Thus,   though  they bitterly  attached  the  "despotic Utopia"  of Tkachev's 
dictatorial  revolution  from  above  as  a perversion of  the popular revolution, 
e  "     rodovoltsi"  reserved  to  themselves virtually  the  same author- 
itoriam  power  in order to     orce  the  necessary transforma"ion  of  social  and 
economic  institutions.     But  their  inherent    -opulist mentality  would  not 
allow them  to  discredit  the  possibility  of  the  eventual   awakening of "the 
Q3   to  the  demands  of the  situation,   upon which awareness  the masses 
would  spontaneously continue  the  revolution by assuming local  power over 
ohjteinas and  factories.     The revel■■t.ionary  party would  simultaneously 
,2Quoted  in Venturi,   p.  674. 
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continue  its  own role  as  destroyers  of  the counter-revolutionary elements, 
supporting with its  newfound  strength the  popular revolution in proce     . 
If  this vie*,:  of  the bioi    contained  distinct  populist  elements, 
it still  reflected  a menacing note  of Blanquist  dictatorship.     Reluctantly 
reoognizing    his,   the  "Tarodovoltsi" desperately contrived  to dispel  such 
• tory  i' ■       "   they began  to emphasize more  and  more  the  one facet 
of their policy  that  would  disqualify them as  pure  Blanquistsi      a Con- 
tuent Assembly.     In  the later  articles in Harodnaya Volya,   the  authors 
pounced upon  this  idea  and   proclaimed it  with  all  t] •( te  force  of 
revolutionary  spirit: 
'If oiroui oea  should become   less  favorable,   the 
revolutionary  -overnment  will  c-rry out an economic  revolution 
at  the  same  time   as  it  frees   th jple  and ere- olitioal 
institutions.     It  will  do  away  with  the  right  of private  owners 
to  the  land  and  to  the  tools  of heavy industry.     And  then   the 
true  representatives  of  the  people,   freed  now of  their political 
and economic bondage,   will  answer  the  summoning of  the Zei 
Senor.    And  \ '"c of the people,!tself will be   impregnably 
[ on  the  will   of  the  people.1 
will  of  the  people!     It  was  a magnificent  manipulation of  their party's 
a  in  order  to  express  their mo do  sentiments  on  the  goals  of revol- 
ution.     It Lfioent  also  in  what  it  inherently repudiated:     both  the 
an-archy of Bakunin end  the  dictatorship of Tkachev.     It smelled  unmistak- 
ably Russian and  popul'i 
But the "Earodovoltsi" were faced immediately with the question of 
the  relationship  of their party  to  this  freely,   universally elected body 
of the   people.     Could  the  strength  and power of their revolutionary forces 
bow before   the  democratic  procedure  that  this  concept demanded?    Bakunin 
had  avoided  the question  with his  spontaneously  arising federation of 
autonomous  obaWainas,   Tkachev had  refused  even  to entertain  the  impossible 
^Quoted  in Venturi,   p.   675* 
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idealism of  such a body?   Nechaev had  Bought   to manipulate  it  as  a front 
for  the dictatorial of the revolutionary elite?   and Lenin  in 1917 
would activate  this Nechaevist principle in the • Iclal oonvening of 
Constituent Assembly,   only  to  o- orceful  dispersal  when 
•   had  co  manded  but  a minority of representative:;.     However,    the 
ovoltsi"  were  still  populists  and  therefore  very idealistic;   their 
c  arter boasted   this  paragraph: 
•While  wholly submitting ourselvc ■   to   the   will  of  the 
people,   wc   nevertheler a party believe  it   to be our 
duty  to put  forward  a program  for the benefit of the 
people.     We intend  to  continue  makin.-- pro or 
our program up  to  the  outbre- '    o '  the  revolution, 
shall  continue   to recommend it  during  the  elocto 
campai.-n and we  shall  defend  it  in  the  Constituent 
cmbly itself.'44 
The letter  to Alexander  III repeated  the  same  intention of  the party's  sub- 
Lon   to  the  will  of the  Constituent  Assembly,   ae   Lf     be   "Nnrodovoltsi" 
would  renounce  their  supreme authority and  consent  to  serve  merely  as  one 
rota     of participants  in the  01 n and  in  the  dejnooratio  govern- 
ment following-  the elections.     Its  plans were  further elucidated in one 
of  the  last   articles of Narodnaya Volva: 
'In a constituent  assembly,   created  autonomously or by  a 
summons  from  the   -overnment,   and  supplied  with  the  mandates 
of  its   electors.   .   .ninety per cent  of the  deputies  will  be 
peasants.     And  if we  assume  that  the party  acts clovaiy 
enough   they will  belong to  the  3ame  party.     What  win an 
sembly decide?    It  is  exceed: Ikely  that  it  will 
completely reverse  the whole  economic  and  rgovernmental 
system.* 
But Venturi   is convinced  that  the  "NarBodovoV    '"     ore  fully  aware  of the 
Lty  which  thlfl  assembly of  the people  offered   them  for the  fufillment 
44 
45 
Quoted  in Payne,   p.   lf>8. 
Quoted  in Venturi,   p.   676. 
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of their particular    program, without  fear  of defeat at  the  hands  of 
other,   possibly bourgeois,   parties^   The germ of his conclusion lies 
in this  statement  made by Kibalchich: 
'When  government centralized ion has  been finally smashed 
by  the  wave  of  the popular movement,   what  so' '11 
will  show they they constitute  real   force;;?     Who  will 
ovorn  the  course  of ever. ot the  privileged  classes, 
of  course,   for they  ar    not unj        .     Hot the  lawful  parti 
o-ur,e  they are  disorganized.     Only the  people and  the  social 
.  ."        on-ry party will  constitute  those fundamental  forces 
on which  the  sooial   and State  or 'on  of  the  future  will 
depend.' 
Venturi's words t  -e    significant   ' the  true oharaoter of 
•odnaya Volya"  in  this consistent i      for embly: 
"   ■ turally  this conception too had  its JacobJ sot:     the Zemsky, 
Sob or under discussion was    really the Convention.    The role to be 
played by  the  party  in its relations  with it  wa     obviously  that  of  the 
French Jacobins.' 
Paced  with   the  equally  terrible  consequences  of its   total  attack 
:  the  State—anarchy—and  of its  centralized conspiratorial  power— 
I   oquist  dictatorship—,   "Narodnaya Volya"  chose   the  safe  middle  road 
of a Constituent Assembly,   which  in   any event  was  consistent with  their 
opuli»st ideals and which left thern enough potential freedom to assert 
their power in the most advantageous manner. 
Having justified  their existence  as  the  genuine  instrument    of the 
"will  of  the  people,"  the  »lferodovolts>  continued  their  assassination 
attempts, «d by  so doing,   isolated   themselves  further and farther  from 
-VIbid.,  p.   676-677- 
47Ibid,,   p.  677- 
-169- 
the  people  and  finally  destroyed  themselves  entirely.     7era : c> 
ompted  to   justify  this iso       la eriM   g  the  policy of her party 
or.  the  necessity  of linking its  activity with  the  "or;nni si tion"  of 
revolul ; the  so]r>:; ■   .   • •   ■■ nts.     But 
her own  aba^Bie       of  the afta i of March  1,   1881,   did  more  to  condemn 
than to Lfy the • concentration of "Narodovoltsi" upon 
•  of  the  Tsar.     The military revolt and  the  peasant  uprisd iver 
lized;   the  pel    I believed, . chaev had ted,   that  the 
iry landlords  had killed  the   "Tsar-R( •";   Zhelyabov,   Peroval •. i , 
Timofei« LloVj laJ akov,   and  ".'' ■     ;od  on'April 
3,   l88l;   the  rest  of  the Executive Comnittr 'orcver;   s 
rathe- ■■.-■ ■     snt  to make  concessions,   the   as 'on 
provoked  one  of the most reactio   i oriods  in  Russian history.     "TIarodn-, 
Volya"  died unreachable cause,   never  having made more  than  the 
latest  impact upon  the people  in whose  name   ',hey had  acted. 
Lenin  in  What  is  to be  done?   (1902)   defended eo '   ant 
anization  of "     -odovoltsi," '    '        Lt  and  the  organization  of 
"Zemlya i  Volya"  as  a model  for his  own concept  of a Sooia]   De ic 
Party, '     it  the Economists*s derc ohar •      Lnst  its failure  to 
i    basic ■Anci*    of democratic  theory: 
To 'd   a militant revolutionary o • Lo 
speoj I j-odnaya Volya in character is  absurd.   .   • ; 
for no revolutionary trend,   if it seriously  thinks of struggle 
can dispense  with  such  an or      lizatio   .     The  mis the 
aya Volya committed was not in striving  Lo enlist all 
the discontented  in the   organization and  to  direct   this 
'  i;emoiV»« of a Revolutionist,   pp.'117-123. 
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organieation to rocoluto struggle against the autoc7-acy; 
on the  contrary,   that  was  its great  historic I 'it. 
The  mistake  was  in relying on a  theory which  in  subs- 
tance ot  a revolutionary  theory at  all,   and   the 
•odnaya Volya members  either did  not know how,   or  were 
unable  to link their movement  inseparably class 
struggle in the develop!.,   c ]     alist socie'. . 
irally,   Lenin was condemning that  note of populist  idealism which 
Lhe  peasant,  rather  than  the  worker,   at;  the vital  revolutionary force, 
but he  , loesed  over  the  fact  that  any  strong militant  conspiratorial 
Lzation must  suffer the fate of isolation from its so-c;illed 
revolutionary forces,   i.  e.   the people.     Indicative of Lenin's opportun- 
istic nee  to  onlj   those  parts  of  "^arodnaya Volya"  which  conformed 
Li    own  idei I  an  incident  in  1906,   recalled  later by Pokrovoky  in 
his  funeral   speech or  Lenin at  the  Socialist Academy  in 1924,   when Pofciwrfy 
deed  Lenin to mention  the  twenty-fifth  anniversary  of March 1,   1881, 
in Iskra  (The Spark): 
Lenin refused.     'Well  and  good,   they died.     :ionor and  glory 
to  them,   but why Amid  we  talk about  it?'      'At  thai   tine, 
Ld Pokrovsky,   'this  seemed  to  me a sign of coldness,   of 
oral bresJ preceding  stage  in  the  revolution- 
ary movement.     How I  understand  that  this  was  simply  a 
reflection of a well-known  tactic,   a refusal  at  a   :ime  of 
stmjggle,   to  cive  even post^nunous  compliments   to 
terror.' 
Ls  just   these   two elements  of  "Narodnaya Volya"-terror  end  the  fail- 
■      0      oogatse  the proletariat 1 .evolutionary force-that provoke 
:on of the  Soviet  histo- -   but  Lenin's  reference  to  them 
in Vhnt  1,  to be  done?  is  enough  to  Justify  the  conclusion  that  "Narod- 
naya Volya"  exerted a great  influence  upon   his  own tactic. . 
[*nln,  nniiRcted Wo-ks,  vol.  5,  P- 474. 
5°Vorlanov,   pp.   24-25. 
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The  "I'arodovoltsi"  succeeded  in o  ly  one  aspec:   o '  their activity— 
the destruction  of  one  Tsar—,   and  this was merely   the  first  step of 
their r ionary plans.    T] of ford       oo  o< >om the  new 
-f   of  promoting a popular revolution,   of secretly  pit to  seize 
nower  and  convoke  a Constituent Assembly were doomed  to  die wit]    their 
leaders^     Their faili the  co contradiction "between  the 
practic- ]   - iei sures taken to Tsar and the   Ldealia    of their 
talityj   ' Ls sense,   they were  a  self- ' lOtive  phen- 
5 on one aspect  of "disorganization"   and  thus 
precluding;  their  chances  of 01   '    'ully  org nizing the nee revolut- 
ions.     Their direct  heirs  were   the Social   Revoluti< , 
e      Loyed   terror and  who were   suooei enough to  command  a majority 
of the votes in the Constituent AS    nbly elections of 1917.    The eval- 
Lon of Leal struggles of the "Barodovoltsi" 01     only place 
• • c  o> begoriesi     politioal populi I     theory;   terrorists in 
the  actual  practice  of conspiracy;   and  potential  Blanquists  in the  event 
of revolutio   i cccss.     11 the  unique mixture  of  these  three  elements 
that kept them functioning for a year « ,    ut it w      also the 
'     »r conse. uenccs of the int. oontradiotion of tl '  ors 
bheir  swift and  tragic  disc i    co  from the revolu:I 
scene. 
CONCLUSION 
CONCLUSION 
By the 1890's in Russia,   the fashionable term in revolutionary 
circles had become the  "dictatorship of the proletariat," reflecting 
the development of Marxist ideology,   and that other dictatorship—the 
ilanquist revolutionary dictatorship—has been discredited and relo- 
cated to a pijeonhole in the annals of history.     In retrospect,  it 
would be apt to compare the two  in many respects,   for the Marxist 
slogan in practice in the Soviet Union took on all the characteristics 
of a dictatorship over the proletariat.    Herzen had sadl;/  foreseen 
this occurrence;   3akunin condemned it in  every theory but his own; 
Tkachev and Zaichnevsky knew and accepted it;  Ishutin and Nechaev ig- 
nored it;   and "Narodnaya Volya"  desperately attempted to  scare the 
spectre of it away from their ideolojy,  and then reluctantly accepted 
it as ultimate necessity. 
The  very existence and consequences of dictatorship in any form 
have haunted Soviet historiography since its  earliest post-revolutionary 
beginnings.     Probably the first and most significant polemical battle 
took place in the immediate aftermath of the revolution between Karl 
Kautsky on one side and Lenin and Trotsky on the other.    Kautsky,  the 
most outstanding orthodox Marxist in  the first two  decades of the 
twentieth century,   in his book The Dictatorship of the Proletariat 
(1918),   defended Marx'  use of the term "dictatorship" not in a literal 
sense,   i.e.,   a form of government,  but in the sense  "of a condition 
which must  everywhere arise when the proletariat has conquered 
-173- 
„1 political power,"    in other  words,  popular sovereignty.    Kautsky did 
concede the necessity for a revolutionary minority to maintain 
political power temporarily in order to  destroy the counterrevolution- 
ary elements in  civil  war,  but only if that revolutionary dictatorship 
would abrogate itself immediately upon its victory over those 
elements.    Otherwise,   "the dictatorship of the lower classes opens 
2 
the way for the dictatorship of the sword"    or a minority rule  that 
maintains itself against the will of the people by means of either 
"Jesuitism" or  "Bonapartism."    This condition,   says Kautsky,   is a 
perversion of what Marx meant by dictatorship of the proletariat": 
"      the dictatorship of the proletariat we are unable to understand 
anythinj  else than its rule on the basis of democracy.nJ   Kautsky 
accordingly viewed with alarm the forcible dissolution by the 
j«lsheviks of the Constituent Assembly,  a truly democratic body,  and 
interpreted it as a forebodin; of the fate of democracy in the Russia 
of the future. 
But Trotsky and Lenin were in the very throes of civil  war,   and 
to them the situation  demanded a  stron;;,  unmiti atin-j battle to the 
death with the enemies of the revolution.    Kautsky's va^ue proclama- 
tion of democracy did not offer that strength,   while the Bolshevik 
party,  in the name of the dictatorship of the proletariat,  had success- 
fully seized power in Russia and was the only a-ent capable of using that 
nower to  save the revolution.     Interpreting  the dictatorship  to  fit his 
XThe Dictatorship of the Proletariat,   The University of Michigan 
Press,   Ann Arbor,  19:'^,  P«  *5« 
"Ibid, p.   58. 
3Ibid, p.   58. 
own conception.   Trotsky referred to  the great masters,  Marx and Sh.-els, 
and particularly the latter's statement in 1891 that the dictatorship 
of the proletariat was  "'the sole form in which the proletariat can 
achieve control of the State.'"       Throwing back into Kautsky's  face 
the fact that Kautsky himself had often repeated that very phrase, 
Trotsky ijnored the distinction made by the latter between dictator- 
ship as a form of government and as a condition,   and accused his 
onnonent of repudiating the very concept of "dictatorship of the nro- 
letariat".     He further condemned Kautsky for theorizing in a vacuum 
and i-norin;  the vitally dangerous threat to the revolution and the 
proletarian dictatorship in Russia:     "The contendin    forces are not 
proletarian and bour-eois mannikins produced in the retort of 
Wajner-Kautsky,  but a real proletariat and a real bourgeoisie,   as they 
have emerged from the last imperialist  slaughter."      Violent measures 
were necessary to  destroy  the bourgeois threat in collaboration with 
the intervention of the imperialist countries;  thus Trotsky justified 
both the terror and the proletarian dictatorship personified in  the 
Belshevik party. 
By the  end of the civil war in Russia,  Kautsky's distinction 
between the popular sovereignty of a class and the authoritarian rule 
of a minority party had blurred and fallen by the  wayside.     By 1921, 
B. I.  Gorev,   a former Menshevik,   was  defending openly in his book on 
Auguste HLan*ui the influence of HLanquisra upon the Bolsheviks. 
Terrorism and Communism,  The University of Michigan Press, 
Ann Arbor,  1961,  p.  22. 
%bid, p. 26. 
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Varl-m#.V interprets Gorev's thesis in this way: 
The essence of the argument about elements of BLanquism in 
.larxisra boiled down to  three basic organizational and tactical 
features:     the conspiratorial party,   the seizure of power and 
the  dictatorship of the revolutionary vanjuard after the 
seizure of power.     Forev showed that all these constitute 
indubitable elements of BLanquism in the tactics and organ- 
ization of the Balsheviks. 
Later in 1923i   in answer to a review of his book,    iorev renewed his 
denunciation of the ilenshevik concept of revolution by proclaimin: 
the proletarian dictatorship as the only possible  form of rule in the 
revolution.     Sit surprisingly,   in an attempt to make his analysis as 
thorough.oin;j as possible,   'iorev did not fail to observe that this 
dictatorship,   thou ;h dependin• on the masses,   was  really a dictator- 
ship of the minority,   "'for the dictatorship of the majority is an 
n 
internally contradictory concept.'"       Here was a  resurrection of the 
Kautsky distinction,  but this time it was  stated,   not in condemnation, 
but in support of the 3©lshevik dictatorship.     Thus,   the dictatorship 
of a party in the approvin;  eyes of all had replaced the dictatorship 
of a class,   and within a dozen years a literal dictatorship of one man 
-.rould be substituted and entrenched in the Soviet  system.     '.fl.th the 
advent of that Stalinist autocracy,   the brief decade of identification 
of BLanquist and Marxian-style dictatorships would pass into oblivion, 
alon;  with the historical  school  which had constructed it,  leaving 
behind a Stalinist perversion attributed openly to  Marx,  but possessing 
all  the earmarks of the HLanquist-Tkachevist simultaneous destruction 
nTarlamov, p. 15- 
rj 
Varlamov, pp. 15-l6a. 
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of revolutionary enemies and reconstruction of the socialist society. 
Jan K»charzewski,  in his book The Origins of xbdern Russia, 
devotes considerable  space to a discussion of Jacobinism.     In an 
excellent analysis of the loose interpretation of the term,   resulting 
in its use as a condemnatory slogan on both sides of the fence, 
Kucharzewski begins his discussion with Plekhanov,   whom we have  seen 
was the  staunch opponent of the political  terrorism of "Uarodnaya Valya." 
o 
"Jet,  Plekhanov was  "by no means a  categorical opponent of terrorism. " 
The distinction in his mind lay between the Jacobin  Terror of 1793i 
which was supported by the 7rench masses,   and the terror of the 
"Narodovoltsi,"  which was isolated from the Russian people.     Thus,   we 
see Plekhanov in the seemingly incredible role of defender of 
orthodox Jacobin dictatorship and terror as necessary measures in the 
battle between French socialists and French bourgeoisie.    Kucharzewski 
emphasizes  the fact that the focal point for Plekhanov was the mass 
support of terror,   and points out that Plekhanov failed to observe 
the difference in the French and Russian terrors,  i.e.,   that the former 
was instituted after  the seizure of power as an act of revenge and the 
latter was directed against the State in the hopes of forcing con- 
cessions or  even,   if necessary,   seizing power.°    Plekhanov foresaw a 
period of "true"  Jacobin terror in Russia after the fall of tsardom, 
and it was this opinion that prompted Lenin to call Plekhanov, 
approvingly,   a Jacobin.     But Plekhanov later denied this epithet,   turn- 
in ■ it against Lenin himself by labelling him an "ultra-Jacobin," 
while he (Plekhanov) remained a  "half-Leninist,"  in the  sense  that 
8Kucharzewski,   The Orlrins of rbdern Russia,   The Polish Institute 
of Arts and Sciences in America,   New lork,   19^,  u.  M-52. 
-177- 
Lenin  sought like Zhelyabov to   "give history a push"  without con- 
sideration for the necessary accompaniment of a popular uprising. 
Lanin himself approved of Plekhanov's definition of Jacobinism,   and in 
1904 he used that term to distin ;uish the Bolsheviks  from the 
"jirondist"  Hensheviks. Beginning  with Sduard Bernstein,   the 
revisionary socialists began derogating the Bolsheviks  with accusa- 
tions of  "Jacobinism"  and "Blanquism,"  while Lenin accepted willingly 
the epithet and defended the conspiratorial organization of the 
latter as a necessary measure for consolidating  strength for the over- 
throw of the tsarist government,  as noted above in his discussion of 
"iiarodnaya Volya"  in '.faat is to be done?    Ostensibly,  Lenin was a 
riarxian economic dfcterminist,   but the autocratic  system in Russia 
demanded that he plot revolution on the model of the Jacobin-Blanquist 
seizure of political power. 
Suffice it to   say that the pre-Harxist Russian Jacobins,   from 
Zaichnevsky to  the  "Narodovoltsi,"   were political determinists intent 
upon conspiratorial preparation for the seizure or manipulation of 
power for the sake of establishing  the vaguely-conceived socialist 
society of the future.     In that sense,  they were true HLanquists 
depending upon the weight of emphasis given to  each successive phase of 
the Blanquist tactic  (using  the three stages defined by 3orev).     Theo- 
rizing in the 31anquist manner reached complex depths,  but the practical 
results never reached beyond the conspiratorial organization  stage. 
In theory,   Zaichnevsky and Tkachev were the only Russians who  pre- 
served the total Blanquist ideology from conspiracy to revolutionary 
10Kucharzewski, p. ^58. 
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dictatorship and who planned circumspectly for the structure of 
society to  follow the dictatorship;   their only fault  (and it was not 
theirs alone,  but rather a basic HLanquist misconception) lay in the 
failure to  recognize that power is not easily abdicated,  and their 
"benevolent"  dictators  were   as   remote as their egalitarian communist 
society.     Herzen and Bakunin each penetrated to  the heart of this 
concept of power,  and while this insight prompted Herzen to  renege 
on his brief and immature flirtation with revolutionary authoritarian- 
ism,  on the other hand Bakunin preached one thing and practiced 
another.     Swept up in a monomanic concentration upon the conspiratorial 
society phase,   Bakunin lost the perspective of the other two  phases, 
simultaneously makin; a mockery of them in his fantastic proposals 
for tsarist revolutionary dictatorships and avoidin;  the question 
entirely by shucking  them in favor of a conveniently ambiguous an- 
archism. 
The three attempts to pursue Blanquist tactics in Russia itself 
were destined never to  reach beyond the first phase,   and even  that 
nea ;er activity was admirable in view of the idealistic vacillation 
amon;  their  emigre Kentors.     Ishutin's  "Organization"  was carefully 
modelled after  similar European societies,   but the youn^ fanatics 
of "Hell,"  personified by Karakozov,  lacked the ability to look 
beyond their noses and,   after last-minute misgivings,   threw caution 
to  the winds and stumbled into  the abyss with Karakozov.    Nechaev too 
managed to  inspire a  thoroughgoing  conspiratorial organization,   while 
the actual  seizure of power and the nature of the revolutionary 
government receded into  the back0round of his mind.     Beyond a 
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primitive planninj of the seizure of the Tula arsenal, the only 
activity of Nechaev's orjanization was  the murder of one of its own 
members,   and that incident marked the death knell of the conspiracy. 
Later,  llechaev was  facile in his  sub-^estion to  the  "HarodovaLtsi" 
to  seize power in  the form of a revolutionary dictatorship,  a point 
to which he had progressed in theory though he had virtually ignored 
it in his own activity.     It is only fair to observe,  however,  that 
Nechaev seeris not to have conceived of his own personal dictatorship, 
thoujh his authoritarian position in the conspiratorial organization 
lo ;icall„r would have led to  that.     Finally,   "Marodnaja Volya"  suffered 
from the  schizophrenia of theory versus action;  it sought to maintain 
its populist-democratic  ideals at the  same time that it was  forced 
to orjanize the centralized conspiratorial organization demanded by its 
terrorist activities and to  entertain the thought of maintaining its 
power after the political turnover for the sake of continuinj the 
socialist revolution.     Seeking to  escape this terrible internal  schism, 
the "l.'arodovtltsi" killed a tsar and their own organization  simultan- 
eously,  thus precluding any opportunity for either clarification of 
their ideolojy or actual proof of their   ;ood intentions. 
It would be fair to conclude also,   that none of these theorists 
and semi-activists of HLanquist tactics could have foreseen a Stalin, 
the ultimate perverted conclusion of their own activity,   thoujh Herzen 
and Bakunin perhaps came the closest of any of them in prophesying such 
an occurrence.     This oversight can be considered unjustifiable,   in 
view of the penetrating analysis of French historians on the subject 
of the consequences of the Jacobin Terror of 1793-    Notable among  these 
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is the conservative Hippolyte Taine,   from whose book The Ori ;ins of 
ixidern France (twenty-fourth edition,  Paris 1904) Kucharzewski quotes 
at length on the subject of Jacobinism.    A portion of that quotation 
is reproduced here,   and,  in particular,   the  sections  which deal 
specifically with  the political rower manipulated by the revolutionary 
dictatorship: 
'In the absence of a ^reat mass which steps aside,  a  small 
group  is on duty and seizes power.     Due to  the abdication of 
the majority,   the minority becomes the  sovereijn,  and the 
public cause,   abandoned by the undecided,  passive,   absent masses, 
falls into  the hands of the decided,  active,   present    roup which 
finds  the  time and which has the will to undertake this task.... 
7<fi.th regard to building or destroying...his   (the Jacobin's) 
straightforward action is  the quickest and most oner.;otic.     For 
if lon~ considerations are necessary to  find out what is 
appropriate for twenty-six million livin;  French people,  a 
;lanco is  sufficient to learn  what abstract men of theory desire. 
Indeed,   theory has cut them all to one measure and has left them 
only an elementary will;  by force of decision,   the philosophical 
automat wants  freedom,   equality,   sovereignty of the people, 
rights of man...That  suffices:    from then on the will of the 
people is known beforehand;  therefore,  one may proceed without 
consulting the citizens;  one is not obliged to  wait for the 
vote.     At any rate,   approval on their part is certain;   if by 
any chance it  should not come,   this  would be ijnorance,  a 
mistake or malice on their part,  and consequently their reply 
would deserve to be recognized as invalid.... Thus everythin 
belon;s to him:    by the mere fact that he is a Jacobin,   he 
considers himself legally both Tsar and Pope. ...Ke alone is 
enlightened,   he alone is a patriot,   and consequently he alone 
is  worthy to rule,   while his conceit of power makes him believe 
that any'resistance is a crime,     '/hen  the majority protests, 
it does  so because it is  stupid or depraved;   for these  two 
reasons it deserves to be made powerless and it shall be 
made nowerless.. .By instinct he always behaved like a ruler. 
He was one even  when he was a common private man and club 
member;  he does not cease to be one now when he has the le ;al 
power,   all the more so,  because when he  weakens he feels lost and, 
in order to  save himself from the scaffold,   he has no other 
escape except dictatorship Yesterday he extalled the rights 
of the    overned,   up to the abolition of the ri;hts of the 
rulers, 'up to  the abolition of the ri ;hts of the Ooverned. 
Accordin- to his words, the people is the only authority, 
but he will  treat the neople as  slaves.     Accordin;  to  his  words, 
the   -overnment is only a servant but he  will e;ive the -overnment 
-181_ 
the prerogatives of a  Sultan.     Only recently he condemned the 
smallest act of the public authority as a crime; now he will 
punish as a crime the smallest opposition to the oublic 
authority.     'What should he do to'justify such an about-face 
and with what excuse will he renounce the principles on which 
he had based his own usurpation?    He is careful not to  renounce 
thera;   on the contrary,   he proclaims them as loud as possible. 
Thanks to  this manoeuvre the ijnorant mass,   seein; that the 
same  flask continues to be jiven to  it,  imagines that the same 
potion is handed to  it and it is made to  drink tyranny under 
the label of freedom.     During  six months he will spread 
charlatan  emblems,   slogans,  tirades and lies to camouflage the 
nature of his product;  if in time the public  will find it 
bitter,   so much the worse for the public.     Sooner or later it 
will  swallow it voluntarily or under coercion,  because in the 
meantime  instruments  will have been prepared that will force 
it down its throat.^- 
ihe relevance of Taine's observations to the Stalinist rejirae is 
obvious,  and as  such they serve as severe condemnation of the Russian 
ZLanquists  for their failure to analyze thoroujhly the dangerous con- 
sequences of their adopted Jacobinism.     The internally-destructive 
contradiction in the ideological  structure of these HLanquist-oriented 
Russian revolutionaries is perhaps best expressed by Robespierre's 
classic contradictory statements:     "'The revolutionary government is 
the despotism of freedom with regard to tyranny....'The essence of the 
republic is  to  destroy everythinj  that opposes it.'" 
Finally,   what were the tangible consequences of "conspiracy and 
revolutionary dictatorship in the ideology of Russian populism 
1361-81"?     Three lifelong banishments from the Russian soil,  one life- 
long  wandering  in the provincial  "deserts"  within Russia,  one attempted 
tsaricide,   one accomplished tsaricide,  and one "studenticide" and the 
consequent life imprisonment in a hole in the Peter and Paul Fortress 
1:LXuch«rzewski, pp. 459-461. ^Quoted in Kucharzewski,  p.  461. 
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of its perpetrator—these were the tra;ic results of all the fine 
theory and frenzied activity.     Some refused to reco  nize their debt 
to the French masters;  others  extolled them befittin^ly—much as has 
been their fate at the hand of their Soviet heirs—;  but they all 
suffered in one form or another the same martyrdom of Robespierre, 
3abeuf,   Jlonqui.     The autocracy VBS too powerful and too  entrenched; 
the masses were too ignorant and too  reactionary;   and they them- 
selves  were too premature in their activity,  too  idealistic in their 
dreams to brin^ about the right mixture of  all inrredients for the 
precipitation of the revolutionary explosinj.     Those HLanquist-oriented 
Russian revolutionaries of the 1860's and 1870's elaborated upon the 
conspiratorial activity of the French radicals and brought it to the 
point where Lenin and the 3olsheviks  could seize upon their unsuccess- 
ful experience and transform it into  the tools of a  successful move- 
ment.     Their  failure to reach the phases of seizure of power and 
revolutionary dictatorship can be attributed to  the unfavorable climate 
of the times,   but their real tragedy rests in the fact that they 
demonstrated through their martyrdom the difficulty in allyinj  the 
idealistic :joals of the past with the tactical measures necessary for 
an immediate revolution in Russia,     "Harodnaya Volya"  was the  supreme 
example of that uneasy alliance between Herzenist dreams of peasant 
socialism and Tkachevist tactics of forceful revolution  from above; 
therefore,   it  was the  fate of this populist-terrorist party to  close 
the curtain on this Ion •■ and prolific  transitional period between the 
French and Russian revolutions,  between *stern-style socialism and 
Leninist .larxism.     The ,reat historical merit of the heroes of this 
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t-.renty-year period lies in the fact that they shaped an amorphous 
revolutionary ferment into active revolutionary tools,   and that they, 
idth their lives,  made the downpayment on a risky,  but potentially 
profitable investment. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDICES 
A 
THE CATECHISE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY 
The Duties of the Revolutionary toward Himself 
1. The revolutionary is a dedicated man.    He has no personal inclinations, 
no business affairs, no emotions, no attachments,  no property and no 
name.    Everything in him is subordinated towards a single exclusive 
attachment,  a single thought and a single passion—the revolution. 
2. In the very depths of his being, not only in words but also in deeds, 
he has torn himself away from the Donds which tie him to the  social 
order and to the cultivated world, with all its laws,   moralities and 
customs and with all its generally accepted conventions.    He is their 
implacable enemy,  aid if he continues to live with them it ii; only in 
order to destroy them more quickly. 
3. The revolutionary despises all dogmas and refuses to accept the mundane 
sciences, leaving them for future generations. He knows only one sci- 
encej the science of destruction. For this reason, and only for this 
reason, he will study mechanics, physics, chemistry, aid perhaps medi- 
cine. But all day and night he studies the living science of peoples, 
their characteristics and circumstances, and all the phenomena of the 
present social order. The object is the same: the prompt destruction 
of this filthy order. 
ll.    The revolutionary despises public opinion.    He despises and hates the 
existing social order in all its manifestations.    For him,  morality 
is everything which contributes to the triumph of the revolution. 
Immoral and criminal is everything that stands in his way. 
< 
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5. The revolutionary is a dedicated man, merciless towaro  the state and 
altogether merciless toward the educated classes;  and he can expect no 
mercy from them.    Between him and them there exists, declared or con- 
cealed,   a continual ana irreconcilable war "for life or for death." 
He must accustom himself to enduring torture. 
6. Tyrannical toward himself, he must be tyrannical toward others.    All 
the soft and tender affections arising from kinship, friendship and 
love, all gratitude and even all honor must be obliterated,  and in 
their place there ranst be the cold and single-minded passion for the 
work of revolution.    For him there exists only one pleasure, one con- 
solation, one reward, one satisfaction—the success of the revolution. 
Night and day he must have but one thought,  one aim—merciless destruc- 
tion.    Aiming cold-bloodedly and indefatigably toward this end, he 
must be ready to destroy himself and destroy with his own hands every- 
one who stands in his way. 
7. The nature of the true revolutionary excludes all romanticism, all 
sensitivity,  all exaltations and enthusiasms.    He must also exclude 
private vendettas and personal hatred.    The revolutionary passion, 
practiced at every moment of the day until it becomes a habit, is to 
be employed with cold calculation.    At all times and in all places the 
revolutionary must refuse to allow himself to be guided by his personal 
impulses, but only by the total submergence of himself in the revolu- 
tion. 
Relationship of the Revolutionary toward the Revolutionary Comrades 
B.   The revolutionary can have no friendly feeling to anyone unless,  like 
him, the other is dedicated to revolutionary affairs.    His degree of 
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friendship,  devotion,  and obligation towards a comrade mist be deter- 
mined only by the degree of the comrade' s usefulness in the practical 
work of complete and destructive revolution. 
o.    It is superfluous to speak of  solidarity among revolutionaries.    The 
whole strength of the revolutionary work lies in this.    Comrades who 
oossess the same revolutionary passion should, as much as possiDle, 
deliberate all imoortant matters together ana come to unanimous con- 
clusions.    ::ut the revolutionary, in accomplishing whatever plan is 
finally decided upon, must rely altogether on himself.    The contract 
of revolutionary destruction demands that no comrades should come run- 
ning up with advice and assistance if this detracts from the success 
of the plan. 
10. Each comrade should h;.ve under him several revolutionaries of the second 
or third rank, i.e. comrades who are not completely dedicated.    These 
should be regarded as oortions of a common Tuna of revolutionary capi- 
tal, to be expended as he thinks fit.    He should expend them as economi- 
cally as possible,   always attemoting to derive the utmost possible usa 
from then.    He should regard himself as capital consecrated to the 
triumph of the revolution}   and he must not be re6 rded as expendable 
without the entire  agreement of the fully initiated comrades. 
11. When a comrade is caught in a dangerous extremity and the question arises 
whether he should be rescued or not rescued , the revolutionary must 
make his decision without recourse to oersonal feelings,  but only in 
terms of the eventual success of the revolution.    Therefore it is necessary 
to balance carefully the usefulness of the comrade in so far as it is a 
question of revolutionary strength,   and tae ,io,t careful consideration 
should Je made to deciae wnether ne is *orth rescuing. 
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oelationship of the Revolutionary toward Society 
12, Whether a new member, after giving proof of loyalty by word and deed, 
should be accepted is a .-natter to be decided only by unanimous agreement. 
13. The revolutionary enters the world of the state,   of the classes and of 
so-called culture,  and he lives in this world only because he has faith 
in its speedy and total destruction.    He is not a revolutionary if he 
feels any sympathy for this world.    He must not hesitate to destroy 
any position, any place, or any man in this world—all must be equally 
detested by him.    All the worse for him if he has parents,  friends and 
loved ones;  he is no longer a revolutionary if they can stay his hand. 
Hi.   Aiming at implacable destruction the revolutionary can and sometimes 
must live within society while pretending to be other than what he is. 
A revolutionary must penetrate everywhere, anong the lowest and the 
middle classes and in the houses of commerce,  in the churches,  in the 
oalaces of the aristocracy.    He must know the world of the bureaucrats 
Bd of the military and of literature, and he must enter into the Third 
Division and even into the Winter palaco. 
15. All the members of this filthy society can be split up into several 
categories:     the first cateDory comprises those to be condemned to 
death without delay.    The comrades should compile a list of those to 
be condemned, weighing the relative gravity ef their crimes against 
their value to the revolution;  and the executions should be carried 
out according to the prepared oraer. 
16. in the preparation of these lists and in placing the condemned accord- 
inb to the orepared order, no private sense of outrage should be con- 
sidered, nor is it necessary to pay attention to the hatred provoked 
by these people among the comrades or the people.    But hatred and the 
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sense of outrage must to some extent be made use or, oecause these things 
hel."1 to incite rebellion amon^. the people.    It is necessary to be buided 
only by the relative usefulness of these executions for the sake of the 
revolution.    Above all those who are especially inimical to the revol- 
utionary organization must be destroyed;  their violent and  sudden deaths 
will produce the utmost panic in the government,   it will shake the foun- 
dations of government and deprive it of the services of its most intelli- 
gent and energetic agents. 
17.    The second group consists of those to whom we concede life provisionally 
in order that their bestial behavior snail drive the people to inevitable 
revolt. 
L8.    The third category consists of a multitude of personages or animals 
oistinguished neither for intelligence nor for energy:    those who en- 
joy wealth,  connections,  influence, and power.    These must be exploited 
in every possible way;  they must be implicated and confused;  as far as 
possible their dirty secrets should be found out,   so that we can make 
them our slaves.    Their power, influence,  and connections,  their riches 
and energy will form an inexhaustible treasure and a precious help in 
our various undertakings. 
19. The fourth category is composed of ambitious people and liberals of 
various shades,     tie shall pretend we are following their ideas and 
give them cause to think we are blindly conspiring with them, while 
in fact we take them under our own control.    We shall root out all their 
secrets and compromise them to the uttermost,   so that there will be 
no way out for them and they can be used to create disorder in the state. 
20. The fifth category consists of doctrinaires,  conspirators,  revolution- 
aries:    all idle word-spixlers who orate before meetings or in front 
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of a piece of paper.    They mast be constantly driven forward to make 
violent declarations carefully arranged to agree with our purpose. 
The majority of these will leave nothing behind but a vast ruinj from 
a few of them we shall attain real revolutionary gains. 
21.    The ?ixth category is especially important:    women.    They should be 
divided into three chief divisions.    First:    those frivolous,  thought- 
less and vapid women, whom we shall use as we use the third and fourth 
category of men.    Second:    women who are ardent,  gifted and devoted, 
but do not belong to us because they have not yet achieved a passion- 
less and austere revolutionary understanding:    these must be used like 
the men of the fifth category.    Finally there are the women who are 
comoletely on our side, i.e. those who are wholly dedicated and who 
have accepted our program in its entirety.    VTe should regard these women 
as the most valuable of our treasures; without their help it would be 
imoossible to succeed. 
The Duties of our Society towara the People 
22. The aims of our Society are none other than the entire emancipation 
and happiness of the people, i.e.  the common laborers.    Convinced that 
their emancipation and the achievement of this happiness is brought 
about only by means of an all-destroying popular revolt, we shall see 
that society will employ all its power,  all its resources towards in- 
creasing and intensifying the calamities and evils until their patience 
is exhausted and they will break out in a levee-en-masse. 
23. By a popular revolution,  the Society does not mean a revolution tailored 
according to the classic western model,  a pattern which is fundamentally 
restrained by the existence of property and the traditional social orders 
of so-called   civilization and morality.    Until now such a civilization 
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has cast down one political form only to substitute another,  thereby- 
attempting to bring about a so-called revolutionary state.    The only 
salutory form of revolution is one which destroys the entire  state to 
the roots and exterminates all imperial traditions,  the whole  social 
order and all the existing classes in Russia. 
2li.   fith this end in view the Society refuses to impose any new organiza- 
tion from above.    Any future organization will doubtless work its way 
through the movement and life of the people:    but this is a matter for 
future generations to decide.    Our task is terrible,  total, universal, 
and merciless destruction.     (.   .   .   strashnoe, polnoe, povseraestnoe i 
bezposhchadnoe razrusheniye.) 
25. Therefore,  in drawing closer to the people, we must above all unite 
with those elements of popular life which,   ''rom the very beginning of 
the inroerial power of Muscovy, have never ceased to protest,  not only 
in words but in deeds, against everything directly or indirectly connected 
with the States    against the nobility, against the bureaucracy,  against 
the priests,  against business,  and against the tight fist of the extor- 
tioner.    It must unite with the adventurous tribes of brigands, who 
are the only true revolutionaries of Russia. 
26. To knit the people into a single force which is wholly destructive and 
wholly invincible—such is our organization,  our conspiracy,  and our 
task. 
APPENDICES 
B 
THE LETTER OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF 
"NARQDNATA VOLYA" TO TSAR ALEXANDER III 
Your Majesty: — 
Fully comprehending the sorrow which you are experiencing during these 
oresent moments, the Executive Committee does not, however,  feel it right 
to yield to the impulse of natural delicacy, which demands, perhaps,   a cer- 
tain interval of waiting before the following; explanation should be made. 
There is something higher than the most legitimate emotions of a human being: 
that is one's duty to his native land,  a duty for which every citizen is 
obliged to sacrifice nimself and his own feelings,  and even the feelings of 
others.    In obedience to this primal duty, we hove determined to address 
you at once, without any delay,   since that historical process does not wait, 
7ihich threatens us in the future with rivers of blood and the most violent 
convulsions. 
The bloody tragedy which was playea on the shores of the Ekaterininsky 
Canal, was not accidental, and surprised no one.    After all that has passed 
in the course of the last decade, it was absolutely inevitable, and in this 
lies its profound meaning—a meaning which must be understood by the man 
whom fate has placed at the head of the state power.    To interpret such facts 
as being the evil plots of separate individuals,  or even of a bank of crimi- 
nals, would be possible only to a man who was quite incapable of analysinfc 
the life of nations.    In the course of ten years we have seen how,  notwith- 
standing the most severe persecutions, notwithstanding the fact that the 
bovernment of the late Emueror sacrificed everything, freedom, the interests 
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of all slMWSj the interests of industry and even its own dignity,  every- 
thing, unconditionally,  in its attempt to suppress the revolutionary move- 
ment, that movement has nevertheless tenaciously grown and spread,  attracting 
to itself the best elements of the nation, the most energetic and self-denying 
people of Russia,  and for three years now h»s engaged in desperate, partisan 
warfare with the jjovernment.    You know well, your Majesty,  that it is impossi- 
ble to accuse the government of the lste Emperor of lack of energy.    They 
have hanged our followers,   both guilty and innocent;  they have filled the 
orisons and distant provinces with exiles.    Whole dozens of our leaders have 
been seized and hanged.    They have died with the courage and calmness of 
martyrs, but the movement has not been suppressea, it has grown and gained 
strength.    Yes, your iajesty, the revolutionary movement is not such as to 
depend on individual nersonalities.    It is a function of the national organism, 
ond the gallows, erected to hang the most energetic exponents of that func- 
tion, is as powerless to save this outworn order of life, as was the death 
o:' the Saviour on the cross,  to save tne corrupt,  ancient world from the 
triuniph of reforming Christianity. 
Of course,  the government may continue to arrest and hang a great multi- 
tude of separate individuals.    It may destroy many revolutionary faroups. 
Let us grant that it will destroy even the most important of the existing 
revolutionary organisations.    This will not change the state of affairs in 
the least.    The conditions under which we are living,  the general dissatis- 
Taction of the people, Russia' s aspiration towards a new order of life,  all 
these create revolutionists.    You cannot exterminate the whole Russian people, 
you cannot therefore destroy its discontent by means of reprisals; on the 
contrary, discontent grows thereby.    Tnis is the reason that fresh individuals, 
still more incensed,   still more energetic,  are constantly arising from the 
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ranks of the people in great numbers to take the   >lace of those who are being 
destroyed.    These individuals,  in the interests of the conflict, will of 
course organise themselves, having at hand the ready experience of their 
iredecessors,   and therefore the revolutionary movement in the course of time 
mutt gran stronger, both in   quality and quantity.    This we bars actually 
seen in the last ten years.    What aid the death of the  ;aherents of Dolgushin, 
Tchaikovsky, the agitators of the year lBfh,  avail the government?    The far 
more determined populists arose to take their plo.ce.    The terrible reprisals 
o:" the government called fortn upon the sta&e the terrorists of "78 and '7°. 
In vain did the government exterminate such men as the auherents Kovalsky, 
Dubrovin, Osinsky,   and Lizogub; in vain did it destroy dozens of revolution- 
ary cicles.    From those imoerfect organisations,   by the course of natural 
selection there developed still hardier forms.    There appeared at last the 
Executive Committee, with which the government has not yet been able to cooe. 
Casting a dispassionate glance over the depressing decade through which 
ire have lived, we can accurately foretell the future progress of the movement 
if the political tactics of the government do not change.    The movement must 
go on growing, gaining strengthj terroristic acts will Le repeated in ever 
aore alarming and intensified forms.    A more perfect,  stronger revolutionary 
organization will take the place of the groups that are wiped cut.    In the 
meantime, the numcer of malcontents in the land will increase, popular faith 
in the government will lapse, and the idea of revolution,  of its possibility 
and inevitability, will take root and grow more and more rapidly in Russia. 
A terrible outburst,   a bloody subversion,  a violent revolutionary convulsion 
throughout all Russia, will complete the process of the overthrow of the 
old order. 
What evokes this terrible perspective, wnat is responsiole for it? 
Yes, your Majesty,   a terrible and sad perspective.    Jo not take this for 
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& mere phrase.    We understand better than any one else, how sad is the 
perishin6 o ' so much talent,   such energy, in a labour of destruction, in 
bloody conflicts, when,  under different conditions,  these forces might be 
directly applied to creative work,   to the progress of the people, the 
development of their minds,  and the well-oeing of their national life. 
'.Thence comes this sad necessity for bloody strife? 
From the fact, your Majesty, that there exists among us now no actual 
government, in the true meaning of the word.    A government,  according to its 
fundamental princi le,   should express only the aspirations of the peoole, 
should accomplish only the Will of tne People,    tfhile in Russia, pardon ufl 
for the expression,  the government has degenerated into a veritable  canarilla, 
and deserves to be called a band of usurpers far more than does the Executive 
Committee. 
Whatever may have been the intentions of the Sovereign, the acts of 
the government have had nothing in common with the popular welfare and de- 
sires.    The Imperial Government has subjugated the people to the state of 
bondage, it has delivered the masses into the power of the nobility;  and 
now it is openly creating a pernicious class of speculators and profiteers. 
All its reforms lead to but one result, that the people have sunk into 
ever greater slavery,  into a state of more complete exploitation.    It has 
brought Russia to such a point that at the present time the popular masses 
find themselves in a state of utter beggary and ruin,  not free even at their 
own domentic firesides from the most insulting surveillance, powerless even 
in their own communal village affairs.    Only the  spoiler, the exploiter,  is 
favoured by the protection of the law and the government.    The most revolt- 
ing depredations remain unpunished.    But what a terrible fate awaits the man 
who sincerely thinks and plans for the public welfare'.    You know well, your 
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Majesty, that it is not only the socialists who are exiled and persecuted, 
fhat kind of a government is this,  then, which protects such an "order"? 
Is it not rather a band of rascals,  an absolute usurpation? 
This is the reason why the Russian government has no moral influence, 
no support in the peoplej  this is why Russia gives birth to so many revolu- 
tionists; this is why even such a fact as regicide awakens joy and sympathetic 
approval in an enormous part of the population.    Yes, your Majesty, do not 
deceive yourself with the declarations of fawners and flatterers.    ?.e^.icide 
is very popular in Russia. 
There are two possible escapes from this situation:    either a revolu- 
tion, quite inevitable, which cannot be averted by any number of executions, 
or a voluntary turning to the people on the part of the Supreme Authority. 
In the interests of our native land, in the desire to avoid tnose terrible 
calamities which  always accompany a revolution,  the Executive Co'Pinittee turns 
to your Majesty with the advice to choose the second course.    Believe us 
that as soon as xhe Supreme Authority ceases to be arbitrary, as soon as it 
firmly determines to accomplish only the demands of the nation's consciousness 
and conscience, you may boldly drive out the  spies who defile your govern- 
ment,  send your convoys into their b;.rracks,   and burn the gallows which pre 
deoraving your oeoole.    The Executive Committee itself will cease its ore- 
cent activity,  and the forces organised around it will disperse  and consecrate 
themselves to cultural work for the benefit of their own people.    A peace- 
ful conflict of ideas will take the place of the violence which is more re- 
pugnant to us than to your servants, and which we practise only from sad 
necessity. 
We turn to you casting aside all prejudices,   stifling that distrust, 
which the age-long activity of the government has created.    .Ve forget that 
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you ire the representative of that power which has so deceived the people, 
and done them so much harm.    .Ye address you as a citizen and an honourable 
nan.    ffe hope that the feeling of personal bitterness will not suppress in 
you the recognition of your duties,  and the desire to know the truth.    iVe 
too might be erabittere- .    You have lost your father.     Ye have lost not only 
our fathers, but also our brothers, our wives, our children,  our best friends, 
'ut we are ready to suppress our oersonal feelings if the goou of Russia 
demands it.    And we exoect the  same from you also. 
.Ye do not lay conditions upon you.    Do not be  shocked by our proposi- 
tion.    The conditions which are indispensable in order th.t   the revolution- 
ary .novement whall be  transformed  into  p ac«j[ul activity,  h-.ve been createc, 
not by us, but by history.    Re do not impose them, we only recall them to 
your mind. 
In our opinion there are two  such conditions: 
1.    A general amnesty for all political crimes committed in the 
past, inasmuch as these were not crimes, but the fulfilment of a civic 
duty. 
2.. The convocation of an assembly of representatives of all the 
Russian peoole,  for the purpose of examining the existing forms of 
our state and society, and revising them in accord with the desires 
of the people. 
le consider it necessary to mention, however, thatin order th it the 
legality of the Supreme Authority may be confirmed by popular representation, 
the process of selecting delegates must be absolutely unrestricted.    There- 
fore the elections iijtBt be held under the followin6 conditions: 
1. The deputies must be sent from all ranks and classes alike, 
and in numbers proportionate to the population. 
2. There must be no restrictions imposed upon either the electors 
or the deputies. 
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3.    Electioneering,   and the elections themselves, mist be carried 
out in complete freedom, and therefore the government mu-t crant as a 
temporary measure,  orior to the decision of the popular assamblyi 
a. Complete freedom of the ores , 
b. Complete freedom of  speech, 
c. Complete freedom $£ assembly, 
d. Complete freedom, of electoral pre as. 
This is the only way in which Russia can be restored to a course of 
normal and peaceful development.    We  solemnly declare before our native land 
and all the world,  th t our party will submit unconditionally to the deci- 
sion of a Popular Assembly which shall h ve been chosen in accord with the 
above-mentioned conditions;   and in the future we shall offer no armsd resic- 
tance whatever to a feoverniient that has been sanctioned oy the Popular 
Asse.noiy. 
so, your Majesty,  decide.    Bel'ore you are two courses.    On you 
deoends the choicej we can only ask Fate th-t your reason and conscience 
dictate to you a decision which will conform only to the good of Russia,  to 
your own di0nity,  and to your duty to your native land* 
(Signed)      THE BBCUTIVE CCLIMITTEE. 
March 10 (23), luol. 
